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Abstract
Public-key encryption is one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives.
It is being used for providing confidentiality for communications, data storage
and serving as building blocks for security protocols. Most currently standardised
or deployed public-key encryption systems will be broken by the commencement
of large-scale quantum computers in a foreseeable future. This is because they are
built upon computational problems that are easily solvable by large-scale quantum
computers. Moreover, the demands of new public-key encryption systems that are
suitable for new applications and are robust to more powerful and trickier attacks
keeps increasing. This thesis studies the question of building public-key encryption
schemes upon quantumly hard problems. The contributions of this thesis include
three post-quantum public-key encryption schemes that are provably secure in
well-studied security models without using random oracles. Their security is
based on computational problems on lattices which are conjectured to be hard
even for large-scale quantum computers.
Our first public-key encryption scheme has high expressivity. In particular, the
private decryption keys can be expressed as deterministic push-down automata
with multiple stacks and, hence, deterministic Turing machines. Such automata
have a prior bounded runtime and input length. The ciphertexts of such encryption
scheme can be described by input strings of the automata. Decryption succeeds as
long as the automata (resp. Turing machines) reach accepting states. This result
is the first expressive public-key encryption scheme that supports machines with
additional memory space. Besides this, the scheme has the so-called input-specific
decryption properly meaning that certain ciphertexts make decryption faster
which is rare for existing expressive public-key encryption schemes.
Our second one is a scheme of identity-based encryption, a special type of
expressive public-key encryption. The unique feature of our scheme is that it is
the first fully secure identity-based encryption with tight security reduction that
iii
is not based on quantumly broken assumptions. The security loss in reduction is
independent of the number of adversary’s queries. Our identity-based encryptions
scheme further leads to a digital signature scheme which is the first short digital
signature scheme with tight security reduction without relying on the Diffie-
Hellman type assumptions.
Finally, we show a public-key encryption scheme which is secure against
two strong attacks: adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks and selective opening
attacks. This is the first such scheme which does not rely on quantumly broken
assumptions. We give a tight security reduction in a properly defined and widely
used security model. The security loss of reduction is independent of the number
of decryption queries and the number of challenge ciphertexts. The core of our
construction is the first lattice-based all-but-many lossy trapdoor function.
The security of all our proposed schemes can be ultimately based on a
very versatile computational problem on lattices called the learning-with-errors
problem. Our security reductions use learning with errors problems with various
parameters, which are all believed to be sufficiently hard even under quantum
attacks. Moreover, all our proofs are done in the standard model, i.e., do not
require random oracles.
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1.1 Introduction
Encryption is one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives for ensuring
confidentiality of communications. Encryption also serves as a crucial building
block for many security protocols and systems. There are two types of encryption.
One is secret-key encryption, also known as symmetric-key encryption, which
has been used by human beings for centuries. In a secret-key encryption scheme,
two communication participants, the sender and the receiver, share a secret
information called secret key. The sender encrypts a message into the ciphertext,
and then transmits the ciphertext to the receiver. The receiver applies the same
1
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secret key to decrypt the ciphertext recovering the message. While secret key
encryption usually has very fast implementations, it inherently suffers from key
distribution and key management problems. The other type of encryption is public-
key encryption, also known as asymmetric-key encryption, which was invented by
Diffie and Hellam [DH76]. In public-key encryption, the sender encrypts messages
using the public encryption key, called the public key, of the receiver to obtain
ciphertexts. The receiver uses a secret decryption key, called private key, which
is only known by itself, to decrypt. Public-key encryption alleviates the problem
of key distribution and management and further enables advanced cryptographic
applications, like key establishment protocols and authentication protocols for
the Internet. In this thesis, we are focusing on public-key encryption.
1.1.1 Post-Quantum Challenges
In public-key encryption, a public key and its corresponding private key are
related mathematically. Informally we say that a public-key encryption scheme
is secure if it is “computationally” infeasible to extract the private key from a
known public key, or to get information about the messages from ciphertexts.
This infeasibility usually comes from intractability of certain hard mathematical
problems. So far, most public-key encryption schemes, including the ones that
have been deployed as standards protecting our everyday communications, are
constructed from two classes of hard number-theoretic problems: factoring and
discrete logarithm. These two problems have been studied for a long time. It
appears that for large enough parameters, no efficient algorithms exist within
the classical computational model. However, it was shown by Shor [PW97] that
there are efficient quantum algorithms for solving factoring and discrete logarithm
problems. While no publicly known large-scale quantum computers physically
exist, it is a fact that building full functional quantum computers is being quickly
turned from a theoretic fiction into an engineering problem. Once large-scale
quantum computers are available, our current network communications, which
more or less rely on public-key encryption systems from factoring and discrete
logarithm will be completely insecure! Therefore, building up new public-key
encryption systems upon quantumly hard mathematical problems to replace
existing ones is priority.
Fortunately, there exist many alternative mathematical problems that are
conjectured to be computationally hard even for quantum computers. They
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include computational problems from lattices (e.g., [Ajt96,Reg05]) and coding
theory (e.g., [McE78, Pie12]), the problem of solving multivariate polynomial
equations (e.g., [DS05]), and the problem of finding the isogeny mapping between
two supersingular elliptic curves (e.g., [JDF11]). Among all these alternatives,
certain hard lattice problems, particularly the so-called learning-with-errors (LWE)
problem, appear to be more attractive for designing post-quantum public-key
encryption schemes. The LWE problem is very versatile. It has already been
used to solve “holy grail” cryptographc open problem of constructing efficient
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), and also attribute-based encryption (ABE)
for arbitrary circuits, which we do not know how to achieve from factoring and
discrete logarithm problems. Meanwhile, the LWE problem is an average-case
hard problem as usually required by cryptography. Moreover, solving LWE
problem is no easier than solving all instances of certain hard lattice problems,
which only have essentially exponential-time algorithms after having been studied
for a very long time. This property is well known as the worst-case hardness to
average-case hardness reduction, firstly showen by Ajtai [Ajt96]. Throughout this
thesis, we will be building various public-key encryption systems from the LWE
problem.
1.1.2 Expressive Public-Key Encryption
In traditional public-key encryption, the message sender is allowed to express the
intended recipient by the public key, which, usually, is a meaningless string. In
other words, ciphertexts are addressed by random strings. Such a fact indicates
that traditional encryption scheme does not really provide any expressivity. This
has restricted traditional public-key encryption from being applied to situations
where fine-grained access control on decryption ability is required.
In expressive public-key encryption, ciphertexts can be attached to an expres-
sive description, which meaningfully indicates the decryption requirements or
capability. Of course expressivity does not come for free. A third trusted party
called an authority is needed for generating a global public key and issuing private
keys to users. Significant improvements on expressivity of expressive public-key
encryption have been made since its invention. The first and simplest expressive
public-key encryption is identity-based encryption (IBE) [Sha85,BF01] in which
ciphertexts are described by recipients’ unique and meaningful identifiers, e.g.,
email addresses or drivers’ licences. To decrypt ciphertexts, recipients who have
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the matched identifiers get decryption keys from the authority with respect to
their unique identifiers. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a more general
type of expressive encryption. Another popular example of expressive public-
key encryption is attribute-based encryption. In ABE systems, a messages is
encrypted with a string x indicating attributes of the ciphertext (of the message),
a decryption key is specified by a predicate P (·) defined over an attribute set.
Decryption succeeds iff P (x) = 1.
ABE is particularly suitable for sharing data through the “cloud”. With a
proper ABE scheme, the data owner just needs to use an attribute string to
enforce decryption constraints during encryption (without specifying receivers
individually). The encrypted data is then stored in the “cloud” and the data
owner can be off-line. Any user who has a private key satisfying the decryption
policy will be able to decrypt. (The authority will reject any private key requests
on illegitimate predicates.)
The major research problem on expressive public-key encryption or attribute-
based encryption is to increase the expressivity to make the predicate P support
broader classes of functions or different computational models. Another very
important research problem is to increase the decryption efficiency for expressive
public-key encryption systems. The problem comes from the fact that in almost
all existing systems, evaluating the predicate P on arguments x takes most of
the total decryption, and this process always has worst-case runtime, regardless
of the content of x, since it is generally hard to make on-line optimisations from
the cryptographic representations of x.
1.1.3 Selective-Opening Security for Public-Key Encryp-
tion
The first rigorous security definition for public-key encryption, namely semantic
security, was given by Goldwasser and Micali [GM84]. Such a definition only
captures security under passive attacks, say eavesdropping. Public-key encryption
schemes satisfying this definition are able to ensure that passive attackers cannot
extract any useful information from ciphertexts. Another security definition,
known as indistinguishability against adaptively chosen-ciphertext attacks, cap-
tures the intuition that an active attacker cannot extract any useful information
from a particular ciphertext, even if it is able to arbitrarily ask for the decryption
of any other ciphertexts. This security definition is widely accepted as the “cor-
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rect” one for public-key encryption. Meeting this security definition is generally
required in practice.
However, the above security definitions only consider a situation where attacks
are conducted toward a single target, one challenge ciphertext, which is not often
the case in the real-world situation. In the real world, more trickier active attacks
could be conducted against multiple targets at once. It turns out that there do
exist many powerful but also realistic attacks which are strictly stronger than
the attacks considered by the above traditional single-challenge definitions. In
this thesis, we will consider one of such practically viable attacks, called selective-
opening attack. So far the question of constructing adaptively chosen-ciphertext
and selective-opening secure public-key encryption schemes that do not rely on
quantumly broken assumptions remains open.
1.1.4 The Tightness of Reductions
The reductionist approach to cryptographic security algorithms seeks to prove
theorems along the lines of: “If a t-time adversary attacks the scheme with
successful probability , then a t′-time algorithm can be constructed to break
some computational problem with success probability ′ = /θ and the time
t′ = k · t+ o(t).”. The parameters θ ≥ 1 and k ≥ 1, or more simply the product
k·θ, measures how tightly the security of the cryptographic scheme is related to the
hardness of the underlying computational problem. Alternatively, when k ≈ 1 as is
the case in many reductions, θ measures the security loss of the security reduction
of our cryptographic scheme from the underlying assumption. A cryptographic
scheme is tightly secure if θ is a polynomial in the security parameter that in
particular does not depend on parameters under the adversary’s control.
Tight reduction is an elegant notion from a theoretical point of view. A tight
reductionist proof (with respect to a well-defined security model) indicates that
the security of a cryptographic scheme is closely related to the hardness of the
underlying hard problem, which is the optimal case we expect from provable
security theory. On the other hand, it is also a determinant factor to the
practicality of real-world security. Its opposite, loose security, means that in order
to realise a desired “real” target security level, one has to increase the “apparent”
security level inside the construction to compensate for the loose reduction. This
inflates the size of data atoms by some polynomial, which in turn increases the
running time of cryptographic operations by another polynomial, combining
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multiplicatively.
In practice, adaptive chosen-ciphertext security for public-key encryption
schemes is often needed. Also the situation where the adversary is targeting
multiple ciphertexts, which can be captured by the multi-challenge security
models, should be considered. From a theoretical point of view, this might
not be problematic. A number of public-key encryption schemes than meet
the traditional indistinguishability against adaptively chosen-ciphertext attacks
would be also secure in the multi-challenge case, because in the provable security
framework, the ciphertexts is “polynomially bounded”, polynomial-time security
reductions for the single-challenge setting give, by a simple hybrid argument,
polynomial-time security reductions for the multi-challenge setting. In practice,
such generic reductions are indeed problematic if the security reductions are
not tight. An adversary would ask for many decryption queries and challenge
ciphertexts, making the security reduction very loose. Consequently, prohibitively
large parameters have to be chosen to compensate such loose reductions. Therefore,
getting tight reductions that are independent of the number of decryption queries
and challenge ciphertexts, or, more generally, any adversarial queries is very
important.
There have already been some public-key encryption schemes with tight secu-
rity from traditional, standard, but quantumly broken computational problems
with respect to standard security models. For instance, there are public-key
encryption schemes with tight reductions that are independent of the number
of decryption queries and challenge ciphertexts with (e.g. [HJ12]) or without
(e.g., [GHKW16]) bilinear pairings, and tightly secure identity-based encryption
schemes under linear assumptions using bilinear pairings (e.g., [CW13,HKS15]).
However, achieving such goals from post-quantum computational problems re-
mains an open area.
1.2 Research Objectives
This thesis aims for the following three main research objectives that are drawn
from the above discussions.
• Constructing new post-quantum public-key encryption schemes which have
high expressivity on private decryption keys and ciphertexts, and provable
security in well-studied and well-understood security models.
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• Improving the security reduction of existing expressive post-quantum public-
key encryption schemes in well-studied and well-understood security models.
• Constructing post-quantum public-key encryption schemes that are provably
secure against non-traditionally strong and tricky attacks, particularly, the
selective-opening attacks and chosen-ciphertext attacks.
1.3 Research Outcomes
Our research addresses all these research objectives. The research objectives are
accomplished by our research outcomes which are summarized as follows.
1. We propose a new expressive public-key encryption scheme. Private keys can
be expressively described as multi-stack deterministic push-down automata.
Such automata have a-priori bounded polynomial (in the security parameter)
runtime and input length. Each ciphertext is described by an input string
(with length less than the polynomial bound). Decryption succeeds iff the
automaton accepts the input string. The security of our attribute-based
encryption scheme in the selective security model is provably reduced to
the hardness of the LWE problem.
This scheme is the first attribute-based encryption scheme for automata
with additional memory space. It also enjoys an input-specific decryption
property meaning that decryption algorithm’s runtime varies for different
attribute strings. This is in contrast to most attribute-based encryption
schemes where the decryption algorithms always process whole attribute
strings, even when not necessary, resulting in (always) worst-case runtime.
This outcome has resulted in two published papers [BL15,BL16b].
2. We present a new fully (adaptively) secure identity-based encryption scheme
uniquely featuring tight security reduction without relying on any quantumly
broken assumptions, e.g., factoring or discrete-log assumptions. The security
of the scheme can be tightly reduced to the security of the LWE problem
and the security of a concrete instantiated pseudo-random function, which
can be based on the LWE problem as well.
The scheme is the first tightly secure identity-based encryption scheme from
lattice assumptions, which improves greatly upon existing fully secure lattice
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identity-based encryption schemes [ABB10, CHKP12]. As a by-product,
our identity-based encryption scheme also gives the first fully secure “short”
lattice signature scheme without random oracles, which solves an open
problem left by Blazy et al. [BKKP15].
This outcome has resulted in a publication [BL16a].
3. We show a construction of the first adaptively chosen-ciphertext secure
public-key encryption scheme against selective-opening attacks without
relying on any quantumly broken assumptions. To that end, we construct
the first all-but-many (lossy) trapdoor function from lattices. A notable
feature of our public-key encryption scheme is that it has tight security
reduction from the LWE problem in the multi-challenge setting.
This research outcome gives a solution to the problems proposed by Hofhienz
[Hof12] and Peikert and Alperin-Sheriff [ASP12] of constructing all-but-
many (lossy) trapdoor functions from the LWE assumption. It is also the
first adaptively chosen-ciphertext secure public-key encryption scheme with
tight security reduction (independent of number of decryption queries and
challenge ciphertexts) in the standard model, from quantum-safe assump-
tions. It provides an alternative solution to the problem, firstly answered
by Gay et al. [GHKW16], of constructing pairing-free public-key encryption
schemes with tight reductions under adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attacks in
the multi-challenge setting.
This research outcome has resulted in a peer-reviewed research paper titled
“All-But-Many Lossy Trapdoor Functions from Lattices and Applications”
which has been accepted to the 37th International Cryptology Conference
(CRYPTO 2017).
We emphasize that the security of all our proposed schemes can be ultimately
and solely based on LWE assumptions (with various parameters), which are
conjectured to be quantumly safe, and all our security proofs are done in the
standard model, i.e., without random oracles.
1.4 Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
1.4. Outline 9
• Chapter 2 provides mathematical background that is necessary for remaining
chapters, including notations, basic cryptographic concepts, useful facts of
lattices and lattice-based cryptography, and definitions of two cryptographic
primitives: pseudo-random functions and chameleon hash functions.
• Chapter 3 presents our expressive attribute-based encryption scheme from
the LWE assumption.
• Chapter 4 describes our tightly and adaptively secure identity-based en-
cryption and the tightly secure short lattice signature scheme.
• Chapter 5 firstly shows a construction of all-but-many (lossy) trapdoor
function from the LWE assumption. Then the tightly secure public-key en-
cryption scheme against adaptively chosen-ciphertext attacks and selective-
opening attacks is derived from it.
• Chapter 6 concludes by summarising the contributions of this research and
discussing future works.
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In this chapter, necessary mathematics background including notations, com-
putational assumptions, and the notion of pseudo-random functions are provided.
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2.1 Notations and Basic Concepts
Throughout this thesis, we let ‘PPT’ abbreviate “probabilistic polynomial-time”.
If S is a set, we denote by a
$←− S the uniform sampling of a random element of S.
Let D be some distribution and we denote by X ∼ D that X has distribution D.
For a positive integer n, we denote by [n] the set of positive integers no greater
than n. We use bold lowercase letters (e.g. a) to denote vectors and bold capital
letters (e.g. A) to denote matrices. For a positive integer q ≥ 2, let Zq be the
ring of integers modulo q. We denote the group of n × m matrices in Zq by
Zn×mq . Vectors are treated as column vectors. The transpose of a vector a (resp.
a matrix A) is denoted by at (resp. At). For A ∈ Zn×mq and B ∈ Zn×m′q , let
[A|B] ∈ Zn×(m+m′)q be the concatenation of A and B. The inner product of two
vectors x and y is written 〈x,y〉.
We use standard asymptotic notions: O(·),Ω(·),Θ(·), ω(·), o(·) etc. In addition,
tildes (e.g., O˜(·)) are used to hide logarithmic factors in the main parameters.
Matrix Norm. We need the following norms for vectors and matrices through-
out this thesis.
• For a vector a, we denote its Euclidean norm by ‖a‖.
• We use ‖R‖ to denote the Euclidean norm of the longest column of R.
• We use ‖R‖GS to denote ‖R′‖ where R′ is the result of applying the Gram-
Schmidt transformation to R’s columns.
• We refer to s1(R) = supx∈Rm+1 ‖R · x‖ as the spectral norm of R. For
matrices X and Y, we have s1(XY) ≤ s1(X) · s1(Y).
We will be using the following lemma which is a direct consequence of Brent
and McKay’s Theorem 1.1 [BM87].
Lemma 2.1.1. Let integer n ≥ 2, prime q ≥ 2. A randomly sampled Zn×2nq -
matrix H has at least n linearly independent columns, i.e., H has rank n, with
all but negligible probability in n.
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Proof. By the Theorem 1.1 of [BM87] the probability that H has rank n is
n∏
i=1
(1− 1
qn+i
) ≥ (1− 1
qn+1
)n
≥ 1− n · q−(n+1)
≥ 1− negl(n)
as required.
Negligible Function. For a parameter λ, we say a function negl(λ) is negligible
in λ if it is smaller than all polynomial fractions for a sufficiently large λ.
Indistinguishable Ensembles. Let X and Y be two random variables over
some finite set S, the statistical distance between X and Y , denoted as ∆(X, Y ),
is defined as
∆(X, Y ) =
1
2
∑
s∈S
|Pr[X = s]− Pr[Y = s]|.
Let {Xλ} and {Yλ} be ensembles of random variables indexed by the security
parameter λ. We say {Xλ} and {Yλ} are statistically indistinguishable (or close)
if
∆(Xλ, Yλ) = negl(λ).
We say {Xλ} and {Yλ} are computationally indistinguishable if∣∣Pr[A(1λ, Xλ) = 1]− Pr[A(1λ, Yλ) = 1]∣∣ = negl(λ)
for every PPT algorithm A.
2.2 Randomness Extractor
The min-entropy of a random variable X over a set S is defined as
H∞(X) = − log(max
s∈S
Pr[X = s]).
The average min-entropy of a random variable X given Y is defined as
H˜∞(X|Y ) = − log
(
Ey←Y
[
2−H∞(X|Y=y)
])
14 Chapter 2. Background
Lemma 2.2.1 ([PW11, Lemma 2.1]). If Y takes at most 2r possible values and
X is any random variable, then
H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ H∞(X)− r.
Definition 2.2.1 (Universal Hash Functions). A family of functions UH = {UH :
X → Y} is called a family of universal hash functions if, for all x, x′ ∈ X , with
x 6= x′, we have Pr[UH(x) = UH(x′)] ≤ 1|X | .
Lemma 2.2.2 ([PW11, Lemma 2.2]). Let X, Y be random variables such that
X ∈ {0, 1}n and H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ k. Let UH be a family of universal hash functions
from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}` where ` ≤ k − 2 log(1/). It holds that for UH $←− UH and
r
$←− {0, 1}`, ∆ ((UH,UH(X), Y ), (UH, r, Y )) ≤ .
Corollary 2.2.1. Let q > 2,  > 0. Let UH = {UHh : {0, 1}` → Zq} be a
family of hash functions where ` ≥ log(q/(2)), y = UHh(x) =
∑`
i=1 hixi mod
q for x = x1 . . . x` ∈ {0, 1}`, h = h1 . . . h` $←− Z`q . Let r $←− Zq; we have
∆((UHh,UHh(x)), (UHh, r)) ≤ .
Proof. It is easy to see that for different inputs x and x′, and h $←− Z`q, UHh(x) =
UHh(x
′) happens with probability 1/q. So UH is a family of universal hash
functions. Applying Lemma 2.2.2 concludes the proof.
We also need the following generalised leftover-hash lemma.
Lemma 2.2.3 ([ABB10, Lemma 4]). Suppose that m > (n+ 1) log q + ω(log n)
and that q > 2 is prime. Let R be an m×k matrix chosen uniformly in {1,−1}m×k
mod q where k = k(n) is polynomial in n. Let A and B be matrices chosen
uniformly in Zn×mq and Zn×kq respectively. Then, for all vectors w ∈ Zmq , the
distribution (A,AR,R>w) is statistically close to the distribution (A,B,R>w).
2.3 Lattices
2.3.1 Definitions
Definition 2.3.1. Let B = [b1| . . . |bm] ∈ (Rm)m of linearly independent vectors.
The lattice generated by the basis B is defined as
Λ =
{
y ∈ Rm : ∃si ∈ Z, y =
m∑
i=1
sibi
}
.
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The dual lattice Λ∗ of Λ is defined as
Λ∗ = {z ∈ Rm : ∀y ∈ Λ, 〈z,y〉 ∈ Z} .
In this thesis, we particularly focus on q-ary lattices.
Definition 2.3.2 (q-ary Lattice). For q prime, A ∈ Zn×mq and u ∈ Znq , we define
two m-dimensional lattices as
Λq(A) =
{
y ∈ Zmq : ∃s ∈ Znq s.t. yt = stA (mod q)
}
Λ⊥q (A) = {y ∈ Zm : Ay = 0 (mod q)}
Notice that Λq(A) and Λ
⊥
q (A) are dual in the sense that Λq(A) = q · Λ⊥q (A)∗
and Λ⊥q (A) = q · Λq(A)∗. We also define a “shifted lattice” of Λ⊥q (A) with
syndrome u ∈ Znq as Λuq (A) = {y ∈ Zm : Ay = u (mod q)}.
2.3.2 Lattice Trapdoor and Discrete Gaussians
It has been shown by Ajtai [Ajt96] and Micciancio and Peikert [MP12] that how
to sample a “nearly” uniform random matrix A ∈ Zn×m along with a trapdoor
matrix TA ∈ Zm×m which is a short or low-norm basis of the induced lattice
Λ⊥q (A). We refer to this procedure as TrapGen.
Lemma 2.3.1. There is a PPT algorithm TrapGen that takes as input integers
n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2 and a sufficiently large m = O(n log q), outputs a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq
and a trapdoor matrix TA ∈ Zm×m, such that A · TA = 0, the distribution
of A is statistically close to the uniform distribution over Zn×mq and ‖TA‖GS ≤
O(
√
n log q).
Discrete Gaussians. Let m ∈ Z>0 be a positive integer and Λ ⊂ Zm. For any
real vector c ∈ Rm and positive parameter σ ∈ R>0, let the Gaussian function
ρσ,c(x) = exp
(−pi‖x− c‖2/σ2)
on Rm with center c and parameter σ. Define the discrete Gaussian distribution
over Λ with center c and parameter σ as
DΛ,σ =
ρσ,c(y)
ρσ(Λ)
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for ∀y ∈ Λ, where ρσ(Λ) =
∑
x∈Λ ρσ,c(x). For notational convenience, ρσ,0 and
DΛ,σ,0 are abbreviated as ρσ and DΛ,σ.
The following lemmas show bounds of the Euclidean norm of Gaussian vectors
and spectral norm of Gaussian matrices.
Lemma 2.3.2 ([MR07]). For any lattice Λ of integer dimension m with basis T,
c ∈ Rm and Gaussian parameter σ ≥ ‖T‖GS · ω(
√
logm), we have Pr[‖x− c‖ >
σ
√
m : x← DΛ,σ,c] ≤ negl(n).
Lemma 2.3.3 ([BKPW12, Lemma 5.1]). Let h > 0, w > 0 be integers and σ > 0
be Gaussian parameter. For R← Dh×wZ,σ , we have s1(R) ≤ σ ·O(
√
h+
√
w) with
all but probability 2−Ω(h+w).
Smoothing Parameter. We recall the very important notion of smoothing
parameter of a lattice Λ. It is the smallest value of s such that the discrete
Gaussian DΛ,s “behaves” like a continuous Gaussian.
Definition 2.3.3 ([MR07]). For any lattice Λ and positive real  > 0, the
smoothing parameter η(Λ) is the smallest real s > 0 such that ρ1/s(Λ
∗ \ {0}) < .
We recall the following important lemmas established from this nothing of
smoothing parameter which is crucial for the security of our encryption schemes.
Lemma 2.3.4 ([GPV08,BKPW12]). For prime q and integer b ≥ 2, let m ≥
n logb q + ω(log n). With overwhelming probability over the uniformly random
choice of A ∈ Zn×mq , the following holds: for r← DmZ,b·ω(√logn), the distribution
of Ar is statistically close to the uniform distribution over Znq .
Lemma 2.3.5 ([Reg05, Special case of Corollary 3.10]). Let r ∈ Zm be a vector
and r, s > 0 be reals. Assume that 1/
√
1/r2 + (‖r‖/s)2 ≥ η(Zm) for some  <
1/2. Let y be a vector with distribution DZm,r and e be a scalar with distribution
DZ,s. The distribution of 〈r,y〉+ e is statistically close to DZ,√(r‖r‖)2+s2 .
2.3.3 Lattice Sampling Algorithms
Our constructions make use of Boyen et al.’s “two-sided trapdoor” framework
from [ABB10,Boy10] which consists of two sampling algorithms SampleLeft and
SampleRight.
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Theorem 2.3.1 ([ABB10, Theorem 3]). Let q > 2, m > n and σ > ‖TA‖GS ·
ω(
√
log(m+m1)). There is an algorithm SampleLeft(A,B,TA,u, σ) that takes
as input a full-rank matrix A with short basis TA of Λ
⊥
q (A), a matrix B ∈ Zn×m1q ,
a vector u ∈ Znq , and a Gaussian parameter σ, outputs a vector d ∈ Zm+m1
distributed statistically close to DΛuq (F),σ for F = [A|B].
Theorem 2.3.2 ([ABB10, Theorem 4]). Let q > 2, m > n, and σ > ‖TB‖GS ·
s1(R) · ω(
√
logm). There is an algorithm SampleRight(A,B,R,TB,u, σ) that
takes as input matrices A ∈ Zn×kq , R ∈ Zk×m, a full-rank matrix B with a short
basis of Λ⊥q (B), a vector u ∈ Znq , and a Gaussian parameter σ, and outputs a
vector d ∈ Zm+k distributed statistically close to DΛuq (F),σ for F = [A|AR + B].
For notational simplicity, we state the following direct corollary from algorithm
SampleLeft and Lemma 2.3.4.
Lemma 2.3.6 ([ABB10,CHKP12]). Let integers n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, and m =
O(n log q). Let F = [A1|A2| . . . |A`] be a matrices concatenation of Ai ∈ Zn×mq
where ` = `(n), and Ti ∈ Zm×m be the trapdoor basis of Ai satisfying ‖Ti‖GS ≤
O(
√
n log q). Let ‖T‖GS be the largest norm of the Gram-Schmidt orthogonal-
ization of all Ti. There is a PPT algorithm SampleExtend that takes as input
the matrix F = [A1|A2| . . . |A`], a trapdoor basis Ti, a matrix U $←− Zn×kq
where k = k(n) and the Gaussian parameter σ ≥ ‖T‖GS · ω(
√
log (`m)), outputs
R ∈ ΛUq (F) from a distribution statistically close to DΛUq (F),σ. Moreover, the
following two distributions of the tuple (F,R,U):
{
F ∈ (Zn×mq )`,D← (DZm,σ)k,U← FD (mod q)
}
and {
F ∈ (Zn×mq )`,U $←− Zn×kq ,D← SampleExtend
}
are statistically close.
2.4 Computational Assumptions
The cryptographic schemes in this thesis are based on the average-case hardness
of two conservative lattice computational assumptions: the learning with errors
(LWE) assumption and the short integer solution (SIS) assumption.
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2.4.1 Learning with Errors and Variants
Learning with Errors Problem.
Definition 2.4.1 (Decision LWE). Let n and q be positive integers. Let χ be a
distribution over Zq. Let s
$←− Znq be a secret vector. Define the following oracles :
• Os: samples a $←− Znq , e← χ; returns (a, 〈s, a〉+ e mod q).
• O$: samples a $←− Znq , b $←− Zq; returns (a, b).
The decision LWE problem, denote LWEn,q,χ, asks to distinguish between Os and
O$. For an algorithm A, define the advantage in the security parameter λ as
Adv
LWEn,q,χ
A (λ) =
∣∣Pr[AOs(1λ) = 1]− Pr[AO$(1λ) = 1]∣∣
Hardness of LWE. The decison LWEn,q,χ problem appears to be hard (even
for quantum computers). One the one hand, it has successfully withstood various
cryptanalysis. The state-of-art solving algorithms have essentially exponential
time in n. On the other hand, as an average-case problem, the LWE problem
enjoys the so-called worst-case to average-case reduction from classic lattices
problems. Let χ take discrete Gaussian distribution DZ,αq where αq ≥ 2
√
n.
Regev [Reg05] showed that solving a random instance of decisional LWEn,q,χ
problem with q = poly(n) is as hard as quantumly solving GapSVP problem
and SIVP problem with approximation factor O˜(n/α) on arbitrary n-dimensional
lattice. Peikert [Pei09] showed that for exponential q > 2n/2, solving GapSVP with
approximation factor O˜(n/α) on arbitrary n-dimensional lattice can be reduced
to solving decisional LWEn,q,χ problem. Brakerski et al. [BLP
+13] gave another
similar classic reduction from GapSVP problem on arbitrary n2-dimensional lattice
to the LWEn,q,χ problem for q = poly(n).
Some Variants of LWE. It turns out, as shown by Applebaum et al. [ACPS09]
that the decision LWE problem remains hard if the coordinates of s are inde-
pendently sampled from the distribution χ. Such a variant is known as the
normal-form decision LWE problem.
Definition 2.4.2 (Normal-form LWE). Let n, q be positive integers. Let χ be
be a distribution over Zq. Let s← χn be a secret vector. Define two oracles:
• Os: samples a $←− Znq , e← χ; returns (a, 〈s, a〉+ e mod q).
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• O$: samples a $←− Znq , b $←− Zq; returns (a, b).
The normal form of the LWEn,q,χ problem asks to distinguish between Os and O$.
For an algorithm A, define the advantage in the security parameter λ as
Adv
LWEn,q,χ
NF,A (λ) =
∣∣Pr[AOs(1λ) = 1]− Pr[AO$(1λ) = 1]∣∣
Lemma 2.4.1 ([ACPS09, Lemma 2]). Let n, q, χ be defined as above. Let λ be
the security parameter. If there exists an algorithm A that solves the normal form
of LWEn,q,χ problem with advantage Adv
LWEn,q,χ
NFA (λ), there exists an algorithm B
for LWEn,q,χ problem, which uses slightly larger number of samples than A and
has roughly the same runtime as A, such that AdvLWEn,q,χB (λ) = AdvLWEn,q,χNF,A (λ).
We also consider the normal-form LWE problem that uses matrices instead of
vectors as secrets.
Definition 2.4.3. Let n, q, h be positive integers. Let χ be be a distribution
over Zq. Let S← χn×h be a secret vector. Define two oracles:
• OS: samples a $←− Znq , e← χh; returns (a,Sta + et mod q).
• O$: samples a $←− Znq , b $←− Zhq ; returns (a,b).
The normal form of the LWEn,q,χ problem with matrix secret asks to distinguish
between OS and O$. For an algorithm A, define the advantage in the security
parameter λ as
Adv
LWEn,h,q,χ
NF,A (λ) =
∣∣Pr[AOS(1λ) = 1]− Pr[AO$(1λ) = 1]∣∣
By a standard hybrid argument the LWEn,h,q,χ problem is equivalent (up to
a factor of h of security loss) to the LWEn,q,χ problem, as shown by Peikert and
Waters [PW11, Lemma 6.2].
Lemma 2.4.2. Let λ be a security parameter. Assume n, q ≥ 2,h ≥ 1, all
polynomials in λ. Let χ be the noise distribution over Zq. For every PPT
adversary A against LWEn,h,q,χ, there exists a PPT adversary B against LWEn,q,χ
where
Adv
LWEn,h,q,χ
NF,A (λ) ≤ h · AdvLWEn,q,χNF,B (λ)
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2.4.2 The Short-Integer-Solution Assumption
The short-integer-solution (SIS) problem was firstly studied by Ajtai [Ajt96]. It
is a basis of a number of lattice signature schemes.
Definition 2.4.4. For a security parameter λ, let n = n(λ), m = m(λ), and
β = β(λ). Let q be a prime integer. The short-integer-solution problem SISn,q,β,m
is as follows. Given a uniform random matrix A
$←− Zn×mq , find a non-zero vector
e ∈ Zm such that Ae = 0 (mod q) and ‖e‖ ≤ β. We define the advantage
(function of the security parameter λ) of an algorithm A in solving the SISn,q,β,m
problem as
Adv
SISn,q,β,m
A (λ) =
 Ae = 0 (mod q)and ‖e‖ ≤ β,
and e 6= 0.
:
A
$←− Zn×mq
e← A(1λ,A)

We say the (t, SIS)-SISn,q,β,m assumption holds if no t-time algorithm A has
advantage at least SIS in solving the SISn,q,β,m problem.
The SIS problem is very consevative and also enjoys the worst-case to average-
case reduction. For instance, it has been shown by Gentry et al. [GPV08] that
solving the average-case instances of the SISn,q,β,m problem for m,β = poly(n),
q ≥ β ·ω(√n log n) is as hard as solving SIVP problem on arbitrary n-dimensional
lattice with approximation factor β · O˜(√n).
2.5 Gadget Matrices and Fully Homomorphic
Evaluation
2.5.1 Gadget Matrices
The notion of “gadget matrix” in the context of lattice-based cryptography was
firstly explicitly defined by Micciancio and Peikert [MP12]. It plays a central role
in lattice-based cryptography. A gadget matrix defines an “easy lattice” in the
sense that there is a publicly known trapdoor such that certain computational
problems on such lattice are easily solvable.
Let n ≥ 2, q ≥ 2 be a prime, b ≥ 2 be a constant, and w = dlogb qe. Let G∗
be the primitive gadget matrix defined as G∗ = In ⊗ [1, b, b2, . . . , bw−1] ∈ Zn×nwq .
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Lemma 2.5.1 ([MP12, Theorem 1]). The lattice Λ⊥q (G
∗) has a publicly known
trapdoor basis TG∗ ∈ Znw×nw, which has Gram-Schmidt norm ‖TG∗‖GS ≤√
b2 + 1.
Lemma 2.5.2 ([BGG+14, Lemma 2.1]). Let m ≥ nw and G = [G∗|0] ∈ Zn×mq ;
that is, G is obtained by appending the proper number of zero columns to the
right of G∗. There is a deterministic algorithm, denoted G−1(·) : Zn×mq → Zm×m,
that takes any matrix A ∈ Zn×mq as input, and outputs the preimage G−1(A)
of A such that G ·G−1(A) = A (mod q) and ‖G−1(A)‖ ≤ (b − 1)√m and
s1 (G
−1(A)) ≤ (b− 1)m.
2.5.2 Gadget Trapdoors
Peikert and Micciancio [MP12] showed how to use gadget matrices to construct
lattice trapdoor functions. Let m¯ = m − knw ≥ n logb q + ω(log n) form some
integers m and k ≥ 1. Let A¯ ∈ Zn×m¯q which has a distribution that is either
statistically close to or computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distri-
bution over Zn×m¯q . Set a gadget matrix G = Ikn ⊗ [1, b, b2, . . . , bw−1] ∈ Zkn×knwq .
Define a trapdoored matrix A =
[
A¯|A¯R + HG] ∈ Zmq where H ∈ Zn×knq has
rank n. In their work [MP12], it has been shown that for “short” inputs, the
LWE function defined by the matrix A is efficiently invertible. The following
lemma states this fact.
Lemma 2.5.3 ([BKPW11, Lemma 5.3]). Let A ∈ Zn×m¯q , R ∈ Zm¯×2nw. Let
H ∈ Zn×2nwq with rank n. Let Gˆ ∈ Z2n×2nwq be the gadget matrix. For
yt = gF(x) = x
t
[
Im
F
]
= xt1 + x
t
2 · F mod q
where F = [A|AR + HGˆ], there is a PPT algorithm Invert(F,R,H,y) that
outputs x with overwhelming probability if ‖x1‖ ≤ q/Θ(b · s1(R)).
Here we adjust the dimensions of the gadget matrix specially for our construc-
tions in Chapter 5.
2.5.3 Fully Homomorphic Evaluation
We will use the fully homomorphic evaluation algorithms, which were developed
previousely [GSW13,BV14,BGG+14] in the context of fully homomorphic encryp-
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tion and attribute-based encryption for circuits, to evaluate (strong and weak)
PRFs.
We firstly consider an evaluation algorithm for arbitrary fan-in-2 Boolean
circuits with a-priori bounded depth. Let parameters n,m, q be defined as in
Lemma 2.3.4. Let C : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} be a fan-in-2 Boolean NAND circuit with
depth d. Assume x = x1x2 . . . x` ∈ {0, 1}` is an ` bits input of C. Let A ∈ Zn×mq
and Ri ∼ Dm×nwZ,b·ω(√logn). Let G ∈ Zn×nwq be the gadget matrix where w = dlogb qe.
We make a set of ` matrices {Ai = ARi + xiG}i∈[`] that correspond to ` input
wires of C. The generic evaluation algorithm [GSW13] takes {Ai}i∈[`] as input
and computes a unique matrix AC ∈ Zn×nwq which corresponds to the output wire
of C. This is done by inductively evaluating each NAND gate. More specifically,
Let g(u, v;w) be a NAND gate in C with input wires u, v and output wire w. Let
Au = ARu + xuG and Av = ARv + xvG be two (public) matrices associated
with u, v where xu, xv are input bits for u and v respectively. The algorithm
computes
Aw = G−Au ·G−1(Av) (2.1)
= G− (ARu + xuG) ·G−1(ARv + xvG)
= ARg + (1− xuxv)G
where 1 − xuxv = NAND(xu, xv), and Rg = −Ru · G−1(Av) − xuRv has low-
norm if Ru,Rv have low-norm. Finally, the algorithm will output a matrix
AC = ARC + C(x1, x2, . . . , x`)G where RC which depends on {Ri}i∈[`] has
(reasonably) low norm, and C(x1, x2, . . . , x`) ∈ {0, 1} is the output of C with
input x = x1x2 . . . x`. Assume the norm of Ri is bounded by some polynomial
poly(n) (recall Ri has low norm as it has Gaussian distribution). The above
evaluation process results in RC with norm bounded by poly(n)
d. Unfortunately,
this is not always satisfiable in some settings.
By observing that the norm of RC in above evaluation process is accumulated
in an asymmetric way, Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan devised a variant evaluation
algorithm which leads to asymptotically much slower norm accumulation. The
following lemma follows directly from the Claim 3.4.2, the Lemma 3.6, and
Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan’s Theorem 3.5 [BV14].
Lemma 2.5.4. Let C : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} be a NAND Boolean circuit with depth
d. Let {Ai = ARi + xiG ∈ Zn×nwq }i∈[`] be ` matrices correspond to each input
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wire of C where A
$←− Zn×mq , Ri ← Dm×nwZ,b·ω(√logn), xi ∈ {0, 1} and G ∈ Zn×nwq is
the gadget matrix. There is an efficient deterministic algorithm EvalBV that takes
as input C and {Ai}i∈[`] and outputs a matrix AC = ARC + C(x1, . . . , x`)G =
EvalBV(C,A1, . . . ,A`) where RC ∈ Zm×nw, and C(x1, . . . , x`) is the output of C
on the arguments x1, . . . , x`. EvalBV runs in time poly(4
d, `, n, log q).
Let s1 (Rmax) = max {s1 (Ri)}i∈[`], nw ≤ m, the spectral norm of RC can be
bounded, with overwhelming probability, by
s1 (RC) ≤ O(L · s1 (Rmax) ·m)
≤ O(L · b ·O(√m) ·m)
≤ O(4d ·m3/2)
where L is the length of the width-5 branching program which simulates C and
s1 (Ri) ≤ b ·O(
√
m) for i ∈ [`] with overwhelming probability, by Lemma 2.3.3.
Particularly, if C has depth d = η log ` for some constant η, i.e. C is in NC1,
we have L = 4d = `2η and s1 (RC) ≤ O(4d ·m3/2) = O(`2η ·m3/2).
Remark 2.5.1. For technical reasons we will use gadget matrices with different
dimensions in our encryption schemes. This will not affect the correctness of the
general evaluation algorithm and the EvalBV algorithm as long as the width of
the low-norm R matrices is adjusted accordingly.
Throughout this thesis, we will be using the following three gadget matrices
which are direct (dimensional) extension of the primitive gadget matrix. The
first one is the matrix G =
[
In ⊗ [1, 2, 4, . . . , 2w−1] | 0 ∈ Zn×mq
]
where n, q ≥ 2,
w = ndlog qe and m = O(w). This will be used in our construction of tightly
secure IBE. They second and third ones are
G¯ =
[
G∗| 0
]
∈ Zn×2nwq
and
Gˆ = I2n ⊗
[
1, b, b2, . . . , bw−1
]
=
[
G 0
0 G
]
∈ Z2n×2nwq .
They will be used for our construction of all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions.
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2.6 Pseudo-random Functions
A pseudo-random functions (PRFs) are an important symmetric-key primitive. A
PRF is a keyed function that essentially behaves like a truly random function for
polynomially bounded adversaries who are not given the secret key. A (strong)
PRF guarantees such property even if an adversary gets to see outputs on its
own adaptively chosen inputs, while a weak PRF remains indistinguishable from
a random function if an adversary gets to see outputs only on random inputs.
In recent, PRFs and their extensions have found enormous application in
public-key cryptography as well. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we show two novel
applications of PRFs in obtaining tightly and strongly secure asymmetric-key
encryption scheme.
The definitions of PRF and weak PRF are given as follows. Let λ > 0 be the
security parameter.
Definition 2.6.1 (Pseudo-random Functions). A pseudo-random function PRF :
K×M→ R is an efficiently computable keyed function where K is the key space,
M is the message space and R is the output space. Let F :M→R be the set
of all functions with domain M and range R. The advantage AdvPRFA (λ) of an
adversary A in attacking PRF is defined as
∣∣Pr [APRF(K,·)(1λ) = 1]− Pr [AF (·)(1λ) = 1]∣∣
where the probability is taken over a uniform choice of key K
$←− K and F $←− F ,
and the randomness of A. We say that PRF is (t, )-secure if for all t-time
adversaries A, AdvPRFA (λ) ≤ .
Definition 2.6.2 (Weak Pseudo-random Functions). A weak pseudo-random
function wPRF : K ×M → R is an efficiently computable keyed function. Let
F : M → R be the set of all functions with domain M and range R. The
advantage AdvwPRFA (λ) of an adversary A in attacking wPRF is defined as∣∣Pr [A(1λ, {xi,wPRF(K, xi)}i∈[Q]) = 1]− Pr [A(1λ, {xi, F (xi)}i∈[Q]) = 1]∣∣
for every Q = poly(λ), xi
$←−M, where the probability is taken over a uniform
choice of key K
$←− {0, 1}k and F $←− F , and the randomness of A. We say that
wPRF is (t, )-secure if for all t-time adversaries A, AdvwPRFA (λ) ≤ .
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2.7 Chameleon Hash Functions
A chameleon hash function ([KR00]) CH = (CH.Gen,CH.Eval,CH.Equiv) has three
PPT algorithms:
– CH.Gen(1λ) The key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter,
it generates a hash key and trapdoor pair (Hk,Td).
– CH.Eval(Hk, X;R) The hash algorithm takes as input a hash key, a message X
from XCH = {0, 1}∗, the message space of CH, and a randomness R ∈ RCH,
the randomness space. It outputs a hash value Y ∈ YCH, the range of CH.
– CH.Equiv(Td, Y,X ′) Given a hash value y = CH.Eval(Hk, X;R) for some
message-randomness pair (X,R) and another message X ′, the equivocation
algorithm uses Td to find a randomness R′ such that
Y = CH.Eval(Hk, X;R) = CH.Eval(Hk, X ′;R′)
A chameleon hash function has output uniformity which guarantees the distri-
bution of hashes is independent of the messages. Particularly, for all Hk, two
messages X,X ′, the distributions
{R $←− RCH : CH.Eval(Hk, X;R)}
and
{R $←− RCH : CH.Eval(Hk, X ′;R)}
are identical. A chameleon hash function is collision-resistant. That is, for all
PPT adversary A, for random (Hk,Td)← CH.Gen(1λ), the advantage
AdvcollCH,A(λ) =
 ((X,R), (X
′, R′))← A(1λ,Hk)
(X,R) 6= (X ′, R′),
CH.Eval(Hk, X;R) = CH.Eval(Hk, X ′;R′)

must be negligible in λ.
A similar e definition of chameleon hash function [Hof12], the message space
is assumed to be {0, 1}∗. This is not a big issue since we can always apply a
collision-resistant hash function on the input to get an actual input that has fixed
size for the chameleon hash function. We additionally require the chameleon
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hash function to have the following property in order to achieve selective-opening
security in Chapter 5.
Definition 2.7.1. Let CH = (CH.Gen,CH.Eval,CH.Equiv) be a secure chameleon
hash function. We say CH has equivocation indistinguishability if for (Hk,Td)←
CH.Gen(1λ), given a fixed message X ∈ XCH, the following two distributions of
tuple (X,R, Y ) are statistically indistinguishable:
{X ∈ XCH, R $←− RCH, Y ← CH.Eval(Hk, X;R)) ∈ YCH}
and
{X ∈ XCH, Y $←− YCH, R← CH.Equiv(Td, Y,X) ∈ RCH}
It is well-known that chameleon hash functions can be obtained from mild
lattice assumption, i.e., the short-integer-solution (SIS) assumption [CHKP12].
Such a construction has equivocation indistinguishability which follows directly
from Gentry et al.’s lattice construction of preimage-samplabe function [GPV08].
2.8 Summary
We have given a background for our work in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter
5. In particular, we have presented the mathematical notations, the concept of
randomness extractor with some useful facts, a overview of lattices and crypto-
graphic tools for lattice-based cryptography, and two computational assumptions,
the Learning-With-Errors assumption and the Short-Integer-Solution assumption,
on lattices. We also reviewed the important notion of “gadget matrices” as well as
their applications to lattice trapdoors and fully homomorphic evaluation. Finally,
we have provided the definitions of two cryptographic primitives: pseudo-random
functions and and chameleon hash functions.
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In this chapter, we study expressive public-key encryption from the LWE
assumption. Particularly, we present an attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme
from LWE. Users’ decryption keys in this scheme can encode bounded determinis-
tic Turing machines whose runtime and acceptable input lengths are bounded by
some a-priori specified polynomials in the security parameter. Ciphertexts in the
scheme are described by attribute strings that are inputs of bounded deterministic
Turing machines. A private decryption key decrypts a ciphertext if and only if
the attribute string is accepted by the Turing machine. One nice feature offered
by our scheme is what we call “input-specified decryption complexity” meaning
that certain (or in practice, even most of the) inputs will lead to fast decryption .
3.1 Introduction
Expressive public-key encryption or attribute-based encryption (ABE) enables the
enforcement of complex access control conditions based on expressive decryption
keys and ciphertext attributes. In an ABE scheme [GPSW06], a decryption key
is associated with a Boolean predicate P from a family of predicates P, and
a message is encrypted with a public attribute string w. Decryption succeeds
iff P (w) = 1. Designing ABE schemes with expressive and efficient access
policies is of both theoretical and practical interest. On one hand, research on
ABE has resulted in substantial advances in theoretical cryptography, such as
functional encryption, garbling schemes and various of security proof techniques.
With its potential applications in Cloud storage, access control, and outsourced
computations etc., ABE appears a promising cryptographic primitive for the “Big
Data” era in which huge amounts of sensitive data need to be securely stored and
efficiently accessed in an expressive way.
As we have discussed in Chapter 1, there are two major research problems
along the research line of expressive public-key encryption or ABE. The first one
is increasing the expressivity and the second one is escaping the always-worst-case
decryption time.
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3.1.1 Expressiveness of ABE
One of the central problems in ABE research is how to make predicates and
policies ever more expressive. Most ABE schemes handle boolean formulas of
polynomial size, with certain restrictions such as a monotonicity requirement.
A significant advance over this model was provided with with Attrapadung
and Water’s pairing-based ABE schemes [Wat12, Att14] and Boyen and Li’s
lattice-based scheme [BL15], where predicates attached to decryption keys are
deterministic finite automata (DFAs), and attribute strings attached to cipher-
texts are viewed as DFA input strings. Another recent breakthrough in that
area came with the construction of ABE schemes for general boolean circuits
with polynomial size [GGH+13,GVW13,BGG+14], using different technical ideas
such as (now broken) multi-linear maps and/or lattices. Assuming the existence
of Extractable Witness Encryption and Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of
Knowledge (SNARKS), two very strong and non-standard assumptions, Gold-
wasser et al. [GKP+13] proposed an ABE scheme for any polynomial-time Turing
machines. An outstanding feature of ABE schemes for DFAs [Wat12,Att14] and
for Turing machines [GKP+13] is that attribute strings could be arbitrarily long,
which lead to various interesting applications, such asWaters’ innovative audit
log system [Wat12]. However, it should be mentioned that the non-standard
computational assumptions used by Attrapadung and Waters [Wat12, Att14]
require fixing an a-priori bound on the input length for the security reduction
to obtain, and Goldwasser et al.’s construction [GKP+13] came with a price of
requirement of strong assumptions which have no satisfactory instantiations. In a
different direction, ABE schemes for general circuits [GGH+13,GVW13,BGG+14]
provide obvious versatility benefits, as they enable predicates or policies to be any
polynomial-size combinational (memoryless) function. For certain applications
where policies have polynomial size, one could convert the policies into circuits
on the fly and then apply the ABE schemes for circuits.
In this work, from the perspective of expressiveness of ABE, we focus on
extending the notion of ABE for DFAs from previous work [Wat12,Att14,BL15]
by providing memory taking the form of one or more push-down stacks—yielding
a notion of ABE for (bounded) deterministic push-down automata and Turing
machines respectively.
Although the Waters’ technique [Wat12] initiated the study of ABE schemes
for automata (as opposed to the more traditional boolean formulas and circuits), it
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did not seem to support any mechanism for “read/write” tapes. Conceptually, two
difficulties with implementing secure stack or tape machines are that configurations
are exponentially many and time varying. One possible but very unsatisfactory
answer is to encode the entire memory (e.g., the stack or the tape) atomically
into the atomic state or configuration of the machine. A related approach is
to unroll an entire (bounded) Turing machine into a boolean circuit, e.g., so
that a circuit-oriented ABE scheme [GGH+13,GVW13,BGG+14] can be used;
in this case it is the entire memory across the entire execution that is encoded
“atomically” into the circuit as a function of its inputs.
A conceptually more desirable approach is to embrace the nature of the stack
or tape as an attached memory, from which only the current element under the
read/write head is accessible to the actual state machine, itself possibly very
small. This approach requires guarantees that the portion of memory that is
temporarily out of sight will not be tampered with—a non-trivial proposition.
Our main contribution is to provide a secure way to attach stacks and tapes onto
a “seed” ABE for DFA in a flexible and generic way. Based on this, we show
how to realise ABE for deterministic state machines with multiple stacks (two
stacks are enough to get a Turing machine, though additional stacks will increase
efficiency). Our construction is based on the standard LWE assumption, rather
than Waters’ pairing-based approach [Wat12].
3.1.2 ABE with Input-Specific Decryption Complexity
Usually, the policy evaluation ABE in decryption algorithms incurs a heavy
computational overhead. As Goldwasser et al. mentioned [GKP+13], in most of
the previously proposed ABE schemes whose polices are polynomial-size boolean
formulas or boolean circuits, the policy evaluation always takes the worst-case
runtime. With the input-specific runtime, policy evaluation could run in the bare
necessary time and could be very fast even for very large inputs. This property is
crucial in most real world applications.
A simple example is a filter rule set in firewall systems. In a firewall system,
the coming packets are inspected by filters according to a set of filtering rules.
These filtering rules are usually sequentially arranged and will be applied to
packets sequentially as well. Inspecting one packet under all rules is obviously
inefficient. However, it is common practice to arrange the rules so that early
accept/reject decisions can be made for most normal packets. As a consequence,
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decisions will hopefully be made very quickly for most of the packets and, thus,
efficiency increases. Our Turing-machine-ABE scheme with input-specific runtime
could see applications in complex filtering-based security systems for encrypted
data.
From a practical perspective, it is desirable to design ABE schemes from
standard cryptographic assumptions with efficient data access or decryption
time. This serves as another motivation of us to design automata-based ABE
scheme with input-specific decryption time. In the computation models of
various automata, computations of an automaton would finish once it gets to
an accepting state after reading a prefix of inputs. However, this does not mean
that all the automata-based ABE schemes have input-specific decryption. In
fact, the decryption time in previous pairing-based ABE schemes [Wat12,Att14]
depends on the length but not the content of input attributes, and thus, is not
input-specific.
Most interestingly, it is a well-known (if poorly understood) phenomenon that
most NP-complete problems exhibit a “phase transition” [CKT91] from easy to
hard to easy again, as a certain statistic of the input is varied (such as the ratio
of number of clauses to number of variables in random 3-SAT instances). This is
why SAT solvers work very well in practice, despite tackling problems that are
formally NP-hard. Accordingly, our input-specific runtime constructions open
the door to functional policy specifications that are technically NP-complete or
NP-hard, but easily computable for inputs of practical interest.
3.1.3 Our Contributions
With the above two motivations, we present a direct ABE scheme with input-
specific decryption time for multi-stack deterministic push-down automata (DP-
DAs) that have polynomial (in security parameter) runtime. In particular, this
yields an ABE scheme for deterministic Turing machines (DTMs) with polynomial
runtime (in security parameter) through the equivalence between DTMs and
DPDAs with two stacks. We refer to this special type of DPDAs and DTMs as
bounded DPDAs and bounded DTMs, respectively, for short. To the best of our
knowledge, our construction is the first ABE scheme which directly supports stack
automata and has input-specific decryption time from standard cryptographic
assumptions.
In our scheme, predicates or policies of users’ decryption keys are directly
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expressed as bounded DPDAs. Messages are encrypted with polynomial-size
attribute strings (the length of individual strings can vary). Decryption keys
recover messages if and only if the automata recognize the strings attached to the
ciphertexts. We prove the security of our scheme in the selective security model,
based on the learning-with-errors problem (LWE).
In general, deterministic push-down automata refer to single-stack machines.
Deterministic push-down automata with two stacks are much more powerful,
being equivalent to deterministic Turing machines (DTMs). Our approach works
with an arbitrary number of stacks; we will focus on constructing an ABE scheme
for single-stack DPDAs and then show how to extend it easily to two (or more)
stacks, to capture the full power of (bounded) deterministic Turing machines.
3.1.4 Our Approach
Our approaches stem from the LWE-based ABE scheme for DFAs [BL15]. We
firstly give a quick review of stack and push-down automata. A stack is a basic
data structure which stores data in such a way that the most recently stored item
is the first to be retrieved (also known as “last in, first out” access). Basically,
stacks provide two principal operations: “push” a new element to the top of
stack and “pop” the top-most element from stack. Stacks provide PDAs with
additional memory space making PDAs more powerful than DFAs. A 3-Stack
PDA is depicted in Figure 3.1.
Control Unit
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Figure 3.1: A 3-Stack Push-down Automaton
We outline our approach for 1-stack DPDAs. A deterministic push-down
automaton M with one stack is a 7-tuple: M = (Q,Σ,Γ, δ, s0, z0, F ). The input
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tape of M consists of symbols of an alphabet Σ. We write Σε = Σ ∪ ε for the
empty symbol ε. The finite internal states of M make up a set Q. F ⊆ Q is a
set of accepting states. Γ is an alphabet of stack elements. For every execution,
M starts from a unique initial state s0 ∈ Q, with the stack empty which is
indicated by a bottom stack element z0 ∈ Γ. For one computation process of
M , a string w of symbols of Σ, which forms an input tape, is taken as an input.
In one step of computation, M takes a current letter of input tape and the top
stack element as input, does a stack operation, and shifts its state according to
a deterministic transition function δ : Γ × Q × Σε → Γ × Q. For instance, in
the transition δ(u, s, b)→ (v, s′), an automaton reads the symbol b ∈ Σ, changes
the top stack element from u to v, and shifts its state from s to s′. Once M
reaches some accepting state sω ∈ F , it stops and accepts w. A PDA does not
“remember” its execution history. A triple (γ, s,w), which is called Instantaneous
Description (ID), can be used to track the execution history of a PDA by capturing
a “snapshot” of a PDA’s execution status. In the ID, γ ∈ Γ∗ is the current stack
contents with sequential order, s ∈ Q is the current state, and w ∈ Σ∗ is the
remaining unread input. An accepting ID is (γ ′, sω,w′) where γ ∈ Γ∗ is the stack
contents, sω ∈ F is a accepting state, and w′ ∈ Σ∗ is a suffix of w.
The starting point of our construction is naturally to encode the input tapes
and the transition function of PDAs into ciphertexts and decryption keys, re-
spectively. We show the idea by describing a toy construction. Let ` be the
upper bound of the length of all input strings. Let Sz0 and As0 be two publicly
known matrices representing the unique initial stack element z0 and state s0 for
all DPDAs. A lattice trapdoor of [Sz0|As0 ] serves as the master secret key. A
ciphertext of the input tape which contains an input string w = w1w2 . . . w` ∈ Σ`
has the LWE form
st · [Sz0 |As0|Bw1|Bw2| . . . |Bw` ] + νt
for a random secret vector s
$←− Znq , public matrices Bwi $←− Zn×mq , and noise vector
ν from some noise distribution χ. Note [Sz0||As0|Bw1|Bw2| . . . |Bw` ] is just the
matrix representation of ID (s0, z0, w1w2...w`) for all the DPDAs in the beginning
of execution.
The decryption key of a PDA M = (Q,Σ,Γ, δ, s0, z0, F ) contains a set of low-
norm transition matrices {Rδ} such that a transition δ(u, s, b)→ (v, s′) ( where
s /∈ F ) is mathematically abstracted as a matrix multiplication [Su|As|Bb] ·Rδ =
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[Sv|As′ ] (mod q) (here we don’t consider ε transitions, i.e., transitions that
consume no input). These equations are inductively constructed. Firstly check
if a matrix [Su|As] exists with an available trapdoor (the first of this type of
matrix is [Sz0|As0 ] which does have a trapdoor). If one of the sub-matrices of
[Su|As] does not exist, sample it by the “matrix-trapdoor” sampling algorithm
TrapGen. Run TrapGen again to sample Sv and As′ if they haven’t been created.
Then apply the lattice preimage sampling function SampleExtend to sample the
low-norm transition matrix Rδ. Finally, each matrix Asω for sω ∈ F will be
equipped with a decryption vector that allows decrypters to recover messages.
The decryption procedure works by following an accepting execution path,
sequentially applying the transition matrices Rδ to linearly transform
st · [Sz0|As0|Bw1 |Bw2| . . . |Bw` ] + νt
into
st · [Su|Asω |Bwj |Bwj+1| . . . |Bw`]+ ν¯t,
(for some u ∈ Γ) which is the incomplete matrix (in terms of stack configuration)
representation of an accept ID (sω,γ, wjwj+1...w`) where 1 ≤ j. The decryption
vector of Asω then applies. We note the decryption does not need to read the
whole input string.
Two problems make this toy construction insecure. Firstly, the concatenation
matrix [Bw1|Bw2| . . . |Bw` ] does not mathematically enforce any sequence between
letters in the string. Secondly, no mechanism ensures the consistency of stack
configurations. Different configurations may lead to the same execution result. For
instance, consider two IDs (uvz0, s, w1w2w3) and (uvvz0, s, w1w2w3). A transition
δ(u, s, w1) → (v, s′) takes them to different next IDs, but they have the same
transition equation. In particular, a transition equation only mirrors one piece of
the whole execution of a DPDA and shows no connections with other transitions.
On the other hand, this problem brought by the “memoryless” description of
DPDAs can be amended by including the whole execution history into each
transition step, just as ID does. However, this leads to exponentially many
IDs (within the input length bound `) which are impossible to encode in the
decryption keys.
Summing up, in order to securely embed bounded DPDAs with one or multiple
stacks into decryption keys, we must take care to retain enough state to prevent
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malleability attacks while avoiding an exponential blow-up of the size of the
decryption keys.
3.1.5 The Challenges of (Not) Keeping Memory.
To figure out the minimal amount of state we need to keep in a push-down
automaton with respect to some input length bound, we notionally unroll all the
possible execution paths of the automaton into a specially crafted low-dimensional
space. The dimensions and coordinates of the space are determined so that the
execution graph of a push-down automaton is a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
Intuitively, the coordinates of this “execution graph space” represent the variables
that the core state machine must remember about the stack/tape configuration.
For example, one dimension could be a counter indicating how many symbols
the machine has read from its second stack so far. The fewer the dimensions,
the more risk that the graph of all possible unrolled executions, will contain
directed cycles. If that happens, a malicious user can “jump” from one execution
to another, yielding an illegal execution that could accept a word not in the
language—an attack.
At one extreme, a machine whose core remembers nothing about the tapes
corresponds to a very low-dimensional execution space (as the case of the toy
construction). In this case, an adversary will be able to alter the stack tape
or the input tape “out of sight” of the state machine, undetected, in order to
take shortcuts/longcuts/sidecuts in the execution, throwing the machine into
a configuration it should not have been able to reach from the given input.
Conversely, a Turing machine whose state remembers everything, including the
whole tape itself, can obviously be simulated as a mere DFA, albeit one with
a huge state space, without danger of allowing an adversary to deviate from
the execution. In this case the execution graph space will have (at least) one
dimension for each possible cell. This will make the graph acyclic, but at the cost
of requiring a state machine with exponentially many states.
Between those unworkable extremes, we devise an execution graph space of
low constant dimension (function only of the number of stacks) that will always
guarantee acyclicity. This gives us the variables that the core state machine will
need to keep track of, to cryptographically ensure correct execution regardless
of the size of the stack(s). Those variables enforce a set of constraints sufficient
to ensure that users (performing the decryption) proceed consistently with the
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forward execution of the DPDA step by step, without having to remember
unneeded data about the DPDA’s previous steps. In our full construction, the
actual execution of an automaton is based on the repeated application of transition
equations similar to the toy construction. But each transition equation will carry
(just) enough aforementioned variables so that the acyclic execution graphs can
be correctly instantiated. We note that the transition equation (as in the toy
construction) is a direct generalisaztion of the two-to-one recoding [GVW13],
itself ultimately based on lattice basis delegation [ABB10,CHKP10].
Perhaps the most novel aspect of our ABE construction is the secure con-
struction of (long, bidirectional) read/write tapes that do not require the entire
configuration to be kept “in focus” at all times, unlike most other lattice-based
public-key encryption schemes. We cryptographically enforce “big picture” consis-
tency across space and time, using only local transformations or transitions with
a short window of visibility. More specifically, there are a few transition steps
involved in our constructions, implemented as local matrix multiplications. Once
we ensure the current decryption step has been securely and honestly taken, it is
automatically guaranteed that the previous decryption steps have been securely
taken too, which by induction implies that the entire execution is globally correct.
We prove all this using a game-based reductionist simulation from the LWE
hardness assumption. The aforementioned execution graph and the selection of
its dimensions to ensure acyclicity, are critical to the success of this simulation.
3.1.6 Relationship with ABE for Circuits.
We emphasize that the push-down automata in our scheme are subject to polyno-
mial size input and polynomial execution time restrictions, and thus also admit
(non unique) functionally equivalent polynomial size circuits. Previous ABE
schemes for general circuits [GGH+13, GVW13, BGG+14] can thus in theory
achieve the same functionality by converting the bounded DPDA to DTM into an
equivalent circuit beforehand. Our schemes provide a quite different and direct
way to solve the problem, with the distinct additional advantage of input-specific
decryption time.
More specifically, the process of converting deterministic push-down automata
(especially with multiple stacks) into circuits is subtle. First, we need an actual
algorithm, not just an existential equivalence. Second, the actually translated
circuits can be optimised to have gates with small fan-in at the expense of depth,
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or be optimised for shallowness and require many gates, but not both. As both
the height of the circuit and the number of gates and their fan-in affect the
efficiency of circuit-based ABE schemes, a compromise would have to be struck.
A proper comparison with circuit-based ABE would require taking into account
the exact cost of translating a DPDA or Turing machine into a circuit, not only in
the sense of existential upper bounds, but also in the form of efficient algorithms
that achieve them. A naive translation approach could result in a very noticeable
penalty in the resulting Circuit ABE. Alas, an extensive literature search has failed
to reveal any hypothetical TM-to-Circuit translators that would be markedly
superior than the naive translation. For an ABE policy specified as a DPDA or a
DTM, our construction sidesteps all issues related to translation and its tuning,
and has the advantage of simplicity. Conversely of course, given an ABE policy as
a circuit, it would be preferable to use a DTM for circuits rather translate it into
a machine representation for our construction. Last but not least, the conversion
into circuits will certainly lose the advantage of input-specific decryption times
from which many potential applications may get benefits in terms of efficiency.
The main contribution of our result is to show how the “simple” idea of
directly embedding a bounded DPDA or DTM into an ABE system can actually
be made to work, and proven secure in the reductionist simulation framework.
3.2 Definitions
3.2.1 Push-down Automata
Definition 3.2.1 (Deterministic Push-down Automata (1-Stack DPDAs)). A de-
terministic push-down automaton with one stack is a 7-tuple (Q,Σ,Γ, δ, s0, z0, F ),
where
1. Q is a finite set of states,
2. F ⊆ Q is the set of the accept states.
3. Σ is the finite input alphabet, and Σε = Σ ∪ {ε} for the empty symbol ε,
4. Γ is the finite stack alphabet,
5. δ : Γ×Q \ F × Σε → Γ×Q is the deterministic transition function,
38 Chapter 3. Attribute-Based Encryption for Bounded Turing Machines
6. z0 ∈ Γ is the initial stack element and it is always at the bottom of the
stack and never been removed,
7. s0 ∈ Q is the unique start state.
In order to keep track of a 1-Stack DPDA, we need the information of the
current machine state, the portion of the input string that has not been read, and
the current stack content. An instantaneous description (ID), which states the
current configuration of the DPDA machine, is represented by a triple (γ, s,w)
where
1. γ ∈ Γ∗ is the stack contents,
2. s ∈ Q is the current state of M , and
3. w ∈ Σ∗ is the remaining unread input
Let M = (Q,Σ,Γ, δ, s0, z0, F ) be a 1-Stack DPDA. Suppose δ(u, s, b)→ (v, s′)
where u, v ∈ Γ, s, s′ ∈ Q, and b ∈ Σε. We write
(uγ, s, bw) `M (vγ, s′,w)
for γ ∈ Γ∗ and w ∈ Σ∗ to mean that the transition takes M from the first ID
to the second one by consuming the input symbol b and replacing u on the top
of the stack by v, and shifting from state s to s′. We denote by `∗M the zero or
more moves of a push-down automaton M .
We say an input string w = w1w2 . . . w` ∈ Σ` is accepted by M if
(z0, s0,w) `∗M (γ, sω,w′)
for stack contents γ ∈ Γ∗, some state sω ∈ F , and the remaining substring w′ ∈ Σ∗
that has not been read. That is once M gets to any accepting state, M stops and
the input is accepted. The language recognised by a 1-Stack PDAs is precisely the
set of all strings that are accepted by M , namely L(M) = {w : M accepts w}.
We consider 1-Stack DPDAs with transition functions for the principal stack
operations “push” and “pop”. Push operations write a symbol at the top of stack.
Pop operations remove the current symbol at the top of stack and makes the
second top-most symbol to be the new top symbol. We define them as follows:
Let M = (Q,Σ,Γ, δ, s0, z0, F ) be a deterministic push-down automaton or DPDA
machine. Let s, s′ ∈ Q, b ∈ Σε, u, v ∈ Γ, w ∈ Σ∗, and γ ∈ Γ∗ .
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1. Push: δ(u, s, b)→ (v, s′) where (uγ, s, bw) `M (vuγ, s′,w): An element v
is pushed to the stack and it becomes the new top element of the stack
while M reads b (note, b can be ε) and transits the state from s to s′. If
γ = ∅, then we restrict u = z0.
2. Pop: δ(u, s, b)→ (v, s′) where (uvγ, s, bw) `M (vγ, s′,w): The current top
stack element u is removed from the stack while M reads b (note, b can
be ε) and transits the state from s to s′. The second top-most element v
becomes the new top stack element. If γ = ∅, then we restrict v = z0.
It is straightforward to extend the definitions of 1-Stack DPDAs to the
definitions of DPDAs with n stacks. We are particularly interested in 2-Stack
DPDAs.
Definition 3.2.2 (Deterministic Push-down Automata with Two Stacks (2-Stack
DPDAs)). A deterministic push-down automaton with two stacks is a 9-tuple
(Q,Σ,Γ1,Γ2, δ, s0, zˆ0, zˇ0, F ), where
1. Q is a finite set of states,
2. F ⊆ Q is the set of the accept states.
3. Σ is the finite input alphabet, and Σε = Σ ∪ {ε} for the empty symbol ε,
4. Γ1 and Γ2 are the two finite stack alphabets,
5. δ : Γ1×Γ2×Q \F ×Σε → Γ1×Γ2×Q is deterministic transition function,
6. zˆ0 ∈ Γ1 and zˇ0 ∈ Γ2 are the initial stack elements. They are always at the
bottom of the stack and never removed,
7. s0 ∈ Q is the unique start state, and
The current configuration of a 2-Stack DPDA machine is also described by
the instantaneous description (ID) which is a quadruple (γ1,γ2, s,w) where
1. γ1 ∈ Γ∗1 and γ2 ∈ Γ∗2 are the contents of the two stacks,
2. s ∈ Q is the current state of M , and
3. w ∈ Σ∗ is the remaining unread input.
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Let M = (Q,Σ,Γ1,Γ2, δ, s0, z0, F ) be a 2-Stack DPDA machine. Suppose
there is a transition δ(uˆ, uˇ, s, b)→ (vˆ, vˇ, s′) where uˆ, vˆ ∈ Γ1, s, s′ ∈ Q, uˇ, vˇ ∈ Γ2,
and b ∈ Σε. We write
(uˆγ1, uˇγ2, s, bw) `M (vˆγ1, vˇγ2, s′,w)
for w ∈ Σ∗, γ1,γ2 ∈ Γ∗ meaning that the transition takes M from the first ID to
the second one by consuming the input symbol b (maybe ε), replacing uˆ on the
top of the first stack by vˆ, replacing uˇ on the top of the second stack by vˇ, and
shifting from the state s to s′. We also denote by `∗M the zero or more moves of
the 2-Stack DPDA machine.
We say an input string w = w1w2, . . . , w` ∈ Σ` is accepted by the above
2-Stack DPDA machine M if
(zˆ0, zˇ0, s0,w) `∗M (γ1,γ2, sω,w′)
for some stack contents γ1 ∈ Γ∗1, and γ2 ∈ Γ∗2, state sω ∈ F , and the rest of
unread string w′. The language recognised by M is precisely the set of all strings
that are accepted by M , namely, L(M) = {w : Maccepts w}.
The same as in DPDAs, we only consider the basic stack operations for the
2-Stack DPDAs. Concretely we consider the case that two stacks are working
independently and one of the two stacks does “push” or “pop” operation while
the other one stays unchanged. Their definitions are essentially the same as the
ones defined above for DPDAs. Finally, we note that the n-Stack DPDAs can be
defined similarly to the 2-Stack DPDAs .
It turns out that 2-Stack DPDAs are equivalent to deterministic Turing
machine (DTMs). Essentially, one could simulate the DTMs with 2-Stack DPDAs
efficiently by using one stack to represent the content of the input DTM tape to
the right of the tape head and another stack to represent the content to the left
of the tape head.
3.2.2 Definition of ABE for PDAs
An attribute-based encryption scheme for PDAs consists of four algorithms (Setup,
KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt). Setup takes as input a security parameter λ and a
universal alphabet Σε. It generates public parameters Pub and master secret
key Msk. KeyGen uses Msk to generate a decryption key skM for a given PDA
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machine M . Encrypt applies Pub to encrypt a message m under a string w ∈ Σ∗,
and produces the ciphertext ctw. Decrypt recovers the message from ctw using
skM if M accepts w, i.e. w ∈ L(M).
Security Model. We review the selective security model of ABE scheme for
PDAs. Let A be the adversary, B be the challenger.
Initial. A submits a string w∗ ∈ Σ∗ as its challenge.
Setup. B runs algorithm Setup to generate the public parameters Pub and master
secret key Msk and passes Pub to A.
Phase 1. A adaptively issues the key generation queries for keys correspond to
any PDA machine M of its choice. The only restriction is w∗ /∈ L(M). B
runs the algorithm KeyGen(Pub,Msk,M) and returns skM .
Challenge. A chooses a challenge message to be encrypted with w∗. B flips
a random coin γ ∈ {0, 1}. If γ = 1, the challenge ciphertext is returned.
Otherwise, a random element in the ciphertext space is returned.
Phase 2. This phase is exactly the same as Phase 1.
Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess bit γ′ of γ. It wins if γ′ = γ.
The advantage of A in the above game is defined as
AdvselectiveΠ,A (λ) = |Pr[γ′ = γ]− 1/2|.
We say an ABE scheme for PDAs is selectively secure if all PPT adversaries have
at most a negligible advantage in the above game.
3.3 Execution Graph of DPDAs
We now turn to explain the structure of the specially crafted execution graphs
of DPDAs which are low-dimensional and acyclic. The execution graphs allow
us to securely encode bounded DPDAs into decryption keys and to successfully
overcome the difficulties of keeping execution history in memory. Without loss of
generality, 1-Stack DPDAs are described in full detail. It is straightforward to
extend the ideas to 2-Stack DPDAs and n-Stack DPDAs, by linearly increasing
the dimension of the execution graphs so that they remain acyclic.
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3.3.1 Descriptions of Execution Graph
The execution graph G = (V,E) of a 1-Stack DPDA M = (Q,Σ,Γ, δ, s0, z0, F ),
with respect to the input length bound τ and running time bound η, consists of
a set of vertices, denoted by V , and a set of edges denoted by E.
A vertex in V , which comprises of 5 variables, has form (u, s, j, t′, t). The first
coordinate u ∈ Γ is the current top-most stack element. The second coordinate
s ∈ Q is the current state of DPDA. The third coordinate j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ τ , is
the “input position” indicating the currently the first j − 1 input symbols have
been read by M , and the next symbol to be read is the jth one. The fourth and
fifth coordinate t′ and t, where −1 ≤ t′ ≤ 2η − 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ 2η and t′ < t, are
“stack position tags” of u. The tag t represents the stack position of current stack
element u and t′ represents the stack position of u’s previous stack element, i.e.,
the element before u. These stack position tags sequentially chain all current
stack elements together in a logical way. During the transition (execution), the
stack position tags change dynamically (in a way we specify later) so that the
new top-stack element which is pushed in has a (logically) higher position than
the previous top stack element, and the sequential relation between the stack
element that is popped out, and rest of stack elements is removed. For the special
stack element z0 which will never be popped out, we assign the special tag value
-1 to indicate that z0 is always at the bottom of the stack.
The edges in E are defined by the input of transitions, either a symbol b ∈ Σ
or an empty symbol ε. The input symbol b ∈ Σ, which defines the outgoing edge
of a vertex (s, u, j, t′, t), is tied by input position j. We don’t explicitly define the
input position for the ε input as it never appears in the input string.
The initial vertex of an execution graph of M is (z0, s0, 1,−1, 0). Inductively,
two vertices are connected to each other with respect to the type of transition,
increasing input position tags and increasing stack positions. Let (u, s, j, t′, t)
be the current vertex for the top stack element u ∈ Γ, the state s ∈ Q, input
position j, and stack position tags t and t′ for u and u’s previous stack element
respectively.
1. For a “push” transition δ(u, s, b)→ (v, s′), b ∈ Σ will define the outgoing
edge. The next vertex will be defined as (v, s′, j + 1, t+ 1, t+ 2) in which
we increase the input position by 1, meaning that a non-empty symbol is
read, and assign stack position tag t+ 2 to v and update u’s position tag
from t to t + 1. There must be the case that −1 ≤ t′ < t. We write this
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relation as:
(u, s, j, t′, t) b−→ (v, s′, j + 1, t+ 1, t+ 2)
In the special case t′ = −1, we have u = z0.
2. For a “pop” transition δ(s, u, b) → (s′, v), b ∈ Σ will define the outgoing
edge. The next vertex will be defined as (v, s′, j + 1, t′′, t+ 1) in which we
increase the input position by 1 and update v’s stack position tag from t′
to t + 1 and v’s previous tack element’s stack position tag, say t′′, is not
changed. It must be the case that −1 ≤ t′′ < t′ < t. We write this relation
as:
(u, s, j, t′, t) b−→ (v, s′, j + 1, t′′, t+ 1)
In the special case t′′ = −1, we have v = z0.
3. For an ε “push” transition δ(u, s, ε)→ (v, s′), the ε symbol will define the
outgoing edge. The next vertex will be defined as (v, s′, j, t + 1, t + 2) in
which the input position stays unchanged, meaning that no input has been
read in this transition. v is assigned the new stack position tag t+ 2 and
u’s position tag is updated from t to t + 1. There must be the case that
−1 ≤ t′ < t < 2η. We write this relation as:
(u, s, j, t′, t) ε−→ (v, s′, j, t+ 1, t+ 2)
In the special case where t′ = −1, we have u = z0.
4. For an ε “pop” transition δ(u, s, ε)→ (v, s′), the ε symbol will define the
outgoing edge. The next vertex will be defined as (s′, v, j, t′′, t+ 1) in which
the input position stays unchanged, meaning that no input has been read
in this transition. We update v’s stack position tag from t′ to t + 1. v’s
previous tack element’s stack position tag, say t′′, is not changed. It must
be the case that −1 ≤ t′′ < t′ < t < 2η. We write this relation as:
(u, s, j, t′, t) ε−→ (s′, v, j, t′′, t+ 1)
In the special case t′′ = −1, we have v = z0.
In a execution process with respect to a specific input, M will start from
(z0, s0, 1,−1, 0). The execution then follows the path defined by the input and
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ε transitions to travel between vertices. Once M reaches a vertex with some
accepting state sω, it stops and accepts the input. Otherwise, M stops and rejects
the input if there is no transition with respect the current input or one of j, t′, t
reaches the bounds.
To see why the execution graphs for 1-Stack DPDAs are acyclic, the coordinates
of tuple (u, s, j, t′, t), (input position j and stack position tags t′, t) increase
monotonically with at least one of them increasing at each step. t′ decreases only
when the top-most stack elements are popped out from the stack and its stack
position tag is never going to be used again.
3.3.2 Matrix Representation
In our constructions, the execution graphs are instantiated by matrices (recall the
toy construction). However, matrix concatenation neither forces any sequential
order to the individual matrices nor logically binds the individual matrices
together. On the other hand, in an execution graph, coordinates in a vertex are
logically integrated, vertices and edges (specified by input symbols) are bound
with respect to the input positions. In order to mitigate the notation problem, we
use subscripts of matrices to denote the state, stack element and input symbols,
and encode the input positions and stack position tags in the superscripts of
matrices to tie concatenated matrices together logically.
Specifically, for a vertex (u, s, j, t′, t), we encode it by matrix concatenation
[S
(t′,t)
u |A(t,j)s ]. S(t′,t)u ∈ Zn×mq is the stack matrix of u with t as u’s stack position
tag and t′ as the stack position tag of u’s previous element. A(t,j)s ∈ Zn×mq is the
state matrix of s. The superscript t ties A
(t,j)
s to S
(t′,t)
u , and j ties A
(t,j)
s to the
jth input symbol, say b, which has matrix representation B
(j)
b .
For expressing the transition equations that connect two vertices through an
edge, we consider the following cases:
• (u, s, j, t′, t) b−→ (v, s′, j + 1, t+ 1, t+ 2) where a push transition δ(u, s, b)→
(v, s′) for the jth input b happens: sample a low-norm transition matrix
R
(t′,t,j)
δ ∈ Z3m×3m such that:
[S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)b ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v |A(t+2,j+1)s′ ] (mod q)
• (u, s, j, t′, t) b−→ (v, s′, j + 1, t′′, t + 1) where a pop transition δ(u, s, b) →
(v, s′) for the jth input b happens: sample a low-norm transition matrix
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R
(t′,t,j)
δ ∈ Z4m×2m such that:
[S(t
′′,t′)
v |S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)b ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′′,t+1)
v |A(t+1,j+1)s′ ] (mod q)
• (u, s, j, t′, t) ε−→ (v, s′, j, t+1, t+2) where a push transition δ(u, s, ε)→ (v, s′)
for an ε input happens: sample a low-norm transition matrix R
(t′,t,j)
δ ∈
Z2m×3m such that:
[S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v ||A(t+2,j)s′ ] (mod q)
• (u, s, j, t′, t) ε−→ (s′, v, j, t′′, t+ 1) where a push transition δ(u, s, ε)→ (v, s′)
for an ε input happens: sample a low-norm transition matrix R
(t′,t,j)
δ ∈
Z3m×2m such that:
[S(t
′′,t′)
v |S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′′,t+1)
v |A(t+1,j)s′ ] (mod q)
In all above cases, if the state s′ in the target vertex equals some accept state
sω, we will simply use matrix Aω to denote it without any superscripts. This is
because the vertex (u, sω, j, t
′, t) must be terminal for the execution path and no
next vertex exists.
The reason we use slightly different forms in the equations for push and pop
transition is that we update the stack position tags of the stack elements to keep
the actual transition equations compatible with the execution graphs, to ensure
that no direct cycles happen.
3.4 ABE Scheme for Bounded 1-Stack DPDAs
3.4.1 Construction
Setup
(
1λ, τ, η,Σε = {0, 1, ε}
)
On input of security parameter 1λ, upper bound
τ of length of input string, upper bound η of running time of the push-down
automata, and the universal alphabet Σε:
1. Pick 2τ matrices B
(j)
b
$←− Zn×mq for j ∈ [τ ] and b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Sample A ∈ Zn×mq and its trapdoor TA ∈ Zm×m by TrapGen.
3. Pick u
$←− Znq .
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4. Output Pub =
(
{B(j)b }b∈{0,1},j∈[τ ],A,u
)
and Msk = TA.
KeyGen(Pub,Msk,M = (Q,Γ, δ, s0, z0, F )) On input of Pub, Msk and a 1-Stack
DPDA M , construct a private key by unrolling M (up to the fixed bounds) into
an execution graph:
1. Prepare for the initial vertex (z0, s0, 1,−1, 0):
(a) Run TrapGen to sample matrix A
(0,1)
s0 and its trapdoor.
(b) Pick S
(−1,0)
z0
$←− Zn×mq .
(c) Conditioned on AR = [S
(−1,0)
z0 |A(0,1)s0 ] (mod q), run SampleExtend to
sample (R ∼ DZm)2m.
2. For a normal “push” transition δ(u, s, b)→ (v, s′) that connects two vertices
(u, s, j, t′, t) and (v, s′, j+ 1, t+ 1, t+ 2) through the edge b at input position
j,
(a) The state matrix A
(t,j)
s with its trapdoor and the stack matrix S
(t′,t)
u
are already defined.
(b) In case s′ ∈ Q \ F , run TrapGen to sample A(t+2,j+1)s′ and its trapdoor
if such state matrix has not yet been defined. If s′ equals to some
accept state sω ∈ F , and the matrix Asω has not been defined, run
TrapGen to sample it with trapdoor.
(c) Pick S
(t′,t+1)
u ,S
(t+1,t+2)
v
$←− Zn×mq for v ∈ Γ if this stack matrix has not
been defined.
(d) Run SampleExtend to sample R
(t′,t,j)
δ with distribution (DZ3m,σ)
3m such
that if s′ ∈ Q \ F :
[S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)b ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v |A(t+2,j+1)s′ ] (mod q)
or s′ = sω for some sω ∈ F :
[S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)b ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v |Asω ] (mod q).
3. For a normal “pop” transition δ(u, s, b)→ (v, s′) that connects two vertices
(u, s, j, t′, t) and (v, s′, j + 1, t′′, t+ 1) through the input b at input position
j,
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(a) The state matrix A
(t,j)
s with trapdoor, stack matrices S
(t′,t)
u , S
(t′′,t′)
v are
already defined.
(b) In case that s′ /∈ F , run TrapGen to sample matrix A(t+1,j+1)s′ and its
trapdoor if such state matrix has not been defined. If s′ is some accept
state sω ∈ F , and the matrix Asω has not been defined, run TrapGen
to sample it with trapdoor.
(c) Pick S
(t′′,t+1)
v
$←− Zn×mq if this stack matrix has not been defined.
(d) Run SampleExtend to sample R
(t′,t,j)
δ with distribution (DZ4m,σ)
2m such
that if s′ /∈ F :
[S(t
′′,t′)
v |S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)b ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′′,t+1)
v |A(t+1,j+1)s′ ] (mod q)
or s′ = sω for some sω ∈ F :
[S(t
′′,t′)
v |S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)b ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′′,t+1)
v |Asω ] (mod q).
4. For an ε “push” transition δ(u, s, ε) → (v, s′) that connects two vertices
(u, s, j, t′, t) and (v, s′, j, t+ 1, t+ 2) through edge ε, the algorithm does:
(a) The state matrix A
(t,j)
s with its trapdoor and the stack matrix S
(t′,t)
u
are already defined.
(b) Run TrapGen to sample matrix A
(t+2,j)
s′ and its trapdoor if s
′ /∈ F and
such state matrix has not been defined. If s′ is some accept state
sω ∈ F , and the matrix Asω has not been defined, run TrapGen to
sample it with trapdoor.
(c) Pick S
(t′,t+1)
u ,S
(t+1,t+2)
v
$←− Zn×mq if they haven’t been defined.
(d) Run SampleExtend to sample R
(t′,t,j)
δ with distribution (DZ2m,σ)
3m such
that if s′ /∈ F :
[S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v |A(t+2,j)s′ ] (mod q)
or s′ = sω for some sω ∈ F :
[S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v |Asω ] (mod q).
5. For an ε “pop” transition δ(u, s, b) → (v, s′) that connects two vertices
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(u, s, j, t′, t) and (v, s′, j, t′′, t+ 1) through the edge ε, the algorithm does:
(a) The state matrix A
(t,j)
s with its trapdoor,and the stack matrices S
(t′,t)
u ,
S
(t′′,t′)
v are already defined.
(b) Run TrapGen to sample matrix A
(t+1,j)
s′ and its trapdoor if s
′ /∈ F and
such state matrix has not been defined. If s′ is some accept state
sω ∈ F , and the matrix Asω has not been defined, run TrapGen to
sample it with trapdoor.
(c) Pick S
(t′′,t+1)
v
$←− Zn×mq if this stack matrix has not been defined.
(d) Run SampleExtend to sample R
(t′,t,j)
δ with distribution (DZ3m,σ)
2m such
that if s′ /∈ F :
[S(t
′′,t′)
v |S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′′,t+1)
v |A(t+1,j)s′ ] (mod q)
or s′ = sω for some sω ∈ F :
[S(t
′′,t′)
v |S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s ] ·R(t
′,t,j)
δ = [S
(t′′,t+1)
v |Asω ] (mod q).
6. For all state matrices Aω of accepting states sω ∈ F , run SampleExtend to
a sample Gaussian vector dsω such that: Asωdsω = u (mod q).
7. Output the decryption key as:
skM =
(
R, {R(t′,t,j)δ }, {dsω}sω∈F
)
Encrypt(Pub,w,m) The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters
Pub, a binary string w with length ` ≤ τ , and a message bit m ∈ {0, 1}. Denote
the ith bit of w by w[i]. The algorithm does:
1. Randomly select a vector s
$←− Znq .
2. Select a noise scalar ν0 ← χ and compute the scalar
c0 = s
tu + ν0 + mbq/2c.
3. Select a noise vector ν1 ← χ(`+1)m, and compute the vector
ct1 = s
t · [A|B(1)w[1]|B(2)w[2] · · · |B(`−1)w[`−1]|B(`)w[`] ] + νt1.
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4. Output the ciphertext for the attribute input string w as
ctw = (c0, c1) .
Decrypt(Pub, skM , ctw,w) On input Pub, a decryption key skM for automaton M ,
attribute string w = w1w2 . . . w` and a ciphertext ctw encrypted with w.
1. If w /∈ L(M), return an error symbol ⊥. Otherwise, unroll the execution
graph of M , and find the execution path from the start state s0 to an
accepting state sω. Assume M uses only the first `
′ ≤ ` input symbols to
get to sω. Collect all the transition matrices {Rt′,t,jδ } (including R) of the
path and the vector dsω .
2. Get the useful part of c1: c¯
t
1 = s
t · [A|B(1)w[1]| · · · |B(`
′)
w[`′] ] + ν¯
t
1.
3. Set
ct1,0 = c¯
t
1 ·

R
Im
. . .
Im

︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈Z(`′+1)m×(`′+2)m
modq
= st · [S(−1,0)z0 |A(0,1)s0 |B(1)w[1]| · · · |B(`
′)
w[`′]] + ν¯
t
1,0.
4. Sequentially apply the transition matrices to transform c1,0 into
ct1,end = s
tAsω + ν
t
1,end (mod q)
This can be done in an obvious way and the ciphertext part of the stack
matrices that comes out with Asω at the last step is simply discarded.
5. Set ∆ = c0 − ct1,enddsω and output output m = 0 if |∆| < q/4, or m = 1
otherwise.
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3.4.2 Correctness and Parameters
By applying the decryption algorithm, we have
∆ = c0 − ct1,enddsω (mod q)
=
(
stu + ν0 + mbq/2c
)− (stu + νt1,enddsω)
= mbq/2c+ ν0 − νt1,enddsω
To establish the correctness of the construction, it is necessary to show
|Error| = |ν0 − νt1,enddsω |
≤ |ν0|+ ‖ν1,end‖ ‖dsω‖
< 4/q
with overwhelming probability.
Let B be a bound on the transition matrices (i.e. ‖Rδ‖(t
′t,j) ≤ B) and β be
the bound of norm of the samples from χm. Assume M takes k steps to get to an
accepting state after digesting the first `′ > 0 input symbols of a `-length string
w. We must have `′ ≤ k < η. To bound the accumulated noise ν1,end, we have
‖ν1,end‖ ≤ β
k∑
i=1
Bi < βηBη (3.1)
To run SampleExtend we need a large enough Gaussian parameter σ, i.e.,
≥ ‖T‖GS · ω(
√
log(4m)), where T is the trapdoor basis output by TrapGen such
that ‖T‖GS = O(
√
n log q). So we set
σ = n · ω(
√
log q) (3.2)
Note that the highest row dimension of the transition matrices R
(t′t,j)
δ is 4m.
By Lemma 2.3.2, we have
B = σ
√
4m. (3.3)
Meanwhile, dsω has distribution DZm,σ conditioned on Aωdsω = u (mod q), so
‖dsω‖ ≤ σ
√
m (3.4)
by Lemma 2.3.2. To invoke Peikert’s worst-case to average-case reduction, we set
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χ = DZ,2√n. By Lemma 2.3.2, we have
ν0 ≤ 2
√
n (3.5)
and
β = 2
√
n · √m. (3.6)
Therefore,
|Error| ≤ |ν0|+ ‖ν1,end‖ ‖dsω‖
≤ 2√n+ βηBη
≤ 2√n+ (2n1/2m1/2) · η · (σ
√
4m)η · σ√m
≤ 2√n+ η · 2η+1 ·m1+η/2 · ση+1
≤ O˜ (η · 2η+1 · n(5+3η)/2)
To make |Error| < 4/q, it is sufficient to set
q = Ω˜
(
η · 2η+1 · n(5+3η)/2)
3.4.3 Security Proof
Theorem 3.4.1. If there exists a PPT adversary A against the selective security
of the above encryption scheme, denoted by Π with advantage AdvselectiveΠ,A (λ), then
there exists a PPT adversary B against the LWEn,q,χ problem such that
AdvselectiveΠ,A (λ) ≤ AdvLWEn,q,χB (λ)
We here remark that we consider attribute strings with polynomially bounded
length, by relying on the sub-exponential hardness of the LWE problem and the
standard “complexity leveraging” argument [BB04a].
Proof. We show that if there exists a PPT adversary A has non-negligible ad-
vantage in wining the selective security game, we can construct a simulator B
that solves the LWE problem with non-negligible advantage. This will lead to a
contradiction to the decisional LWE assumption.
Bifurcation vertex. Firstly, we formally define “bifurcation vertex” in ex-
ecution graph, which plays an essential role in the reduction. In the selec-
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tive security model, A is required to supply the challenge attribute string
w∗ = w∗[1]w∗[2] . . .w∗[`] ∈ {0, 1}`. For each DPDA A submits fto require
a the decryption key, the edges specified by w∗ (plus the edges specified by M ’s
ε transition) define the challenge path. For a DPDA M where w /∈ L(M)∗, this
challenge path will not end up with any of the accepting state of M (otherwise
w ∈ L(M)∗). Any execution path of M will, at some vertex, deviate from the
challenge path through a non-ε edge, which is not specified by w∗, and go to some
next vertex that is not on the challenge path. We refer to the vertices where the
execution paths M deviates from the challenge path as bifurcation vertices. We
depict a bifurcation vertex in Figure 3.2 in which red vertices are on the challenge
path and the blue vertex is not (we ignore the stack position tags).
s, u
...s′, v
1−w∗[j + 1]
w∗[j + 1]
Figure 3.2: Bifurcation Vertex
More specifically, a bifurcation vertex (u, s, j, t′, t) of a DPDA M sits on the
challenge path along with a transition δ(u, s, b)→ (v, s′). Here b = 1−w∗[j + 1]
is the j + 1th input symbol. The transition takes M to the next vertex (v, s′, j +
1, t + 1, t + 2) (in case of push transition) or (v, s′, j + 1, t′′, t + 1) (in case of
pop transition). In the reduction, we won’t be able to have trapdoors for the
state and stack matrices of the bifurcation vertex (u, s, j, t′, t) as it lies on the
challenge path. Also, we won’t be able to get trapdoors for next vertices that
connect to (u, s, j, t′, t) through edge ε and edge w∗[j] (if they are existed). This
is because the edge ε does not provide any input matrix from which we could
have trapdoor and we will embed the LWE challenge in the input matrix B
(j)
w∗[j].
However, simulator will sample B
(j)
1−w∗[j] with trapdoor and and this trapdoor
will (hopefully) allow simulator to get full control of the next vertex.
“Fake” bifurcation vertex. There could be a case that two transitions start
from the same vertex and end up with the same vertex through different edges.
More specifically, for an vertex (u, s, j, t′, t) in the challenge path, there could
exist two transitions δ(u, s,w∗[j])→ (v, s′) and δ(u, s, 1−w∗[j])→ (v, s′) which
are different from each other only in terms of the input symbols. As the target
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vertex of these two transition is still on the challenge path, the input matrix of
1−w∗[j] does not really help the simulator to deviate from the challenge path.
We refer to the vertex (u, s, j, t′, t) a “fake” bifurcation vertex. (Figure 3.3)
s, u
s′, v
1−w∗[j] w∗[j]
Figure 3.3: “Fake” Bifurcation Vertex
The reduction. At the beginning, B receives a challenge attribute string
w∗ = w∗[1]w∗[2] . . .w∗[`] ∈ {0, 1}` with length ` ≤ τ . B gets its LWE challenge:
(b, a) ∈ Zq × Znq ; ([b0|b1| . . . |b`] , [A0|A1| . . . |A`]) ∈ (Znq )`+1 × (Zn×mq )`+1
from the oracle. B needs to decide whether there exists a vector s $←− Znq such
that bti = s
tAi + ν
t
i for i ∈ [0, `] and a freshly sampled νi $←− χm.
Setup. B prepares Pub for A as follows:
1. Set B
(j)
w∗[j] ← Ai ∈ Zn×mq for j ∈ [`]. Sample B(j)1−w∗[j] along with trapdoors
for j ∈ [`] and B(j)b for j ∈ [`+ 1, τ ], b ∈ {0, 1} by TrapGen.
2. Set A← A0 ∈ Zn×mq .
3. Set u← a ∈ Znq .
4. Output Pub =
(
{B(j)b }b∈{0,1},j∈[τ ],A,u
)
.
Phase 1. In this phase, A adaptively issues DPDAs such that w /∈ L(M)∗ for
requesting decryption keys. For such a query on a DPDA M = (Q,Γ, δ, s0, z0, F ),
B unrolls M into the execution graph and does the following to construct the
corresponding key skM :
1. To prepare the state and stack matrices of the initial vertex (z0, s0, 1,−1, 0),
B samples R← (DZm,σ)2m and computes
[
S
(−1,0)
z0 |A(0,1)s0
]
← AR mod q.
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2. Starting from (z0, s0, 1,−1, 0), B follows the challenge path defined by w∗
with the transition functions of M until it gets to the bifurcation vertex
or the end of this path. Since w /∈ L(M)∗, the end vertex of the challenge
path does not contain an accepting state. For any transition that lies on
the path, B inductively multiplies the current state and stack matrices with
a freshly sampled Gaussian transition matrix to define the matrices of the
next vertex. More specifically:
(a) For a push transition δ(u, s,w∗[j])→ (v, s′) (j ≤ `), which connects
vertices (u, s, j, t′, t) and (v, s′, j + 1, t + 1, t + 2) (resp. an ε push
transition δ(u, s, ε)→ (v, s′), which connects vertices (u, s, j, t′, t) and
(v, s′, j, t+ 1, t+ 2)), B samples R(t′,t,j)δ ← (DZ3m,σ)3m (resp. R(t
′,t,j)
δ ←
(DZ2m,σ)
3m) and computes
[S(t
′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v |A(t+2,j+1)s′ ]←
[
S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)b
]
·R(t′,t,j)δ mod q
(resp.
[
S
(t′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v |A(t+2,j)s′
]
←
[
S
(t′,t)
u |A(t,j)s
]
· R(t′,t,j)δ mod q)
from the known matrices S
(t′,t)
u , A
(t,j)
s and B
(j)
b .
(b) For a pop transition δ(u, s,w∗[j]) → (v, s′) (j ≤ `), which connects
vertices (u, s, j, t′, t) and (v, s′, j + 1, t′′, t + 1) (resp. a ε pop tran-
sition δ(u, s, ε) → (v, s′), which connects vertices (u, s, j, t′, t) and
(v, s′, j, t′′, t + 1)), B samples R(t′,t,j)δ ← (DZ4m,σ)2m (resp. R(t
′,t,j)
δ ←
(DZ3m,σ)
2m) and computes[
S(t
′′,t+1)
v |A(t+1,j+1)s′
]
←
[
S(t
′′,t′)
v |S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)b
]
·R(t′,t,j)δ mod q
(resp.
[
S
(t′′,t+1)
v |A(t+1,j)s′
]
←
[
S
(t′′,t′)
v |S(t′,t)u |A(t,j)s
]
·R(t′,t,j)δ mod q) from
the known matrices S
(t′,t)
u , A
(t,j)
s and B
(j)
b .
After finishing this step, B has constructed all the transition matrices for
the transitions that happen before the bifurcation vertices.
3. B prepares for transition matrices for all transitions that happen at the
bifurcation vertices. For those transitions, B makes use of the trapdoors
from the input matrices.
(a) For a push transition δ(u, s, 1−w∗[j])→ (v, s′) (j ≤ `), which connects
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vertices (u, s, j, t′, t) and (v, s′, j + 1, t + 1, t + 2), B runs TrapGen
to sample S
(t′,t+1)
u , S
(t+1,t+2)
v and A
(t+2,j+1)
s′ with trapdoors if they
haven’t been defined. Then with the trapdoor from B1−w∗[j] it runs
SampleExtend to sample R
(t′,t,j)
δ with distribution (DZ3m,σ)
3m such that[
S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)1−w∗[j]
]
·R(t′,t,j)δ =
[
S(t
′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v |A(t+2,j+1)s′
]
mod q
(b) For a pop transition δ(u, s,w∗[j]) → (v, s′) (j ≤ `), which connects
vertices (u, s, j, t′, t) and (v, s′, j+1, t′′, t+1), B runs TrapGen to sample
S
(t′′,t+1)
v and A
(t+1,j+1)
s′ if they haven’t been defined. Then, with the
trapdoor from B1−w∗[j] it runs SampleExtend to sample R
(t′,t,j)
δ with
distribution (DZ4m,σ)
2m such that[
S(t
′′,t′)
v |S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)1−w∗[j]
]
·R(t′,t,j)δ =
[
S(t
′′,t+1)
v |A(t+1,j+1)s′
]
mod q
(c) If the state s′ = sω of the target vertex is an accepting state, B simply
sets Aω ← A(t+2,j+1)s′ in the case (a) and Aω ← A(t+1,j+1)s′ in the case
(b). We must have that Aω either hasn’t been defined or has been
defined with trapdoor.
4. For a special case (not always happening) that a normal transition departs
from the end vertex of the challenge path defined by w∗, the transition takes
the ` + 1th input symbol as input. As B has sampled the input matrices
B
(`+1)
b and B
(`+1)
1−b with trapdoors, it uses the same way in step 3 to sample
R
(t′,t,`+1)
δ with proper distributions and dimensions.
5. B prepares the transition matrices of the transitions after the bifurcation
vertices. Here, we note that B at least has a trapdoor for one of the sub-
matrices of the departing vertex. There are two sub-cases. The first case is
that not all the stack and state matrices in the target vertex have already
been defined through the step 2. In this case, B samples the undefined
matrices with their trapdoors which are used further to sample the transition
matrices. In another case, it is possible that the target vertex is in the
challenge path and the corresponding state and stack matrices have already
been defined in the step 2 (as the execution is described as a graph). In
this case, B can still sample the transition matrix. However, since the path
returns back to the challenge path, B needs to wait for the next bifurcation
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vertex. In detail:
(a) For a push transition δ(u, s, b) → (v, s′) which connects vertices
(u, s, j, t′, t) and (v, s′, j + 1, t + 1, t + 2) (resp. a ε push transi-
tion δ(u, s, ε) → (v, s′), which connects vertices (u, s, j, t′, t) and
(v, s′, j, t + 1, t + 2)), B runs TrapGen to sample S(t′,t+1)u , S(t+1,t+2)v
and A
(t+2,j+1)
s′ (resp. A
(t+2,j)
s′ ) with trapdoors for the target vertex,
if they haven’t been defined. Then with the trapdoor from S
(t′,t)
u or
A
(t,j)
s (one of them must be already defined with a trapdoor), it runs
SampleExtend to sample R
(t′,t,j)
δ with distribution (DZ3m,σ)
3m (resp.
R
(t′,t,j)
δ with distribution (DZ2m,σ)
3m) such that[
S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)b
]
·R(t′,t,j)δ =
[
S(t
′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v |A(t+2,j+1)s′
]
(mod q)
(resp.
[
S
(t′,t)
u |A(t,j)s
]
·R(t′,t,j)δ =
[
S
(t′,t+1)
u |S(t+1,t+2)v |A(t+2,j)s′
]
(mod q)).
(b) For a pop transition δ(u, s, b)→ (v, s′) which connects vertices (u, s, j, t′, t)
and (v, s′, j+ 1, t′′, t+ 1) (resp. a ε transition δ(u, s, ε)→ (v, s′), which
connects vertices (u, s, j, t′, t) and (v, s′, j, t′′, t+ 1)), B runs TrapGen
to sample S
(t′′,t+1)
v and A
(t+1,j+1)
s′ (resp. A
(t+1,j)
s′ ) with trapdoors for
the target vertex, if they haven’t been defined. With the trapdoor
from S
(t′′,t′)
v , S
(t′,t)
u or A
(t,j)
s (one of them must exist with a trapdoor),
it runs SampleExtend to sample R
(t′,t,j)
δ with distribution (DZ4m,σ)
2m
(resp. R
(t′,t,j)
δ with distribution (DZ3m,σ)
2m) such that[
S(t
′′,t′)
v |S(t
′,t)
u |A(t,j)s |B(j)b
]
·R(t′,t,j)δ =
[
S(t
′′,t+1)
v |A(t+1,j+1)s′
]
(mod q)
(resp.
[
S
(t′′,t′)
v |S(t′,t)u |A(t,j)s
]
·R(t′,t,j)δ =
[
S
(t′′,t+1)
v |A(t+1,j)s′
]
(mod q)).
(c) If the state s′ = sω of the target vertex is an accepting state, B
simply sets Aω ← A(t+2,j+1)s′ (resp. Aω ← A(t+2,j)s′ ) in the case (a) and
Aω ← A(t+1,j+1)s′ (resp. Aω ← A(t+1,j)s′ ) in the case (b). We must have
that Aω either hasn’t been defined or has been defined with trapdoor.
6. For any Asω defined with trapdoor (this must be the case according to the
simulation) where sω ∈ F , B runs SampleExtend to sample dsω ∈ Zm such
that Asωdsω = u (mod q).
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7. Finally, B collects all the transition matrices constructed above, and outputs
skM =
(
R, {R(t′,t,j)δ }, {dsω}sω∈F
)
.
Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a message bit
m∗ ∈ {0, 1}. B prepares the challenge ciphertext ctw∗ = (c0, c1) as:
1. c0 = b+ m
∗bq/2c.
2. ct1 = [b
t
0|bt1| . . . |bt`].
Phase 2. The same as Phase 1.
Guess. A outputs m′. B decides its own LWE challenge is from Os if m′ = m∗,
or from O$ otherwise. Firstly, if B gets real LWE samples, for i ∈ [0, `] there
must exist a vector s ∈ Znq , noises ν ← χ, νi ← χm such that b = sta + ν and
bti = s
tAi + ν
t
i . According to Pub B set up before, (c0, c1) is a well-formed
challenge ciphertext for w∗. On the other hand, if B gets random samples from
O$, (c0, c1) is truly random. In this case A has no advantage in guessing m∗.
It is easy to see that all the parameters B presented to A in the simulation
are distributed as in the real scheme. The simulation is indistinguishable from
the real scheme. Thus we have
Adv
LWEn,q,χ
A (λ) =
∣∣Pr[AOs(1λ) = 1]− Pr[AO$(1λ) = 1]∣∣
= |Pr[γ = γ′]− 1/2|
= AdvsectiveΠ.A (λ)
That is, A’s advantage in attacking the scheme is transferred in the advantage of
B in solving the decisional LWE problem.
3.5 Extensions to 2-Stack DPDAs (and Thus
Bounded DTMs)
To extend the 1-Stack DPDA ABE scheme to handle two or more stacks (thus
Turing machines), the execution graphs are correspondingly extended to represent
additional memory and preserve the acyclic property. This can be achieved by
adding enough (linearly many) variables. The resulting execution graphs have
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dimensions which are linearly more than the execution graphs of 1-Stack DPDAs
in the number of stacks. The ABE schemes for multi-stacks DPDAs (Turing
machines) are obtained by incorporating the new execution graphs into the matrix
transition equations. Their security can be proven in a similar way as the security
proof of the ABE scheme for single stack DPDAs. The case of DPDAs with
multiple stacks (more than two) follows readily.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have addressed the research problem of constructing more
expressive public-key encryption schemes. Particularly, we proposed an attribute-
based encryption scheme for multi-stack deterministic push-down automata from
the LWE assumption. The push-down automata’s maximum running time and
the length of input string are both a-priori bounded by some polynomials that
fixed in the system is being set up. This is the first ABE scheme whose decryption
key can be expressively described by for multi-stack automata or bounded Turing
machines. Therefore, our construction advances the research line on expressive
encryption.
The core technique our construction uses is the abstraction of the execution of
bounded deterministic push-down automata. That is, every push-down automaton
will be unrolled into a DAG, which is constrained by carefully chosen variables,
with respect to all possible (bounded) input strings. Such graph abstraction
narrows the focus on each single execution step while still being able to logically
chain all history execution steps together to prevent attacks.
A very challenging problem left by this work is to build expressive encryption
schemea for a-priori unbounded Turing machines from post-quantum assumptions
like LWE, which is also one of the ultimate goals of this research line.
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In this chapter, we study the problem of improving security reductions in
terms of tightness for expressive public-key encryption systems. We show how to
construct a fully (or, adaptively) secure identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme
from the LWE assumption with tight security reduction in the sense that the
security loss incurred by reduction of our IBE scheme is independent of the
number of adversarial queries. This is the first lattice-based expressive public-key
encryption scheme that enjoys tight security reduction in the full security model.
Additionally, our IBE scheme gives the first fully secure lattice signature scheme
that achieves short signature and tight security reduction simultaneously.
4.1 Introduction
In an IBE system, any random string that uniquely represents a user’s identity,
such as an email address or a driver license number, can act as a public key
(within a certain domain or realm). Encryption uses this identity, together with
some common domain-specific public parameters, to encrypt messages. Users
are issued private decryption keys corresponding to their public identities, by a
trusted authority (or distributed authorities) called Private Key Generator (PKG)
which hold(s) (shares of) the master secret key for a domain. Decryption succeeds
if the identity associated with the ciphertext matches the identity associated with
the private key, in the same domain.
The strongest, most natural and most widely accepted notion of security for
IBE is the adaptive security model or full security model, formally defined by
Boneh and Franklin [BF01]. In this model, the adversary is able to announce its
target (the challenge identity it wants to attack) at any time during the course of
its adaptive interaction with the system. Without the luxury of random oracles,
an easier security model to achieve was the selective security model, where the
adversary must announce its target identity at the onset of its interaction with
the system.
4.1.1 Post-Quantum IBE with Tight Security Reduction
In the last fifteen years, a great many IBE schemes have been proposed, with
varying efficiency, security models, hardness assumptions, and other features. In
the standard model (i.e., without random oracles or other idealised oracles), we
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mention several notable IBE schemes which have been constructed from bilinear
maps in the selective model [CHK03, BB04a] and the adaptive model [BB04b,
Wat05,Gen06,Wat09,CW13,BKP14], and from lattices in the adaptive model
[ABB10,CHKP12,AFL16]. It is fair to say that, by now, the art of selectively
secure IBE has been well honed. For fully secure IBE from standard cryptographic
assumptions, improving security reductions for existing constructions remains an
important and active research topic. With the powerful dual-system encryption
methodology [Wat09], IBE with tight security reductions under the decisonal
linear assumption over bilinear pairings are known (e.g., [CW13,BKP14,AHY15,
HKS15]). However, all known directly constructed adaptively secure IBE scheme
from standard post-quantum assumptions (specifically the LWE assumptions)
[ABB10,CHKP12,AFL16] have loose security reductions, i.e., the security loss
during reduction depends on the number of adversarial queries. In other words,
there is currently no tightly secure adaptive IBE scheme based on standard
computational problems which are conjectured to be hard under quantum attacks.
In summary, the following research problem remains open:
“Construct a tightly, fully secure IBE scheme from standard post-
quantum assumptions without random oracles.”
4.1.2 Short Signatures with Tight Reduction
Digital signatures and identity-based encryption (IBE) are closely connected. It
has been observed by Naor that an IBE scheme can be immediately converted
into a signature scheme. This suggests that techniques that improve upon the
security of IBE schemes might also improve upon the security of signatures.
Short signatures are useful and desirable for providing data authenticity in
low-bandwidth and/or high-throughput applications where many signatures have
to be processed very quickly. A signature is “short” if the signature consists in a
(small) constant number of group elements (e.g., field elements or lattice points).
Although bare-bones signatures can be obtained from very weak assumptions
(e.g., collision-resistant hash functions), constructing efficient short signatures
satisfying standard security requirements (e.g., existential unforgeability under
adaptively chosen-message attacks), from reasonable assumptions, appears to be
a challenging task. Some of the existing short signature schemes use random
oracles [BLS04,BR93,KW03,GPV08,Lyu12], or rely on non-standard computa-
tional assumptions (strong, interactive assumptions, and/or q-type parametric
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assumptions) [GHR99,CS00,Fis03,BB04c,CL04], or require signers to maintain
state across signatures, e.g., [HW09a].
The first short signature scheme from a reasonable and non-parametric as-
sumption without random oracles was proposed by Waters [Wat05]. Hohenberger
and Waters later proposed a short signature scheme from standard RSA [HW09b].
Lattice-based short signatures from the very mild SIS assumption in the standard
model were proposed Boyen [Boy10] and Micciancio and Peikert [MP12]. Re-
cently, the “confined guessing” technique developed by Bo¨hl et al. [BHJ+13] has
produced short signatures from standard RSA and bilinear-group CDH assump-
tions, and also from the ring-SIS/SIS assumption in combination with lattice
techniques [DM14,AS15] but with very loose reductions.
While all aforementioned short signature schemes from standard assumptions
(without random oracles) have loss reductions, two exceptional signature schemes
by Chen and Wee [CW13] and Blazy et al. [BKP14] achieve short signatures and
tight reductions simultaneously. These schemes are obtained from tightly secure
IBE schemes from bilinear pairings and, therefore, are beloved to be broken under
quantum attacks. So far, existing post-quantum short signature schemes either
have relatively loss reductions, e.g., [Boy10,MP12,BHJ+13], or asymptotically
large signature size, e.g., [BKKP15], or merely have heuristic security arguments
based on random oracles, e.g., [GPV08]. Despite these elegant constructions, the
following research problem on signature schemes remains open.
“Construct a tightly secure and short signature scheme that do not
rely on quantumly broken assumptions.”
4.1.3 Our Contributions
Our contributions made in this chapter are affirmative answers to the two open
problems aforementioned. In particular. we propose the first fully secure IBE
scheme with tight security reduction in the standard model from post-quantum
assumptions. The scheme security is independent of adversarial queries and
is tightly related to the hardness of LWE and the security of an instantiated
pseudo-random function, say PRF, in the sense that the security loss is a nearly
optimal constant factor. More precisely, let  be the advantage of an adversary in
attacking our IBE scheme, LWE be the hardness level of the LWE assumption on
which our schemes are based, and PRF the security level of the PRF instantiation
PRF. Our constructions provide the following: ′ ≈ 2(LWE + PRF), and the
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(polynomial) runtime of the reduction is approximately the same as the attacker’s
runtime. This gives an answer to our first open problem.
Table 4.1 shows a comparison among existing lattice-based IBE schemes. λ
denotes the security parameter. qhash and qid stand for the number of random
oracle queries and the number of identity key generation queries. The IBE scheme
in [KY16] crucially relies on lattices with ring structure and thus ring-LWE
assumptions are required which appear to be stronger assumtpions. We note that
an IBE scheme in [ZCZ16] only enables on a-priori bounded (with a polynomial
fixed in setting up a system) number of identity private keys. This does not
satisfied Boneh and Franklin’s original definition of IBE systems in [BF01], so it
is excluded from the comparison.
Schemes
Security
Model
Security
Loss
Assumptions
Standard
Model
[GPV08] Full O(qhash) LWE 7
[CHKP12] Full O(λqid) LWE 4
[ABB10] Selective O(1) LWE 4
[ABB10] (Full Version) Full O(λqid) LWE 4
[Yam16] Full O(λqid) LWE 4
[AFL16] Full O(λqid) LWE 4
[KY16] Full O(λqid) Ring-LWE 4
Ours Full O(λ) LWE 4
Table 4.1: Comparison of Lattice IBE Schemes
As a by-product, our IBE scheme results in the first fully and tightly secure
short signature scheme without relying on quantumly broken assumptions. The
security our signature scheme is tightly based on the SIS problem and the security
of an instantiated PRF, which is independent of adversarial queries as well. This
answers the second open problem. Table 4.2 provides a comparison among existing
lattice-based signature schemes. In the table, m stands for the integer lattice
dimension, λ stands for the security parameter, and the number of signing queries
made by adversary is denoted by qs.
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Schemes
Signature
Size
Security
Loss
Assumptions
Standard
Model
[GPV08] O(1)× Zm O(1) SIS 7
[CHKP12] O(1)× Zm O(λqs) SIS 4
[Boy10] O(1)× Zm O(λqs) SIS 4
[MP12] O(1)× Zm O(λqs) SIS 4
[BKKP15] O(λ)× Zm O(1) SIS 4
Ours O(1)× Zm O(λ) SIS 4
Table 4.2: Comparison of Lattice Signature Schemes
4.2 Tightly Secure IBE Scheme from Lattices
4.2.1 Definitions of IBE
Algorithms for IBE. An IBE scheme consists of four PPT algorithms: Setup,
KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt. The algorithm Setup generates public parameters
Pub and a master secret key Msk. The algorithm KeyGen uses the master secret
key Msk to produce an identity private key skid for identity id. The algorithm
Encrypt uses Pub to encrypt messages for a given identity id. The algorithm
Decrypt decrypts ciphertexts using the identity private key if the identity of the
ciphertext matches the identity of the private key.
Security Model of IBE. We review the full (adaptive) security model of IBE
proposed by Boneh and Franklin [BF01]. For a security parameter λ, let Mλ
be the message space and Cλ be the ciphertext space.The IND-ID-CPA security
of IBE is defined through the following game between an adversary A and a
challenger B.
Setup. B runs Setup(1λ)→ (Pub,Msk), passes Pub to A, and keeps Msk.
Phase 1. A adaptively issues identity key queries for any identity id. B runs
KeyGen to generate skidi for A.
Challenge. When A decides the Phase 1 is over, it outputs a challenge iden-
tity id∗, which is not been queried during Phase 1, and two equal length
messages m0,m1 ∈ Mλ. B flips a fair coin γ $←− {0, 1} and sets ctid∗ ←
Encrypt(Pub,mγ, id
∗) for A.
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Phase 2. This phase is the same as Phase 1 except A is not allowed to ask
private key for identity id∗.
Guess. A outputs γ′ ∈ {0, 1} and it wins if γ′ = γ.
We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-ID-CPA adversary. We define the
advantage (in the security parameter λ) of A in attacking an IBE scheme E as
Advind-id-cpaE,A (λ) = |Pr[γ′ = γ]− 1/2| .
Definition 4.2.1. For the security parameter λ, let t = t(λ), qid = qid(λ), and
 = (λ). We say that an IBE system E is (t, qid, )-IND-ID-CPA secure if for any
t-time IND-ID-CPA adversary A that makes at most qid identity key queries, we
have Advind-id-cpaE,A (λ) ≤ .
Chosen-Ciphertext Security. By allowing decryption queries in Phase 1 and
Phase 2 (except on the challenge ciphertext), Definition 4.2.1 can be straightfor-
wardly extended to define the full security of IBE system against chosen-ciphertext
attacks. For achieving such higher security level, standard techniques, e.g., the
BCHK transformation [BCHK06], is available to our IBE scheme.
Selective Security. A weaker and less realistic security model of IBE, intro-
duced by Canetti et al. [CHK03], is the selective security model in which the
adversary is required to commit to the challenge identity even before seeing the
public parameters. We note that under computational assumptions with sub-
exponential hardness, a selectively secure IBE is also adaptively secure through a
standard “complexity leveraging” argument [BB04a]; however, complexity lever-
aging incurs a rather severe loss of tightness in the security reduction, which is
theoretically inelegant.
4.2.2 Construction
Setup(1λ) The setup algorithm does the following:
1. Run TrapGen to produce a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq along with a trapdoor basis
TA ∈ Zm×m of lattice Λ⊥q (A).
2. Select random matrices A0, A1, random “PRF key” matrices B1, . . . , Bk,
and random “PRF input” matrices C0, C1 from Zn×mq .
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3. Select a random vector u from Znq .
4. Select a secure PRF PRF : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}, express it as a
NAND Boolean circuit CPRF with depth d = d(λ), and select a PRF key
K = k1k2 . . . ks
$←− {0, 1}k.
5. Output the public parameters
Pub =
(
A, {A0,A1}, {Bi}i∈[s], {C0,C1},u,PRF, CPRF
)
and the master secret key Msk = (TA, K).
KeyGen(Pub,Msk, id) Upon an input identity id=x1x2 . . . x` ∈ {0, 1}`, the key
generation algorithm does the following:
1. Compute b = PRF(K, id).
2. Compute ACPRF,id = EvalBV(CPRF, {Bi}i∈[s],Cx1 ,Cx2 , . . . ,Cx`) ∈ Zn×mq .
3. Set Fid,1−b =
[
A | A1−b −ACPRF,id
]
∈ Zn×2mq .
4. Run SampleLeft to sample did ∼ DΛuq (Fid,1−b),σ hence Fid,1−bdid = u (mod q).
Output skid = did.
Encrypt(Pub, id,m) To encrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1} with respect to an identity
id = x1x2 . . . x` ∈ {0, 1}`:
1. Compute ACPRF,id = EvalBV(CPRF, {Bi}i∈[s],Cx1 ,Cx2 , . . . ,Cx`).
2. Set Fid,b =
[
A | Ab −ACPRF,id
]
∈ Zn×2mq for b = 0, 1.
3. Select two random vectors s0, s1
$←− Znq .
4. Select two noise scalars ν0,0, ν1,0 ← DZ,σLWE and four noise vectors νˆ0,1, νˆ1,1 ←
DZm,
√
2σLWE
, νˇ0,1, νˇ1,1 ← DZm,φ where φ is sufficiently larger than σLWE.1
5. Compute the ciphertext ctid = (c0,0, c0,1, c1,0, c1,1) as:
c0,0 = (s
t
0u + ν0,0 + mbq/2c) mod q
ct0,1 =
(
st0Fid,0 + [νˆ
t
0,1 | νˇt0,1]
)
mod q
1For instance we set φ = O(4d ·m3/2) · ω(√logm) · σLWE.
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
c1,0 = (s
t
1u + ν1,0 + mbq/2c) mod q
ct1,1 =
(
st1Fid,1 + [νˆ
t
1,1 | νˇt1,1]
)
mod q
Decrypt(Pub, skid, ctid) The decryption algorithm uses the key did to try to
decrypt both (c0,0, c0,1) and (c1,0, c1,1)
2. W.l.o.g., assume that (cb,0, cb,1) is the
correct ciphertext. The decryption algorithm computes
∆ =
(
cb,0 − ctb,1did
)
mod q
View ∆ as an integer in (−q/2, q/2]. If ∆ is closer to 0 than ±q/2, the output is
m = 0. Otherwise, it is m = 1.
4.2.3 Correctness and Parameter Selection
Following the decryption algorithm, let did = [d
t
1 | dt2]t. We have
∆ =
(
cb,0 − ctb,1did
)
mod q
=
(
mbq/2c+ νb,0 − νˆtb,1d1 − νˇtb,1d2
)
mod q
Recall, the norm of d1 and d2 is bounded by σ
√
m, |νb,0| ≤ σLWE, the norm of
νˆb,1 and νˇb,1 is bounded by
√
2σLWE
√
m and φ
√
m respectively, by Lemma 2.3.2.
To ensure correctness of decryption, we need
|Error| = |νb,0 − νˆtb,1d1 − νˇt0,1d2|
≤ |νb,0|+ ‖νˆ0,1‖ · ‖d1‖+ ‖νˆ0,1‖ · ‖d2‖
≤ O(σ ·m · (σLWE + φ))
≤ q/4
Accordingly, it is enough to set q such that O(σ ·m · (σLWE + φ)) ≤ q/4.
We now discuss a consistent parameter instantiation that achieves both
correctness and security. Let λ be the security parameter, ` be the identity length,
2To ensure correct decryption, the message should contain some redundancy to weed out the
incorrect ciphertext. It is a standard technique to encrypt multiple bits in GPV-style encryption,
by replacing u with a matrix U ∈ Zn×zq in Pub with which we can now independently encrypt
z > 1 bits without change to the security analysis. If hybrid encryption is used, the multiple
bits can be used to encrypt a symmetric key without redundancy, deferring the integrity check
to the symmetric realm where it can be performed at minimal cost.
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s be the secret key length of PRF, and let l = `+ s be the input length of PRF.
Let, for the most general case, the circuit depth of PRF be d = d(λ). To ensure we
can run TrapGen as in Lemma 2.3.1, we set m = n1+η for some η > 0 (we assume
nη > O(log q)). To make sure SampleLeft in the real scheme and SampleRight
in the simulation algorithm Sim.KeyGen (see section 4.4) have the same output
distribution per Theorem 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we set a sufficiently large Gaussian
parameter σ = ‖T˜G‖ · O(4d ·m3/2) · ω(
√
logm). To ensure the applicability of
Regev’s [Reg05] and Peikert’s [Pei09] LWE reductions from worst-case lattice
problems, we set the Gaussian parameter of the LWE noise distribution to be
σLWE = 2
√
n. So the LWE noise distribution is (DZ,√n) mod q. For the security
proof (specifically for the proofs of Lemma 4.2.2 and Lemma 4.2.8), we set
φ = O(4d ·m3/2) · ω(√logm) · σLWE. Finally, to ensure correctness condition of
decryption, we set q = O(16d ·m9/2) · (ω√logm)2.
If the PRF can be computed by a NAND circuit in NC1 with depth d = c log l for
some constant c > 1, we can set the LWE modulus q = O(l4c ·m9/2) · (ω√logm)2,
which is polynomial in the security parameter λ.
4.2.4 Security Proof
The security of our IBE scheme with respect to Definition 4.2.1 can be stated by
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.1. Let λ be a security parameter. The parameters n, q are chosen
as in section 4.3. Let χ be the distribution DZm,√n. If the (tLWE, LWE)-LWEn,q,χ
assumption holds and the PRF used in the IBE scheme is (tPRF, PRF)-secure, then
the IBE scheme is (t, qid, )-IND-ID-CPA secure such that  ≤ 2(PRF+LWE)+negl(λ)
for some negligible function negl(λ), and max(tPRF, tLWE) ≈ t.
We prove the above theorem through a sequence of indistinguishability security
games. The first game is identical to the IND-ID-CPA game. In the last game,
the adversary has no advantage. We will show that a PPT adversary will not be
able to distinguish the neighboring games which will prove that the adversary
has only negligibly small advantage in wining the first (real) game.
Firstly, we define the following simulation algorithms Sim.Setup, Sim.KeyGen
and Sim.Encrypt.
Sim.Setup(1λ) The algorithm does the following:
1. Select matrix A
$←− Zn×mq .
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2. Select s+4 low-norm matrices RA0 , RA1 , {RBi}i∈[s], RC0 , RC1 $←− {1,−1}m×m.
3. Select a secure pseudo-random function PRF : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}
and express it as a NAND Boolean circuit CPRF with depth d = d(λ).
4. Select a uniformly random string K = k1k2 . . . ks
$←− {0, 1}s.
5. Set Ab = ARAb + bG and Cb = ARCb + bG for b = 0, 1.
6. Set Bi = ARBi + kiG for i ∈ [s].
7. Select a vector u
$←− Znq .
8. Publish Pub =
(
A, {A0,A1}, {Bi}i∈[k], {C0,C1},u,PRF, CPRF
)
Sim.KeyGen(Pub,Msk, id) Upon an input identity id = x1x2 . . . x` ∈ {0, 1}`, the
algorithm uses the parameters generated from Sim.Setup to do the following:
1. Compute the Zn×2mq -matrix
APRF,id = EvalBV(CPRF, {Bi}i∈[s],Cx1 , . . . ,Cx`)
= ARCPRF,id + PRF(K, id)G
2. Let PRF(K, id) = b ∈ {0, 1}. Set
Fid,1−b =
[
A | A1−b −ACPRF,id
]
=
[
A | A(RA1−b −RCPRF,id) + (1− 2b)G
]
.
3. Run SampleRight to sample did ∼ DΛuq (Fid,1−b),σ as the private key skid.
Sim.Encrypt(Pub, id∗,m) For a message m∗ ∈ {0, 1} and an identity id∗:
1. Compute b = PRF(K, id∗).
2. Set
Fid∗,b =
[
A | Ab −ACPRF,id∗
]
=
[
A | A(RAb −RCPRF,id∗)
]
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and
Fid∗,1−b =
[
A | A1−b −ACPRF,id∗
]
=
[
A | A(RA1−b −RCPRF,id∗) + (1− 2b)G
]
.
3. Select random vectors sb, s1−b
$←− Znq .
4. Select noise scalars νb,0, ν1−b,0 ← DZ,σLWE .
5. Sample noise vectors x,y← DZm,σLWE for sufficiently large Gaussian param-
eter σLWE (σLWE ≥ ηε(Zm) for some small ε > 0). Set νˆb,1 = x + y.
6. Let R = RAb − RPRF,id∗ and ri be the i-th column of R. Sample the
noise vector z = (z1, z2, . . . , zm) ∈ Zm with zi ← DZ,φ1,i for the sufficiently
large Gaussian parameter φ1,i =
√
φ2 − 2(‖ri‖ · σLWE)2. 3 Set νˇb,1 =
Rt · (x− y) + z.
7. Select noise vectors νˆ1−b,1 ← DZm,√2σLWE , νˇ1−b,1 ← DZm,φ.
8. Set the challenge ciphertext ctid∗ = (cb,0, cb,1, c1−b,0, c1−b,1) as:
cb,0 = (s
t
bu + νb,0 + mbq/2c) mod q
ctb,1 =
(
stbFid∗,b + [νˆ
t
b,1 | νˇtb,1]
)
mod q

c1−b,0 =
(
st1−bu + ν1−b,0 + mbq/2c
)
mod q
ct1−b,1 =
(
st1−bFid∗,1−b + [νˆ
t
1−b,1 | νˇt1−b,1]
)
mod q
Now we define a series of games and prove that the neighboring games are
either statistically indistinguishable, or computationally indistinguishable.
Game 0 This is the real IND-ID-CPA game from the definition. All the algo-
rithms are the same as the real scheme.
Game 1 This game is the same as Game 0 except it runs Sim.Setup and
Sim.KeyGen instead of Setup and KeyGen.
3In section 4.3, φ is set large enough such that φ1,i can be larger than ‖R‖ · ηε(Zm).
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Game 2 This game is the same as Game 1 except that the challenge ciphertext
is generated by Sim.Encrypt instead of Encrypt.
Game 3 This game is the same as Game 2 except that during preparation of
the challenge ciphertext for identity id∗, it samples (cb,0, cb,1) uniformly random
from Zq × Z2mq for b = PRF(K, id∗). The other part of the challenge ciphertext
(c1−b,0, c1−b,1) is computed by Sim.Encrypt as in Game 2.
Game 4 This game is the same as Game 3 except that for b = PRF(K, id∗)
it runs the real encryption algorithm Encrypt to generate (c1−b,0, c1−b,1) of the
challenge ciphertext instead of using Sim.Encrypt.
Game 5 This game is the same as Game 4 except that it runs Setup and
KeyGen to generate Pub and private identity keys.
Game 6 This game is the same as Game 5 except that for b = PRF(K, id∗),
the challenge ciphertext part (cb,0, cb,1) is generated by Encrypt instead of choosing
it randomly, and (c1−b,0, c1−b,1) is chosen randomly.
Game 7 This game is the same as Game 6 except that it runs Sim.Setup and
Sim.KeyGen to generate Pub and private identity keys.
Game 8 This game is the same as Game 7 except that for the bit value
b = PRF(K, id∗), it computes the challenge ciphertext (cb,0, cb,1) by Sim.Encrypt.
Game 9 This game is the same as Game 8 except that the whole challenge
ciphertext is sampled uniformly at random from the ciphertext space. Therefore,
in Game 9 the adversary has no advantage in wining the game.
In Game i, we let Si be the event that γ
′ = γ at the end of the game. The
adversary’s advantage in Game i is |Pr[Si]− 12 |. We prove the following lemmas
to prove the Theorem 4.2.1.
Lemma 4.2.1. Game 1 and Game 0 are statistically indistinguishable, so
|Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]| ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl(λ).
Proof. We analyse the differences between Game 0 and Game 1:
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1. In Game 0, the matrix A is generated by TrapGen, and in Game 1, the
matrix A is chosen uniformly random. By Lemma 2.3.1, the distributions
of these two ways of constructing the matrix A are statistically close.
2. In Game 0, the matrices {A0,A1}, {Bi}i∈[s], {C0,C1} are chosen uniformly
at random from Zn×mq . In Game 1, They are computed as Ab = ARAb+bG,
Cb = ARCb + bG for b = 0, 1, and Bi = ARBi + kiG for i ∈ [s] for
random and secret low-norm matrices RA0 , RA1 , {RBi}i∈[s], RC0 ,RC1
from {1,−1}m×m. By Lemma 2.2.3, the distributions of these two ways of
generating these public matrices are statistically close. In particular, the
PRF secret key {ki}i∈[s] is information-theoretically concealed by {Bi}i∈[s].
3. We note that in both Game 0 and Game 1, the use of A0 or A1 of the
key generation algorithms is decided by b = PRF(K, id). For a private-key
query on id in Game 1, let
Fid,1−b =
[
A | A1−b −APRF,id
]
=
[
A | A(RA1−b −RPRF,id) + (1− 2b)G
]
.
Note that the publicly known trapdoor of Λ⊥q (G) is also a trapdoor of
Λ⊥q ((1− 2b)G). In Game 1, the identity key did ∈ Λuq (Fid,1−b) is generated
by SampleLeft with the trapdoor basis TA of Λ
⊥
q (A). In Game 1, did is
generated by SampleRight with the trapdoor of Λ⊥q ((1−2b)G). By Theorems
2.3.1 and 2.3.2, for sufficient large Gaussian parameter s, the identity key
did will have the same distribution DΛuq (Fid,1−b),σ up to a negligibly small
statistical difference.
Summing up, the distributions of Game 0 and Game 1 are statistically close,
and thus |Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]| ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl(λ).
Lemma 4.2.2. Game 2 and Game 1 are statistically indistinguishable, so
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S2]| ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl(λ).
Proof. Let R = RAb − RCPRF,id∗ in the Sim.Encrypt algorithm. The difference
between Game 1 and Game 2 is the way of generating the challenge ciphertext.
In Game 1, the challenge ciphertext is generated by Encrypt, and the noise vectors
are sampled from some discrete Gaussian distributions that are independent of
Pub. In Game 2 the challenge ciphertext is generated by Sim.Encrypt, and R,
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where R is computed from RA0 ,RA1 , {RBi}i∈[k],RC0 ,RC1 , the PRF’s key K, the
circuit CPRF, and id
∗.
By construction, Encrypt and Sim.Encrypt generate (cb,0, c1−b,0, c1−b,1) in the
essentially same way (besides the negligible statistical difference in their input
public parameters). So the (cb,0, c1−b,0, c1−b,1)-part of the challenge ciphertexts
output by Encrypt and Sim.Encrypt are statistically close.
By the construction of cb,1 in the challenge ciphertext in Game 2,
ctb,1 =
(
stbFid∗,b + [νˆ
t
b,1 | νˇtb,1]
)
mod q
= st0
[
A|A(RAb −RCPRF,id∗)
]
+[(x + y)t | R(x− y)t + zt]) mod q
=
(
st0
[
A|AR
]
+ [(x + y)t|R(x− y)t + zt]
)
mod q
By Lemma 2.2.3 (the generalised left-over hash lemma), with R appearing in
the challenge ciphertext, the public matrices A0,A1, {Bi}i∈[s],C0,C1 still have a
distribution which is statistically close to the uniform distribution on Zn×mq .
Now we use the idea of smoothing parameter and continuous Gaussian ap-
proximation to show that the noise terms (x + y,Rt(x − y) + z) have proper
distribution.4 In particular, we show x + y and Rt(x − y) + z have proper
distributions individually and are statistically independent.
Firstly, since R has independent columns, z has independent coordinates and
R, z would not appear in other places, the vector Rt(x− y) + z has independent
coordinates. Secondly, x− y is discrete Gaussian with Gaussian parameter σLWE
greater than the smoothing parameter ηε(Zm), so Rt(x − y) is a mixture of
discrete Gaussians that closely approximates a (mixture of) continuous Gaussians,
but only on a “large scale” greater than ‖R‖ · ηε(Zm). The term z is used to
smooth out all visible discretisation introduced by R and make Rt(x− y) + z
closely approximate a continuous Gaussian that has zero-correlation and fixed
standard deviation. So by the construction of Sim.Encrypt and Lemma 2.3.5,
Rt(x− y) + z has a distribution which is statistically close to DZm,φ as required.
By the same reasoning, x + y has discrete Gaussian distribution DZm,
√
2σLWE
that
closely approximates the continuous Gaussian with standard deviation
√
2σLWE.
Since each of x + y and Rt(x− y) + z closely approximates a multivariate
continuous Gaussian as seen above, for which the covariance Cov(x + y,Rt(x−
4Notice that the simulator knows R while the adversary does not know R, x − y, and z
individually.
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y) + z) = 0, (the continuous approximations of) x + y and Rt(x − y) + z are
statistically independent.
Summing up, cb,1 output by Encrypt has a distribution that is statistically
close to the distribution of cb,1 output by Sim.Encrypt. Therefore Game 1 and
Game 2 are statistically indistinguishable and the lemma follows.
Lemma 4.2.3. If the (t, LWE)-LWEn,q,χ assumption holds where χ stands for the
distribution DZ,σLWE reduced modulo q, then |Pr[S2]− Pr[S3]| ≤ LWE.
Proof. We show a simulation algorithm B that uses its LWE challenge to simulate
either Game 2 or Game 3 for an adversary A. At the beginning, B receives its
LWE challenge (W,v) ∈ Zn×mq × Zmq and (w, v) ∈ Znq × Zq which is either from
O$ or Os.
Setup. B prepares the public parameters for A as follows:
1. Set A←W and u← v. We note A,u have uniform distribution.
2. Set the other public parameters as in Game 2.
Phase 1. B answers private-key queries as in Game 2.
Challenge. B prepares the challenge ciphertext for a freshly announced identity
id∗ as follows.
1. Let b = PRF(K, id∗). B sets
Fid∗,1−b =
[
A | A1−b −ACPRF,id∗
]
=
[
A | A(RA1−b −RCPRF,id∗) + (1− 2b)G
]
2. Let R = RA0 −RCPRF,id∗ . B samples y ← DZm,σLWE . It also samples
z ∈ Zm as in Sim.Encrypt by its knowledge of R. Then to construct
(cb,0, cb,1), it sets
cb,0 = (v + m
∗bq/2c) mod q
ctb,1 = ([v
t|vtR] + [yt| − ytR + zt]) mod q
3. B sets (c1−b,0, c1−b,1) the same as Game 2.
Phase 2. B replies the private key queries as in Game 2.
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Guess. Finally, A outputs whether it is interacting with Game 2 or Game 3.
If A says Game 2, B decides its LWE challenge is from Os. Otherwise, B
decides the LWE challenge is from O$.
If B gets the LWE challenge from the oracle Os, there exists a secret vector
s ∈ Znq , a noise scalar x with distribution DZ,σLWE , a noise vector x ∈ Zm with
distribution DZm,σLWE such that v
t = stA + xt and v = stw + x. Rewriting the
ciphertext, we have
cb,0 = (v + m
∗bq/2c) mod q
=
(
stw + x+ m∗bq/2c) mod q
=
(
stbu + νb,0 + m
∗bq/2c) mod q
and
ctb,1 =
(
[vt|vtR] + [yt| − ytR + zt]) mod q
=
(
[stA + xt|(stA + xt)R] + [yt| − ytR + zt]) mod q
=
(
st[A|AR] + [xt + yt|(xt − yt)R + zt]) mod q
=
(
stbFid∗,b + [νˆ
t
b,1|νˇtb,1]
)
mod q
They are valid challenge ciphertext parts in Game 2. Therefore, in this case
B simulates Game 2 for A. On the other hand, if B gets samples from O$,
(cb,0, cb,1) constructed as above will be random, which is the case of Game 3, and
B simulates Game 3. |Pr[S2]− Pr[S3]| ≤ LWE follows.
Lemma 4.2.4. |Pr[S3]− Pr[S4]| = 0.
Proof. Note that for generating (c1−b,0, c1−b,1) of the challenge ciphertext, Encrypt
and Sim.Encrypt behave the same. (cb,0, cb,1) is a random string in both games.
So that adversary’s advantage in Game 4 and Game 3 is the same.
Lemma 4.2.5. Game 5 and Game 4 are statistically indistinguishable, so
|Pr[S4]− Pr[S5]| ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl(λ).
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof for Lemma 4.2.1. We omit
the details.
Lemma 4.2.6. If PRF is (t, PRF)-secure, then |Pr[S5]− Pr[S6]| ≤ 2PRF.
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Proof. We recall the difference between Game 6 and Game 5. let b = PRF(K, id∗)
for the challenge identity id∗. In Game 5, the ciphertext component (cb,0, cb,1)
is uniformly random and (c1−b,0, c1−b,1) is computed by Encrypt. In Game 6,
the ciphertext component (cb,0, cb,1) is computed by Encrypt and (c1−b,0, c1−b,1) is
uniformly random. To prove the indistinguishably between Game 6 and Game
5, three additional security games are added.
Firstly we define Game 5.1 which is the same as Game 5 except that it
samples b
$←− {0, 1} to select a matrix Ab for generating the private keys and the
challenge ciphertext instead of using PRF to compute that. Also, if the same
identity is queried multiple times, the same bit b will be used. (For simulation,
we simply let the simulator keep a state remembering the bit for each identity.)
Obviously, a distinguisher between Game 5 and Game 5.1 leads to a attacker
for PRF. So |Pr[S5]− Pr[S5.1]| ≤ PRF. Secondly, we define Game 5.2 which is
the same as Game 5.1 except that for randomly sampled bit b for id∗, it runs
Encrypt to produce (cb,0, cb,1) and samples (c1−b,0, c1−b,1) uniformly random from
Zq×Z2mq . While here b is uniformly random, we must have |Pr[S5.1]−Pr[S5.2]| = 0.
Finally, as Game 6 is the same as Game 5.2 except that the bit value b is
computed via PRF in the key generation query phase and challenge phase, so we
have |Pr[S5.2]− Pr[S6]| ≤ PRF.
|Pr[S5]− Pr[S6]| ≤ 2PRF follows.
Lemma 4.2.7. Game 7 and Game 6 are statistically indistinguishable, so
|Pr[S6]− Pr[S7]| ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl(λ).
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof for Lemma 4.2.1. We omit
the details.
Lemma 4.2.8. Game 8 and Game 7 are statistically indistinguishable, so
|Pr[S7]− Pr[S8]| ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl(λ).
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof for Lemma 4.2.2. We omit
the details.
Lemma 4.2.9. If the (t, LWE)-LWEn,q,χ assumption holds where χ stands for the
distribution DZ,σLWE reduced modulo q, then |Pr[S8]− Pr[S9]| ≤ LWE.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof for Lemma 4.2.3. We omit
the details.
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Now we prove the Theorem 4.2.1 by the established lemmas.
Proof. Based on the lemmas that show the differences between the games in
the sequence, we have  = |Pr[S0] − 1/2| ≤ 2(PRF + LWE) + negl(λ) for some
negligibly small statistical error negl(λ). The maximum of tLWE and tPRF is equal
to t plus the time of answering private key queries, which is dominated by t.
Therefore we have max(tLWE, tPRF) ≈ t.
4.3 Tightly Secure Short Lattice Signature
Now we present the tightly secure short lattice signature scheme which is a
by-product of our IBE scheme.
4.3.1 Definition of Digital Signatures
Algorithms for Digital Signature. A digital signature scheme consists of
three PPT algorithms: KeyGen, Sign, and Ver. The algorithm KeyGen generates
a public verification key vk and a private signing key sk. The signing algorithm
Sign signs a message M using sk, and outputs the signature Sig. The verification
algorithm Ver uses the verification key vk to verify Sig. It outputs 1 if Sig is valid,
or 0 if Sig is invalid.
Security of Digital Signatures. The standard security definition, existential
unforgeability under chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA), of a digital signature
scheme Π is defined through the following security game between an adversary A
and a challenger B.
Setup. B runs Setup(1λ)→ (sk, vk), and passes vk to A.
Query. A adaptively selects messages M1, . . . ,Mqs to ask for the corresponding
signatures under vk from B. For the query Mi, B responds with a signature
Sigi ← Sign(sk,Mi).
Forge. A outputs a pair (Sig∗,M∗) and wins if
1. M∗ /∈ {M1, . . . ,Mqs}, and
2. Ver(vk, Sig∗,M∗)→ 1.
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We refer to such an adversary A as an EUF-CMA adversary. We define the
advantage (in the security parameter λ) AdvΠ,A(λ) of A in attacking the digital
signature scheme Π to be the probability that A wins above game.
Definition 4.3.1. For a security parameter λ, let t = t(λ), qs = qs(λ) and
 = (λ). We say that a digital signature scheme Π is (t, qs, )-EUF-CMA secure if
for any t time EUF-CMA adversary A that makes at most qs signing queries and
has AdvΠ,A(λ) ≤ .
4.3.2 Construction and Parameter Selection
KeyGen(1λ) The key generation algorithm does the following:
1. Run TrapGen to produce a matrix A along with a trapdoor basis TA.
2. Select random matrices A0, A1, B1, . . . , Bs, C0, C1 from Zn×mq .
3. Select a PRF PRF : {0, 1}s×{0, 1}` → {0, 1}, express it as a NAND Boolean
circuit CPRF with depth d = d(λ), and select a PRF key K = k1k2 . . . ks
$←−
{0, 1}s.
4. Select a Gaussian parameter σ > 0.
5. Output the verification key and signing key as:
vk =
(
A, {A0,A1}, {Bi}i∈[s], {C0,C1}, σ,PRF, CPRF
)
, sk = (TA, K)
Sign(vk, sk,M) The signing algorithm takes as input a public verification key vk,
a signing key sk and a message M = m1m2 . . .m` ∈ {0, 1}`. It does:
1. Compute ACPRF,M = EvalBV(CPRF, {Bi}i∈[s],Cm1 ,Cm2 , . . . ,Cmt) ∈ Zn×mq .5
2. Compute bit value b = PRF(K,M) and set FM,1−b =
[
A | A1−b −ACPRF,M
]
.
3. Run SampleLeft to sample dM ∼ DΛ⊥q (FM,1−b),σ.
4. Output the signature Sig = dM.
5It turns out that if PRF is secure, an efficient SIS algorithm can be tightly reduced to an
efficient algorithm that finds M 6= M′ such that ACPRF,M = ACPRF,M′ . We prove this in the next
subsection.
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Ver(vk,M, Sig) The verification algorithm takes as input a verification key vk, a
message M, and a signature of M, and verifies as follows:
1. Assume Sig = d. Check that if d ∈ Z2m, d 6= 0, and ‖d‖ ≤ σ√2m.
2. Compute ACPRF,M = EvalBV(CPRF, {Bi}i∈[s],Cm1 ,Cm2 , . . . ,Cm`) ∈ Zn×mq .
Check that FM,bd =
[
A | Ab −ACPRF,M
]
d = 0 (mod q) for b = 0 and 1.
3. If all above verifications pass, accept the signature; otherwise, reject.
Parameter Selection. Let λ be the security parameter, we set n = n(λ),
let the message length be t = t(λ) and the secret key length of PRF be s.
For the most general case, let the circuit depth of CPRF be d = d(λ). To
ensure that we can run TrapGen in Lemma 2.3.1, we set m = n1+η for some
η (we assume nη > O(log q)). To run SampleLeft and SampleRight in the real
scheme and simulation per Theorem 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we set σ sufficiently large
such that σ > ‖T˜G‖ · s1(R) · ω(
√
logm) for R = RAb − RCPRF,M. By Lemma
2.5.4 we set σ = O(4d · m3/2) · ω(√logm). For the SIS parameter β, we need
β ≥ O(4d ·m3/2 · σ√2m). So we set β = O(16d ·m7/2) · ω(√logm). To ensure
the applicability of the worst-case to average-case reduction for SIS, we need
q ≥ β · ω(√n log n). So we set q = O(16d ·m4) · (ω(√logm))2.
Particularly, if we choose PRF from the well-known efficient and provably
secure candidates of PRFs like the ones from [NR04,DS15,BPR12,BP14] which
can be computed by NC1 circuits, and let l = s+ ` be the input length of PRF
(which is a polynomial in the security parameter), the circuit depth of CPRF will be
d = c log l for some constant c. In this case we can set β = O(l4c ·m7/2)·ω(√logm)
and q = O(l4c ·m4) · (ω(√logm))2 which are polynomial in the security parameter.
4.3.3 Security Proof
The security of our signature scheme is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let λ be a security parameter. The parameters n, m, and q
are chosen as the section 3.2. If the (tSIS, SIS)-SISn,q,β,m assumption holds and
the PRF used in the signature scheme is (tPRF, PRF)-secure, the signature scheme
is (t, qs, )-EUF-CMA secure where SIS ≥ /2− PRF − negl(λ), for some negligible
statistical error negl(λ), and max(tPRF, tSIS) ≈ t.
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Proof. Consider the following security game between an adversary A and a
simulator B. Upon receiving a SISn,q,β,m challenge A ∈ Zn×mq , the challenger B
prepares vk as follows:
1. Select s+ 4 matrices RA0 , RA1 , {RBi}i∈[s], RC0 , RC1 $←− {1,−1}m×m.
2. Select a secure pseudo-random function PRF : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}
and express it as a NAND Boolean circuit CPRF with depth d = d(λ).
3. Select a PRF key K = k1k2 . . . ks
$←− {0, 1}s.
4. Set Ab = ARAb + bG and Cb = ARCb + bG for b = 0, 1.
5. Set Bi = ARBi + kiG for i ∈ [s].
6. Select a Gaussian parameter σ > 0.
7. Publish vk =
(
A, {A0,A1}, {Bi}i∈[s], {C0,C1},PRF, CPRF
)
.
In the query phase, the adversary A adaptively issues messages seeking the
corresponding signatures. Consider a message M = m1m2 . . .m` ∈ {0, 1}`. B
does the following to prepare the signature:
1. Compute
ACPRF = ARCPRF,M + PRF(K,M)G
= EvalBV(CPRF, {Bi}i∈[s],Cm1 ,Cm2 , . . . ,Cm`)
2. Let b = PRF(K,M), it sets
FM,1−b =
[
A | A1−b −ACPRF,M
]
=
[
A | A(RA1−b −RCPRF,M) + (1− 2b)G
]
and runs SampleRight to generate the signature Sig = dM ∼ DΛ⊥q (FM,1−b),σ.
Finally, A output a forgery (d∗,M∗). Let PRF(K,M∗) = b. If ‖d‖ >
σ
√
2m or
[
A | A1−b −ACPRF,M∗
]
d∗ = 0 (mod q), B aborts. Otherwise, we have[
A | Ab −ACPRF,M∗
]
d∗ = 0 (mod q). Let d∗ = [dt1 | dt2]t ∈ Z2m. B outputs
e = d1 + (RAb − RCPRF,M∗)d2 where ‖e‖ ≤ β as a solution for the SISn,q,β,m
problem instance.
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We show that vk output by B has the correct distribution. In the real
scheme, the matrix A is generated by TrapGen. In the simulation, A has uniform
distribution in Zn×mq as it comes from the SIS challenge. By Lemma 2.3.1, A
generated in the simulation has the right distribution except for a negligibly small
statistical error. Secondly, the matrices A, {A0,A1}, {Bi}i∈[k], and {C0,C1}
computed in the simulation have a distribution that is statistically close to the
uniform distribution in Zn×mq by Lemma 2.2.3. In particular, the PRF secret key
{ki}i∈[s] is information-theoretically concealed by {Bi}i∈[s].
Now we show that given {A0,A1}, {Bi}i∈[s], and {C0,C1}, it is hard to find
two messages M 6= M′ such that ACPRF,M = ACPRF,M′ . Assume that an efficient
adversary finds M 6= M′ such that ACPRF,M = ACPRF,M′ . With the public parameters
set up above, we have
ARCPRF,M + PRF(K,M)G = ARCPRF,M′ + PRF(K,M
′)G
If PRF(K,M) 6= PRF(K,M′), which will happen essentially with 1/2 probability
if PRF is secure, we have RCPRF,M 6= RCPRF,M′ and A(RCPRF,M −RCPRF,M′)±G = 0
(mod q). By Lemma 2.5.1 and algorithm SampleLeft, a low-norm vector d¯ ∈ Zm×m
can be efficiently found such that Gd¯ = 0 (mod q) where d¯ 6= 0 and ∥∥d¯∥∥ ≤ σ′√m
for some Gaussian parameter σ′ ≥ √5 ·ω(√logm). Then (RCPRF,M−RCPRF,M′) · d¯
will be a non-zero vector with all but negligible probability and, therefore, a valid
the SIS solution for A.
In the query phase, the signatures returned to A have the correct distribution
under the predefined conditions. Indeed, by Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, for
sufficiently large Gaussian parameter σ, the distribution of signatures generated
in the simulation by SampleRight is statistically close to DΛ⊥q (FM,1−b),σ where the
distribution of signatures generated in the real scheme by SampleLeft is also
statistically close to DΛ⊥q (FM,1−b),σ.
In the forge phase, A will have at most advantage PRF in predicting the
bit value b with respect to the message it wants to forge. Therefore, if A can
not distinguish PRF from random functions, it will randomly pick either of the
matrices A0 or A1 to make a forgery. With 1/2 chance it will pick the one that B
will be able to use to solve the SIS problem. So we have SIS ≥ /2− PRF−negl(λ)
where negl(λ) stands for negligible statistical error in the simulation.
To argue that e = d1 + (RA1 −RCPRF,M∗)d2 is a valid solution of the SISn,q,β,m
problem instance, we need to show that e is sufficiently short, and non-zero except
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with negligible probability. First of all, we have[
A | Ab −ACPRF,M∗
]
d∗ =
[
A | A(RAb −RCPRF,M∗)
]
d∗
= Ad1 + A(RAb −RCPRF,M∗)d2
= A (d1 + R · d2)
= 0 (mod q)
where R = RAb−RCPRF,M∗ . Since d1,d2 have distribution (DZ,σ)m with condition
d ∈ Λ⊥q (FM,b), by Lemma 2.3.2, d1,d2 ≤ σ
√
m. By Lemma 2.5.4, ‖e‖ ≤
‖d1‖ + s1(R) · ‖(d)‖ ≤ O(4d ·m3/2) · σ
√
m. Letting β ≥ O(4d ·m3/2) · σ√m is
sufficient.
It remains to show that e = d1 + R · d2 6= 0. Suppose d2 6= 0, we have e 6= 0
since d 6= 0. On the other hand, we have d2 = (d1, . . . , dm)t 6= 0 and, thus, at
least one coordinate of d2, say dj, is not 0. We write R = (r1, . . . , rm) and so
R · d2 = rj · dj +
m∑
i=1,i 6=j
ri · di
Observe that for the fixed message M∗ on which A made the forgery, R (therefore
rj) depends on the low-norm matrices RA0 ,RA1 , {RBi}i∈[k],RC0 ,RC1 and the
secret key of PRF. The only information about rj available for A is from the
public matrices in vk, i.e. {A0,A1}, {Bi}i∈[k], {C0,C1}. So by the pigeonhole
principle there is a (exponentially) large freedom in the chioce of rj which is
compatible with A’s view, i.e. Ar′j = Ar′′j (mod q) for admissible (low-norm)
r′j, r
′′
j where r
′
j 6= r′′j . (In fact, here we have even more freedom than Boyen’s
case [Boy10] where R is picked from {1,−1}m×m).
Finally, the maximum of tSIS and tPRF is equal to t plus B’s runtime for answer
signing queries, which is dominated by t. So we have max(tSIS, tPRF) ≈ t which
concludes the proof.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the first fully and tightly secure lattice IBE scheme
which also resulted in the first lattice signature scheme with short signatures and
tight reduction. They are the first lattice IBE and signature schemes in which the
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security dose not degrade along with an increased number of adversarial queries.
The technique we are using is a novel combination of a set of ideas from various
contexts, including Katz and Wang’s proof technique [KW03] for obtaining tightly
secure Full-Domain Hash signature schemes in the random oracle model, Agrawal
et al.’s selectively secure lattice IBE scheme [ABB10], Boyen’s lattice signature
scheme [Boy10], Boneh et al.’s key-homomorphic encryption and Brakerski and
Vikuntanathan’s fully homomorphic evaluation algorithm [BV14] for evaluating
GSW FHE scheme [GSW13].
One interesting future direction is to generalise our current techniques for
designing a lattice IBE scheme with tight reduction in the multi-instance and
multi-challenge setting. Another and also one of the major questions in research
on IBE or more generally expressive public-key encryption, is to design a dual-
system encryption framework [Wat09] for lattices for obtaining full security with
tight reductions in a different way.
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In this chapter, we study the problem of constructing public-key encryption
schemes with strong security properties and improved reductions from post-
quantum cryptographic assumptions. Particularly, we construct the first lattice-
based public-key encryption schemes that is tightly secure, in the multi-challenge
setting, against selective opening attacks and adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks.
We achieve this by following the ideas from Hemenway et al. [HLOV11] and
Hofheinz [Hof12]. We start by constructing the first lattice-based all-but-many
lossy trapdoor function (ABM-LTF) and build the public-key encryption scheme
on top of that. Our results answer the question of constructing all-but-many lossy
trapdoor functions from reasonable assumptions, which was proposed by Hofheinz
[Hof12]. Our ABM-LTF in turn provides the first lattice-based all-but-many
trapdoor function (ABM-TF), affirmatively answering the open question proposed
by Peikert and Alperin-Sheriff [ASP12]. Our public-key encryption scheme also
serves as an alternative solution,firstly answered by Gay et al. [GHKW16], for
building tightly secure public-key encryption against adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attacks without parings in the multi-challenge setting.
5.1 Introduction
For traditional (non-expressive) public-key encryption, indistinguishability against
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) is generally accepted as the
standard security definition. Efficient public-key encryption schemes that achieve
such definition are known from various computational assumptions, e.g. factoring
[HKS13], DDH [CS98], LWE [Pei09, MP12] and LPN [YZ16]. However, the
IND-CCA2 definition only captures certain active attacks in the single-challenge
setting. More specifically, in the IND-CCA2 definition, an adversary tries to
extract information from single challenge ciphertext with the help of a decryption
oracle (which decrypts all legitimate ciphertexts except the challenge). In the
real-world, on the other hand, multiple ciphertexts could be available as equally
compelling targets to adversaries.
Consequently, two problems arise in this scenario. First, it is known that
under chosen-ciphertext attacks, indistinguishability in the single-challenge setting
implies indistinguishability in the multi-challenge setting, via a direct hybrid
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argument. But such a reduction could be very loose in the case of a large number
challenge ciphertexts. An increased parameter size is therefore needed in order to
compensate for such loss, resulting in less efficient systems. Second, with multiple
targets, active adversaries could launch trickier but realistic attacks which are not
implied by the chosen-ciphertext attack. In this case, merely IND-CCA2 secure
schemes do seem to provide enough security guarantees.
In this chapter, we consider a multi-challenge attack, called selective-opening
attack (SOA), in conjunction with adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2). In
selective-opening attack, the adversary gets a collection of N challenge ciphertexts
(cti = Encrypt(pk,mi; ri))i∈[N ] that encrypt mi with randomness ri under public
key pk. The adversary can choose some subset I ⊂ [N ] and ask for the “openings”
of ciphertexts cti to get (mi, ri). Then it tries to extract information about the
messages in the unopened ciphertexts (cti)i∈[N ]\I .
There exist mainly two ways of formalising security under both SOA and
CCA2: simulation-based and indistinguishability-based.
Simulation-based security requires that anything that an adversary can com-
pute from a vector of challenge ciphertexts given openings of a chosen subset
of these ciphertexts, and a decryption oracle (not allowing decryption queries
on the unopened challenge ciphertexts), can also be computed by a simulator
than only gets to see the opened messages. We refer to this security notion as
SIM-SO-CCA2. The indistinguishability-based security essentially requires that if
no adversary who gets a collection of challenge ciphertexts, openings of a chosen
subset of these ciphertexts and and a decryption oracle (no decryption queries on
the unopened challenge ciphertexts) can distinguish the unopened messages and
freshly sampled messages. There is a subtlety on the indistinguishability-based
notion of security. The messages of the challenge ciphertexts are chosen by the
adversary to satisfy some joint distribution. However, this joint distribution
might not be always efficiently resampleable, conditioned on the opened messages.
For instance, consider two messages m1 and m2 having a distribution where m1
is random from Zq and m2 = gm1 for some order-q group G with generator g.
If the adversary asks to open the challenge ciphertext of m2, then conditioned
on m2, the resampling process requires solving a discrete logarithm on G which
is inefficient (under the discrete logarithm assumption). Therefore if one con-
siders arbitrary joint distributions on chosen messages, constructing such an
encryption scheme appears to be hard because one needs to take care of this
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inefficient resampling process. In fact, such indistinguishability-based security
under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, regardless of message distribution, is
not implied by any known security notion of public-key encryption, nor has any
construction. It remains unclear whether such a definition is proper. We refer to
the indistinguishability-based security notion with respect efficiently resampleable
joint distributions of messages as IND-SO-CCA2.1
It turns out that SIM-SO-CCA2 implies IND-SO-CCA2 [BHK12] which sug-
gests that it is preferable to have a SIM-SO-CCA2 security scheme. How-
ever, achieving SIM-SO-CCA2 is a hard task. Only a few standard-model
constructions [FHKW10, Hof12] and their improvements (with similar struc-
tures) [HLQ13,Fuj14] are available2 Currently, there are no public-key encryption
schemes based on quantum-safe assumptions that achieve even IND-SO-CCA2
security. This motivates us to devote some effort to find a way of constructing
lattice-based IND-SO-CCA2 secure public-key encryption scheme, preferably
with a tight security reduction which is independent of the number of challenge
ciphertexts and adversarial queries.
5.1.1 All-but-Many Lossy Trapdoor Functions
All-but-many lossy trapdoor functions (ABM-LTF) are a useful cryptographic
primitive formalised by Hofheinz [Hof12]. ABM-LTFs generalise lossy trapdoor
functions (LTFs) [PW11], all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions (ABO-LTFs)
[PW11], and all-but-N lossy trapdoor functions (ABN-LTFs) [HLOV11]. ABM-
LTF have shown their usefulness in constructiing public-key encryption schemes
with strong security properties including selective-opening security, e.g, [Hof12],
key-dependent message security, e.g., [Hof13] and key-leakage resilience, e.g.,
[QL13].
An ABM-LTF is a function described by public evaluation parameters and
parametrised by a tag from some set. The tag set consists of two disjoint super-
polynomially large subsets: the set of injective tags and the set of lossy tags. An
injective tag makes the function injective and, hence, invertible with trapdoors. A
lossy tag makes the function lossy meaning that the function loses information of
its inputs and, therefore, can not be inverted in the information-theoretical sense
1It is sometimes called weak-IND-SO-CCA2 [BHK12].
2We note that some practical and stadard public-key encryption schemes have been proven
to have SIM-SO-CCA2 security in the random-oracle model [HJKS15]. In this thesis, we mainly
discuss constructions in the standard model, i.e., without random oracles.
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(except with negligible probability). Note that there could exist a spurious set of
invalid tags, that make the function injective yet disable its trapdoor invertibility:
in our construction we need to account for avoiding this possibility. An ABM-LTF
is equipped with two trapdoors: one is the inversion trapdoor which allows one to
correctly invert the function in case the tag is injective; the other is a lossy tags
generation trapdoor which allows the security reduction to generate lossy tags.
ABM-LTFs have two main security properties. The first one, “lossy-tag indis-
tinguishability”, guarantees that a lossy tag is computationally indistinguishable
from a random tag, even given access to the lossy tag generation oracle. The
second one, “evasiveness”, prevents efficient adversaries from generating lossy
tags (notice that this implies that a random tag is an injective tag w.h.p.). These
two security properties make ABM-LTFs particularly useful for handling adaptive
attacks in the multi-challenge setting, in which adversaries are able to obtain
multiple challenge targets (e.g., challenge ciphertext). For instance, evasiveness
forces all adaptive queries to be made with injective tags, enabling the use of
inversion trapdoors in security reductions. Indistinguishability allows security
reductions to use multiple lossy tags for creating multiple challenges embedding
the same computational problem, without tipping off adversaries.
Constructions of ABM-LTFs. Not very surprisingly, with such powerful
properties, ABM-LTFs have more complicated constructions than their simpler
counterparts, say plain LTFs. So far, essentially two types of constructions
of ABM-LTFs exist. The first type is based on Paillier/Damgard-Jurik en-
cryption [Pai99,DJ01] together with some non-standard assumptions, and first
instantiated by Hofheinz [Hof12] and latter improved by Fujisaki [Fuj14]. The
second type, based on subgroup indistinguishable problems over composite-order
bilinear groups, was designed by Hofheinz [Hof12]. Though relying on different
assumptions and algebraic structures, the two types of construction share the
same flavour at a conceptual level. Both of them can be seen as “encrypted
signature” schemes in which a lossy tag corresponds to a valid (but disguised)
signature. Existential unforgeability of signatures guarantees evasiveness. Tag
indistinguishability is provided by the semantic security of Paillier/Damgard-Jurik
encryption, or the hardness of subgroup decisional problems. Roughly, the two
types of construction utilise either additive homomorphism of Paillier/Damgard-
Jurik ciphertexts, or group exponentiation operations, to conduct lossy trapdoor
function evaluations. Not withstanding the elegance of existing constructions, one
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of their disadvantages is their need for non-standard assumptions. Thus, a first
motivation for our present work is to solve the open problem of finding different
constructions of ABM-LTFs under reasonable assumptions, a question first posed
by Hofheinz [Hof12].
All-but-Many Trapdoor Function. Without regard to lossiness, a notion
similar to ABM-LTF is that of all-but-many trapdoor function (ABM-TF). An
ABM-TF’s inversion trapdoor can be concealed among super-polynomially many
tags. Candidate constructions from assumptions related to factoring or discrete
logarithm have already been proposed [Hof12,Fuj14]. On the other hand, while
there exist many constructions and applications of lattice-based all-but-one
trapdoor functions [ABB10,MP12,AS15] and all-but-N trapdoor functions for
N bounded a priori [ASP12], lattice-based ABM-TFs appear to be harder to
construct. Therefore, a second motivation for this work is to solve the open
problem stated by Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [ASP12], namely to construct
lattice-based ABM-TFs (and, a fortiori, ABM-LTFs).
5.1.2 Our Contributions
Our main contribution in this chapter is the first IND-SO-CCA2 secure public-key
encryption scheme based on standard LWE and SIS assumptions, which are
conjectured quantumly hard, with tight security reduction in the multi-challenge
setting. To achieve this result, we also propose the first lattice-based ABM-LTF,
solving the following open problems:
• Constructing ABM-LTFs under reasonable assumptions,
• Constructing ABM-TF from lattice assumptions,
which were first asked by Hofheinz [Hof12] and Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [ASP12]
respectively.
In addition, our lattice-based IND-SO-CCA2-secure public-key encryption
scheme provides an alternative solution for the problem, firstly answered by
Gay et al. [GHKW16], of constructing IND-CCA2-secure pairing-free public-
key encryption schemes with tight reduction (in the sense that the reduction is
independent of number of decryption queries and number of challenge ciphertext)
in the standard model without random oracles.
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5.2 Lossy Trapdoor Functions
In this section, we recall the LWE-based LTF proposed by Bellare et al. [BKPW11],
which is a basis of our ABM-LTF construction.
5.2.1 Definition of LTFs
A lossy trapdoor function with domain D consists of three PPT algorithms:
– LTF.Gen(1λ,mode) The key generation algorithm takes as input a security
parameter, a mode parameter mode = {inj, loss}. It behaves as follows:
• LTF.Gen(1λ, inj) outputs (LTF.ek, LTF.ik) where LTF.ek is a injective
evaluation key and LTF.ik is an inversion trapdoor.
• LTF.Gen(1λ, loss) outputs (LTF.ek,⊥) where LTF.ek is a lossy evalua-
tion key.
– LTF.Eval(LTF.ek, X) The evaluation function evaluates the function on input
X ∈ D with evaluation key LTF.ek.
– LTF.Inv(LTF.ik, Y ) The inversion function takes as input a value Y , and uses
the inversion key LTF.ik to find a value X.
A lossy trapdoor function has the following properties.
Invertibility. For all (LTF.ek, LTF.ik) ← LTF.Gen(1λ, inj), X ∈ D, and Y =
LTF.Eval(LTF.ek, X), we have
Pr [X = LTF.Inv(LTF.ik, Y )] = 1− negl(λ)
Lossiness. We say the lossy trapdoor function is `-lossy if for all LTF.ek =
LTF.Gen(1λ, loss), the image set of LTF.Eval(LTF.ek,D) has size at most
|D|/2`.
Indistinguishability. The first outputs of LTF.Gen(1λ, inj) and LTF.Gen(1λ, loss)
are computationally indistinguishable. That is, for all PPT adversary A,
the advantage AdvindLTF,A(λ),
Pr
[A(1λ, LTF.ek) = 1]− Pr [A(1λ, LTF.ek′) = 1]
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is negligible in λ, where (LTF.ek, LTF.ik)← LTF.Gen(1λ, inj) and (LTF.ek′,⊥)←
LTF.Gen(1λ, loss).
5.2.2 Construction by Bellare et al.
Let c > 1 and b ≥ 2 be two constants to be determined later. Let n1 ≥ 2 be
an integer, q ≥ 2 be a large enough prime. Let n = cn1, w = logb q, m¯ be any
integer such that m¯ > n logb q + ω(log n), and m = m¯+ 2nw = Θ(n logb q). Let
β and γ be integers such that 1 < γ < β < q. Define Iβ = {0, 1, · · · , β − 1} and
Iγ = {0, 1, · · · , γ − 1}. Let G ∈ Zn×nwq be the gadget matrix.
– LTF.Gen(1λ, loss) The lossy function generation algorithm dose the following:
1. Sample A′ ∈ Zn1×m¯q , E1 ← χm¯×(n−n1), E2 ← χn1×(n−n1).
2. Compute A =
[
A′
Et1 + E
t
2A
′
]
∈ Zn×m¯q .
3. Sample R← Dm¯×2nwZ,b·ω(√logn).
4. set LTF.ek = F = [A|AR] ∈ Zn×(m¯+2nw)q .
– LTF.Gen(1λ, inj) The injective trapdoor function generation algorithm does the
following:
1. Sample A′ ∈ Zn1×m¯q , E1 ← Dm¯×(n−n1)Z,χ , E2 ← Dn1×(n−n1)Z,χ .
2. Compute A =
[
A′
Et1 + E
t
2A
′
]
∈ Zn×m¯q .
3. Sample R← Dm¯×2nwZ,b·ω(√logn) and H ∈ Zn×2nq with rank n.
4. Set LTF.ek = F = [A|AR + HG] ∈ Zn×(m¯+2nw)q and LTF.ik = (R,H,G)
– LTF.Eval(LTF.ek,x) For x ∈ Im+n1β × In−n1γ , the algorithm computes
y = gF(x) = x
t
[
Im
F
]
mod q
– LTF.Inv(LTF.ik,y) Given y, run Invert(R,F,y) outputs x.
The invertibility of the function gF(·) where F is generated by LTF.Gen(1λ, inj)
relies on the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.2.1 ([MP12, Theorem 3]). Let A ∈ Zn×m¯q , R ∈ Zm¯×2nw as in the
Lemma 5.2.2. Let H ∈ Zn×2nwq with rank n. Let Gˆ ∈ Z2n×2nwq be the gadget
matrix. For yt = gF(x) = x
t
[
Im
F
]
mod q where F = [A|AR + HGˆ], there is a
PPT algorithm Invert(R,F,y) that outputs x with all but negligible probability
if ‖x‖ ≤ q/Θ(b · s1(R)).
The lossiness of the lossy function gF(·) where F is generated by LTF.Gen(1λ, loss)
relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2.2. Let A′ ∈ Zn1×m¯q , E1 ← Dm¯×(n−n1)Z,χ , E2 ← Dn1×(n−n1)Z,χ , and A =[
A′
Et1 + E
t
2A
′
]
∈ Zn×m¯q . Let matrices F = [A|AR] ∈ Zn×mq where R ∈ Zm¯×2nw
has low norm. Under the conditions γc−1 ≥ 2Ω(m/n1) and β ≥ γ ·s1(E˜) where E˜t =
[Et1|Et1 ·R|Et2], the function gF(x) = xt
[
Im
F
]
mod q, where x ∈ Im+n1β × In−n1γ , is
an Ω(m)-lossy function.
Proof. By the construction of F ∈ Zn×mq we have
gF(x) = x
t
[
Im
F
]
mod q
= (xt

Im¯
I2nw
In1
Et1 E
t
1 ·R Et2
)
Im¯ I2nw
A′ A′R
 mod q
= (xt
[
Im+n1
E˜t
]
)
[
Im
F′
]
mod q
If suffices to bound the number of possible values of xt
[
Im+n1
E˜t
]
∈ Zn1+m. By the
triangle inequality, we have∥∥∥∥∥xt
[
Im+n1
E˜t
]∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ β√n1 +m+ s1(E˜) · γ√n− n1 ≤ √n1 +m · (β + γ · s1(E˜))
Define Nd(r) to be the number of integer points in a d-dimensional Euclidean ball
of radius r. For r ≥ √d, from the volume of the ball and Stirling’s approximation,
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we have Nd(r) = O(r/
√
d)d. Thus the number of possible values of xt
[
Im+n1
E˜t
]
is
O(β + γ · s1(E˜))n1+m.
By the structure of F, γ ≥ 2Ω(m/n1) and γ ≤ q1/C , the base-2 logarithm of the
domain of the function gF(·) is
log |D| = (n1 +m) log β + n1 log γc−1 ≥ (n1 +m) log β + Ω(m)
Since β ≥ γ · s1(E˜), the base-2 logarithm of the range of the function gF(·) is at
most
log |R| = (n1 +m) logO(β + γ · s1(E˜)) = (n1 +m) log β +O(m)
By choosing a sufficiently large constant in the Ω notation, we have log |D| −
log |R| = Ω(m). We conclude that the function gF(·) is Ω(m)-lossy.
The indistinguishability between lossy and injective evaluation keys is based
on the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2.3. For any PPT adversary A against the indistinguishability of
the above LTF with advantage AdvindLTF,A(λ), there exist an adversary B against
LWEn1,q,χ such that
AdvindLTF,A(λ) ≤ 2(n− n1) · AdvLWEn1,q,χNF,B + negl(λ)
for some negligible probability negl(λ).
Proof. We prove the lemma by hybrid games. Let Si be the event that the
adversary outputs 1 in Game i. In Game 1, A is given a lossy evaluation key
LTF.ek′ where (LTF.ek′,⊥)← LTF.Gen(1λ, loss). So we have
Pr[S1] = Pr
[A(1λ, LTF.ek′) = 1]
In Game 2, we sample Ai uniformly from Zn×m¯q for LTF.ek instead of con-
structing it in a LWE form. That is, LTF.ek = F = [A|AR]. By the LWE
assumption we have
Pr[S2]− Pr[S1] ≤ AdvLWEn1,n−n1,q,χNF,B1 (λ)
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for some suitable LWEn1,n−n1,q,χ adversary B1.
In Game 3, we add a matrix HGˆ for rank-n matrix H ∈ Zn×2nq and the gadget
matrix Gˆ to each output evaluation key, i.e., LTF.ek becomes F = [A|AR + HGˆ].
By Lemma 2.3.4, F in both games have distributions that are statistically close
to the uniform distribution over Zn×(m¯+nw)q . Therefore, we have
Pr[S3]− Pr[S2] ≤ negl(λ)
for some negligible function negl(λ).
In the final game Game 4, we construct A as in the real scheme instead of
sampling it random from Zn×m¯q . Again, for some suitable LWEn1,n−n1,q,χ adversary
B1, we have
Pr[S4]− Pr[S3] ≤ AdvLWEn1,n−n1,q,χNF,B1 (λ)
It can be seen that in Game 4, all evaluation keys are in injective form. Thus
Pr[S4] = Pr
[A(1λ, LTF.ek) = 1]
Where (LTF.ek, LTF.ik)← LTF.Gen(1λ, inj).
Put above together and apply Lemma 2.4.2, we obtain
AdvindLTF,A(λ) ≤ 2(n− n1) · AdvLWEn1,q,χBF,B (λ) + negl(λ)
as required.
Setting β and γ. The restriction on the selection of β and γ is based on
the above two lemmas. Firstly, for lossiness we need γc−1 ≥ 2Ω(m/n1) where
m = Θ(n logb q) = Θ(cn1 logb q), and γ · s1(E˜) ≤ β as required by the Lemma
5.2.2. So we have γ ≥ qΘ(1/ log b)·c/(c−1). For any desired constant C > 1, we can
set up constants c > 1 and b ≥ 2 so that γ ≤ q1/C . Secondly, for correct inversion,
we need ‖x‖ ≤ β√m < q/Θ(b · s1(R)). This gives
q1/C · s1(E˜) ≤ β ≤ q/Θ(b · s1(R) ·
√
m) (5.1)
Therefore, it is sufficient to take q large enough such that
q1−1/C ≥ Ω
(
s1(R) · s1(E˜) ·
√
m
)
(5.2)
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5.3 All-but-Many Lossy Trapdoor Functions
5.3.1 Definitions
Our definition mainly follows the original definition given by Hofheinz [Hof12].
We maintain the tagging mechanism he uses [Hof12]. That is a tag tag is divided
into two parts: an primary part tp and an auxiliary part ta. The auxiliary part
is usually just a random string. For any ta, with a lossy tag generation trapdoor,
one can compute tp making tag = (tp, ta) a lossy tag. As in [Hof12], the auxiliary
tag part helps us to embed auxiliary information (e.g., a verification key of a
one-time signature). One difference between our definition (and construction)
and Hofheinz’s definition is that we divide a tag set into three disjoint subsets: a
lossy tag set, an injective tag set and an invalid tag set. This is because in our
lattice-based construction, some tags simultaneously make the function injective
and disable the inversion trapdoor. We will need to make sure that those tags
are hard to find without knowing a trapdoor.
Now we are giving the definition of ABM-LTFs. An all-but-many lossy
trapdoor function with domain D consists of four PPT algorithms:
– ABM.Gen(1λ) The key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter
and outputs an evaluation key ABM.ek, an inversion key ABM.ik, and a lossy
tag generation key ABM.tk. ABM.ek defines the tag space T = tp × {0, 1}∗
that contains the disjoint sets of injective tags Tinj, lossy tags Tloss, and
invalid tags Tinvalid. All tags have form tag = (tp, ta) where tp is the primary
part of the tag, and ta ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the auxiliary part of the tag.
– ABM.Eval(ABM.ek, tag, X) The evaluation algorithm takes as input ABM.ek, a
tag tag ∈ T , and X ∈ D. It produces Y = ABM.Eval(ABM.ek, tag, X).
– ABM.Inv(ABM.ik, tag, Y ) The inversion algorithm takes as input ABM.ik, a
injective tag tag ∈ Tinj and Y , where Y = ABM.Eval(ABM.ek, tag, X). It
outputs X = ABM.Inv(ABM.ik, tag, Y ).
– ABM.LTag(ABM.tk) The lossy tag generation algorithm uses ABM.tk to generate
a lossy tag tag ∈ Tloss.
We require the following properties of ABM-LTFs.
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Invertibility. Invertiability includes two properties. Firstly, it requires that
randomly sampled tags be injective tags with all but negligible probability. That
is
Pr
[
tag ∈ Tinj | tag $←− T
]
≥ 1− negl(λ)
for some negligible function negl(λ) in the security parameter λ. Secondly, it
requires that, for all injective tags, the ABM-LTF be invertiable with all but
negligible probability. That is for all (ABM.ek,ABM.ik,ABM.tk)← ABM.Gen(1λ),
tag ∈ Tinj, X ∈ D, and Y = ABM.Eval(ABM.ek, tag, X) we have
Pr [ABM.Inv(ABM.ik, tag, Y ) = X] = 1− negl(λ)
Lossiness. An ABM-LTF is `-lossy if for all (ABM.ek,ABM.ik,ABM.tk) ←
ABM.Gen(1λ), and all tag ∈ Tloss, the image set ABM.Eval(ABM.ek, tag,D) has
size at most |D|/2`.
Indistinguishability. Even multiple lossy tags are indistinguishable from ran-
dom tags. That is, for (ABM.ek,ABM.ik,ABM.tk)← ABM.Gen(1λ) and all PPT
adversary A’, the advantage
AdvindABM-LTF,A(λ)
= Pr
[AABM.LTag(ABM.tk,·)(1λ,ABM.ek) = 1]− Pr [AOT (·)(1λ,ABM.ek) = 1]
is negligible in λ, where ABM.LTag(ABM.tk, ·) returns a lossy tag, and OT (·)
returns a random tag from T .
Evasiveness. Lossy and invalid tags are computationally hard to find, even
given multiple lossy tags. That is for all PPT adversary A,
AdvevaABM-LTF,A(λ) = Pr
[AABM.LTag(ABM.tk,·)(1λ,ABM.ek) = tag ∈ Tloss ∪ Tinvalid]
is negligible in λ, where (ABM.ek,ABM.ik,ABM.tk)← ABM.Gen(1λ).
5.3.2 Chameleon Hash Function from Lattices
We recall the construction of lattice-based chameleon hash function by Cash et
al. [CHKP12].
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– CH.Gen(1λ) The key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter
λ. It sets 1 ≤ n = n(λ), 2 ≤ q = q(λ), m = O(n log q), and does the
following:
1. Run TrapGen to get A ∈ Zn×mq , trapdoor TA ∈ Zm×m where ‖TA‖GS ≤
O(
√
n log q).
2. Set a parameter σ ≥ ‖TB‖GS · ω(
√
log n). Define a randomness space
RCH = {r ∈ Zm : ‖r‖ ≤ σ
√
m} and message space XCH = {0, 1}`.
3. Randomly pick a matrix B from Zn×`q .
4. Set Hk = (A,B), trapdoor Td = TA.
– CH.Eval(Hk,m; r) The hash evaluation algorithm takes as input the hash key
Hk and a message m ∈ {0, 1}`. It samples a random Gaussian vector
r ∼ DmZ,σ and outputs the hash value
h = Ar + Bm mod q
– CH.Equiv(Td, (m, r),m′) Given a trapdoor Td, a message-randomness pair
(m, r), and a new message m′ 6= m, the equivocation algorithm runs the
algorithm SampleD to sample r′ ∼ DmZ,σ such that
Ar′ = Ar + B(m−m′) (mod q)
So we have Ar′ + Bm′ = Ar + Bm (mod q).
Theorem 5.3.1 ([CHKP12, Lemma 4.1]). Assuming SISn,q,
√
`+4σ2·m is hard, the
above chameleon hash function is collision-resistant and has equivocation indis-
tinguishability.
5.3.3 Lattice-Based Construction
Let n1 ≥ 2, m¯ ≥ 2 be integers, q ≥ 2 be a prime. Let n = cn1, w = logb q
for constants c and b. Set m = m¯ + 2nw. Let β and γ be integers such that
1 < γ < β < q. Define Iβ = {0, 1, · · · , β − 1} and Iγ = {0, 1, · · · , γ − 1}. Let
CH = (CH.Gen,CH.Eval,CH.Equiv) be a secure chameleon hash function with
equivocation indistinguishability.
– ABM.Gen(1λ, d) The key generation algorithm does the following steps:
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1. Choose a random A′ $←− Zn1×m¯q , E2 $←− χn1×(n−n1), E1 ← χm¯×(n−n1) and
set
A =
[
A′
Et2A
′ + Et1
]
∈ Zn×m¯q
2. Select a weak PRF wPRF : {0, 1}t × {0, 1}` → {0, 1} and express it as
a fan-in-2 Boolean circuit CwPRF with depth d. Select K
$←− {0, 1}h×t.
We denote by ki ∈ {0, 1}t the i-th row of K, which serves as an
independent key for wPRF. We denote by ki,j ∈ {0, 1} the j-th bit of
ki.
3. Sample a set of low-norm matrices {Rki,j}i∈[h],j∈[t] where Rki,j ←
Dm¯×2nwZ,b·ω(√logn). Compute Cki,j = ARki,j + ki,jG ∈ Zn×2nwq . 3
4. Sample a set of low-norm matrices {RHi}i∈[h] where RHi ←Dm¯×2nwZ,b·ω(√logn).
Sample a set of random rank-n matrices {Hi}i∈[h] for Hi $←− Zn×2nq .
Compute CˆHi = ARHi + HiGˆ ∈ Zn×2nwq for i ∈ [h]. 4
5. Select Z
$←− Zn×2nq , RZ ← Dm¯×2nwZ,b·ω(√logn), and compute CˆZ = ARZ +
ZGˆ ∈ Zn×2nwq .
6. Run CH.Gen(1λ) to generate a chameleon hash key Hk and a trapdoor
Td. Assume this chameleon hash function has message space XCH =
{0, 1}∗, randomness space RCH and output space {0, 1}`.
7. Set the public evaluation key
ABM.ek =
(
wPRF, CwPRF,A, {Cki,j}i∈[h],j∈[t],
{CˆHi}i∈[h], CˆZ,Hk
)
the private inversion key
ABM.ik =
(
wPRF, CwPRF,K, {Rki,j}i∈[h],j∈[t],
{Hi}i∈[h], {RHi}i∈[h],Z,RZ
)
and the lossy tag generation key
ABM.tk =
(
wPRF, CwPRF,K, {Hi}i∈[h],Z,Td
)
– Tags. A tag has form tag = (tp, ta). The primary tag part tp = (D, R) ∈
3G is the gadget matrix with dimensions n-by-2nw.
4Gˆ is the gadget matrix with dimensions 2n-by-2nw.
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Z2n×2nq × RCH and the auxiliary tag part ta ∈ {0, 1}∗. Set the tag space
as T = Z2n×2nq × RCH. With a tag tag = ((D, R), ta), we can compute
µ = CH.Eval(Hk, (D, ta);R) ∈ {0, 1}`. Let
H = ZD−
h∑
i=1
wPRF(ki, µ) ·Hi (mod q)
We define
tag ∈

Tinj if H has rank n;
Tloss if H = 0 n;
Tinvalid if H has rank 6= 0 or n.
– ABM.Eval(ABM.ek, tag,x) On input x ∈ Im+n1β × In−n1γ , the evaluation does
1. Let tag = (tp, ta) = ((D, R), ta) ∈ T , compute µ = CH.Eval ((D, ta);R) ∈
{0, 1}`.
2. Let µi ∈ {0, 1} be the i-th bit of µ. Run the evaluation algorithm to
compute
C˜i = EvalBV(CwPRF,Cki,1 , . . . ,Cki,t , µ1G, . . . , µ`G)
= AR˜i + wPRF(ki, µ)G (mod q)
for some low-norm R˜i ∈ Zm¯×2nw and i ∈ [h] as per Lemma 2.5.4.
Notice that R˜i is not known by the evaluator who does not know
ABM.ik.
3. Compute
C¯ = CˆZ · Gˆ−1(D · Gˆ) mod q
= A
(
RZ · Gˆ−1(D · Gˆ)
)
+ (ZD) · Gˆ
= AR¯ + (ZD) · Gˆ
for low-norm R¯ = RZ · Gˆ−1(D · Gˆ) ∈ Zm¯×2nw. Notice R¯ is not known
by the evaluation who does not know ABM.ik.
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4. Finally, set
F = [A|C¯]− [0|
∑h
i=1
C˜i ·G−1(CˆHi)] mod q
= [A|AR + (ZD−
∑h
i=1
(wPRF(ki, µ) ·Hi)Gˆ] mod q
= [A|AR + HGˆ] mod q
for low-norm Zm¯×2nw-matrix R where
R =
h∑
i=1
(
R˜i ·G−1(CˆHi) + wPRF(ki, µ) ·RHi
)
+ RZ · Gˆ−1(DGˆ)
and
H = ZD−
∑h
i=1
(wPRF(ki, µ) ·Hi (mod q).
Again, notice that R and H are not known by the evaluator since it
does not known ABM.ik.
5. Compute the output of the function as
yt = gF(x) mod q = x
t
[
Im¯+2nw
F
]
mod q
– ABM.Inv(ABM.ik, tag,y) The inversion algorithm takes as input an inversion
key ABM.ik, an injective tag tag ∈ Tinj and an image y. It does the following:
1. Let tag = ((D, R), ta), compute µ = CH.Eval(Hk, (D, ta);R) ∈ {0, 1}`.
2. Compute F = [A|AR + HGˆ] as the algorithm ABM.Eval where
R =
h∑
i=1
(
R˜i ·G−1(CˆHi) + wPRF(ki, µ) ·RHi
)
+ RZ · Gˆ−1(DGˆ)
and
H = ZD−
∑h
i=1
(wPRF(ki, µ) ·Hi (mod q)
are known to the inversion algorithm as it takes ABM.ik as input.
Notice that here H has rank n as tag ∈ Tinj.
3. Call the algorithm Invert(F,R,H,y) to get x.
– ABM.LTag(ABM.tk) The lossy tag generation algorithm takes as input the loss
tag generation key ABM.tk. It does the following:
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1. Randomly select a tag tag′ = ((D′, R′), t′a) ∈ T and compute µ =
CH.Eval(Hk, (D′, t′a);R
′). 5
2. Solve for D ∈ Z2n×2nq such that ZD =
∑h
i=1(wPRF(ki, µ) ·Hi (mod q).
3. Randomly select ta ∈ {0, 1}∗.
4. ComputeR = CH.Equiv(Td, ((D′, t′a), R
′),D) and output tag = ((D, R), ta).
It is easy to check that the algorithm indeed outputs a lossy tag.
5.3.4 Parameter Selections
An instance of parameter selection that meets all requirements of correctness and
security properties is given here.
Firstly, to enable the statistical arguments for security, i.e., Lemma 2.2.2 and
Lemma 2.3.4, we set m¯ > n logb q + ω(log n), and for any  > 0, set h = poly(λ)
such that log(q/(2)) ≤ h.
We set the constant C = 6 for the inequality (5.1) (we can pick proper
constants c and constant logarithm base b accordingly). Instantiating wPRF with
an LWE/LWR-based weak PRF (which is essentially the decryption circuit of
many LWE-based FHE schemes, e.g., [BV11,GSW13,BV14]), we can establish the
fan-in-2 NAND Boolean circuit (in NC1) of wPRF with input length `+ t = poly(λ)
and depth η log(`+ t) = η log(poly(λ)) for some constant η > 0.
We bound the norm of R ∈ Zm¯×2nw in F. By the specification of ABM.Eval,
R =
h∑
i=1
(
R˜i ·G−1(CˆHi) + wPRF(ki, µ) ·RHi
)
+ RZ · Gˆ−1(DGˆ)
We have
s1
(
h∑
i=1
R˜i ·G−1(CˆHi)
)
≤
h∑
i=1
(
s1(R˜i) · s1(G−1(CˆHi))
)
≤ O (h · 4d · m¯3/2) · ((b− 1) · 2nw) (Lemma 2.5.4, 2.5.2)
≤ O (h · 4d · m¯3/2 · m¯) ((b− 1) · 2nw ≤ O(m¯))
≤ O (h · 4d · m¯2)
5As we will show, a randomly sampled tag will be an injective tag with overwhelming
probability. Here, type of tag′ does not matter.
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and
s1
(
h∑
i=1
wPRF(ki, µ) ·RHi
)
≤
h∑
i=1
s1(RHi)
≤ h · b · ω(
√
log n · 2√m¯)
≤ O˜(h · m¯1/2)
and
s1
(
RZ · Gˆ−1(DGˆ)
)
≤ s1 (RZ) · s1
(
Gˆ−1(DGˆ)
)
≤ b · ω(
√
log n) ·O(√m¯) · (b− 1) · 2nw
≤ O˜(m¯3/2)
So we have
s1(R) ≤ s1
(
h∑
i=1
R˜i ·G−1(CˆHi)
)
+ s1
(
RZ · Gˆ−1(DGˆ)
)
+ s1
(
RZ · Gˆ−1(DGˆ)
)
≤ O (h · 4d · m¯2)+ O˜(h · m¯1/2) + O˜(m¯3/2)
= O˜(h · 4d · n21) (5.3)
We choose the LWE noise distribution χ = DZ,2√n1 for accommodating the
average-case to worst-case hardness reduction from classical lattice problems, e.g.
SIVP, given by Regev [Reg05]. We bound s1(E˜) where E˜
t = [Et1|Et1 ·R|Et2] as in
Lemma 5.2.2.
s1(E˜) ≤ s1(E)(1 + s1(R))
≤ 2√n1 · (
√
m¯+ n1 +
√
n− n1)(1 + s1(R)) (by the Lemma 2.3.3)
= O˜(h · 4d · n31)
Thus we can set up q through equation (5.2) as
q = Θ
(
(s1(R) · s1(E˜) ·
√
m)C/(C−1)
)
= Θ˜
(
(h · 4d · n31 · h · 4d · n21 · n0.51 )C/(C−1)
)
= Θ˜
(
(h2 · 24d · n5.51 )(C/C−1)
)
= Θ˜
(
h2.4 · 24.8d · n6.61
)
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Hence we can set up γ = O˜
(
(h2 · 24d · n5.51 )1/(C−1)
)
= O˜
(
h0.4 · 20.8d · n1.11
) ≤
q1/C . For β = we have γ · s1(E˜) = O˜ (h1.4 · 22.8 · n4.11 ) and q/Θ(b · s1(R)
√
m) =
O˜
(
h2.4 · 22.8d · n4.11
)
. So we set
γ · s1(E˜) ≤ β = Θ˜
(
h2.4 · 24.8d · n6.61
) ≤ q/Θ(b · s1(R)√m)
satisfying the equation 5.1.
Summing up, an example of parameter selection is given in the following
d = O (log(poly(λ)) ; q = Θ˜
(
h2.4 · 24.8d · n6.61
)
; m = Θ(n1 logb q)
β = Θ˜
(
h2.4 · 24.8d · n6.61
)
; γ = O˜
(
h0.4 · 20.8d · n1.11
)
5.3.5 Security Proofs
We prove all the required properties of our construction of ABM-LTF.
Lossiness. The lossiness property of our ABM-LTF is based on the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.3.2. By our parameter selection in Section 5.3, for any lossy tag
tag ∈ Tloss, the function gF(·) is Ω(m)-lossy, where F = [A|AR] ∈ Zn×mq was
computed via ABM.Eval with tag and m = Θ(n logb q).
Proof. Firstly, the spectral norm of R is bounded through inequality (5.3). This
along with our parameter selection satisfy Lemma 5.2.2. So by Lemma 5.2.2,
gF(·) is Ω(m)-lossy.
Invertibility. We prove the following theorem that states the invertibility of
our ABM-LTF.
Theorem 5.3.3. For our construction, randomly sampled tags are injective tags
with all but negligible probability. In addition, for any tag tag ∈ Tinj, the function
gF(·) is invertible with overwhelming probability, where F = [A|AR + HGˆ] ∈
Zn×mq was computed via ABM.Eval with tag.
Proof. Let tag = ((D, R), tp) be a randomly sampled tag, that is, D
$←− Z2n×2nq ,
R
$←− RCH and tp $←− {0, 1}∗. We have ZD mod q is uniformly random over Zn×2nq ,
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thus, so is H. By Lemma 2.1.1, H has rank n except with negligible probability.
So tag = ((D, R), tp) is an injective tag.
By the parameter selection, we have β ≤ q/Θ(b · s1(R)
√
m) satisfying (5.1).
Meanwhile, we have ‖x‖ ≤ β · √m resulting in ‖x‖ ≤ q/Θ(b · s1(R)). Since H
has rank n, applying Lemma 5.2.1 concludes the proof.
Indistinguishability. We need to prove that for all PPT adversary A, the
advantage AdvindABM-LTF,A(λ) is negligible in the security parameter λ. Intuitively,
the goal is to prove that multiple lossy tags do not reveal any information about the
PRF key K = {ki}i∈[h], matrices {Hi}i∈[h], and matrix Z. Therefore an adversary
is not able to tell, for a (freshly generated) challenge tag tag = ((D, R), ta) and
µ = CH.Eval(Hk, (D, ta);R), whether the following equation holds:
ZD =
∑h
i=1
wPRF(ki, µ) ·Hi (mod q)
Note that no inversion oracle is available to the adversary. Such an inversion
oracle would give adversary a trivial way to distinguish between lossy and injective
tags.
Theorem 5.3.4 (Indistinguishability). For any PPT adversary A against in-
distinguishablity of above ABM-LTF with advantage AdvindABM,A(λ), there exist
adversaries A1, A2 and a negligibly small error negl(λ) such that
AdvindABM,A(λ) ≤ (n− n1) · AdvLWEn1,q,χNF,A1 (λ) + h · AdvwPRFA2 (λ) + negl(λ) + 
Proof. We proceed with the proof by game sequence. Let Si be the event that
A outputs 1 in the game Game i. In Game 1, all algorithms work exactly the
same as in the real scheme. A interacts with ABM.LTag(ABM.tk, ·) which outputs
lossy tags. So we have
Pr
[AABM.LTag(ABM.tk,·)(1λ,ABM.ek) = 1] = Pr[S1]
In Game 2, we change the way of generating the public matrix A. Particularly,
we sample A from Zn×m¯q uniformly at random. Because A does not affect the
output distribution of ABM.LTag, by the LWE assumption and Lemma 2.4.2, this
change is not noticeable to A. So we have
Pr[S1]− Pr[S2] ≤ (n− n1) · AdvLWEn1,q,χNF,A1 (λ)
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for a suitable LWEn1,q,χ adversary A1.
In Game 3, the public evaluation key of the ABM-LTF is set as
ABM.ek =
(
wPRF, CwPRF,A, {Cki,j}i∈[h],j∈[t], {CˆHi}i∈[h], CˆZ,Hk
)
where {Cki,j}i∈[h],j∈[t], {CˆHi}i∈[h], and CˆZ in ABM.ek are chosen uniformly at
random from Zn×2nwq . Accordingly, the low-norm secret matrices in ABM.ik, which
include {Rki,j}i∈[h],j∈[t], {RHi}i∈[h], RZ, are not needed. It is easy to see that this
change does not affect the (output distribution of) algorithm ABM.LTag. Moreover,
by Lemma 2.3.4, ABM.ek in Game 3 has a distribution that is statistically close
to the distribution of ABM.ek in Game 2. So for some negligibly small statistical
error negl(λ), we have
Pr[S2]− Pr[S3] ≤ negl(λ)
In Game 4, we change the algorithm ABM.LTag. Specifically, in step 2 of
ABM.LTag, we compute ri(µ) with random functions ri : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} instead
of wPRF(ki, µ) for i ∈ [h]. (Note this does not affect ABM.Eval which still uses
CwPRF.) As µ is uniformly random, for a PPT adversary A2 against wPRF, a
straightforward hybrid argument shows that
Pr[S3]− Pr[S4] ≤ h · AdvwPRFA2 (λ)
In Game 5, we randomly sample a matrix S
$←− Zn×2nq instead of computing
S =
∑h
i=1 ri(µ) ·Hi mod q as in Game 4. By Corollary 2.2.1 with h ≥ log(q/(2)),
the statistical distance between the distribution of the variable
∑h
i=1 ri(µ) ·
Hi mod q and the uniform distribution over Zn×2nq is less than . So we have
Pr[S4]− Pr[S5] ≤ 
On the other hand, in Game 5, H = ZD + S mod q with random S, thus
D, R are independent of H. Therefore all tags generated in Game 5 are random
tags. So we have
Pr[S5] = Pr
[AOT (·)(1λ,ABM.ek) = 1]
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Summing up, we have
AdvindABM-LTF,A(λ) = Pr
[AABM.LTag(ABM.tk,·)(1λ,ABM.ek) = 1]− Pr [AOT (·)(1λ,ABM.ek) = 1]
≤ (n− n1) · AdvLWEn1,q,χNF,A1 (λ) + h · AdvwPRFA2 (λ) + negl(λ) + 
(5.4)
which completes that proof.
Evasiveness. The first part of proof largely follows the proof of indistinguisha-
bility.
Theorem 5.3.5. For any PPT adversaryA against evasiveness of the above ABM-
LTF with advantage AdvevaABM-LTF,A(λ), there exist A1, A2, A3 and a negligible
function negl(λ) such that
AdvevaABM-LTF,A(λ) ≤ (n−n1)·AdvLWEn1,q,χNF,A1 (λ)+h·AdvwPRFA2 (λ)+AdvcollCH,A3(λ)++negl(λ)
Proof. We prove the theorem by game sequence. Let Si be the event that
A outputs a lossy or invalid tag in Game i. We further consider two types
of tag output by A (recall A tries to output lossy or invalid tags to vio-
late the evasiveness.). We say a tag tag = ((D∗, R∗), t∗a) is Type I if µ
∗,
which is equal to CH.Eval(Hk, (D∗, t∗a);R
∗) is also the chameleon hash output
of some previously generated tag. A tag tag = ((D∗, R∗), t∗a) is Type II if
µ∗ = CH.EvalCH.Eval(Hk, (D∗, t∗a);R
∗) is not the chameleon hash value of any
previously generated tag.
In Game 1, A interacts with ABM.LTag(ABM.tk, ·) which works exactly as
in the real system description. By hypothesis, we have
AdvevaABM-LTF,A(λ) = Pr[S1]
In Game 2, we sample the public matrix A randomly from Zn×m¯q . This does
not affect the output distribution of ABM.LTag. By the LWE assumption and
Lemma 2.4.2, the change is not noticeable to A. So we have
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ (n− n1) · AdvLWEn1,q,χNF,A1 (λ)
for a suitable LWE adversary A1.
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In Game 3, the public evaluation ABM-LTFs is set as
ABM.ek =
(
wPRF, CwPRF,A, {Cki,j}i∈[h],j∈[t], {CˆHi}i∈[h], CˆZ,Hk
)
where {Cki,j}i∈[h],j∈[t], {CˆHi}i∈[h], and CˆZ in ABM.ek are chosen uniformly at
random from Zn×2nwq . Accordingly, the low-norm secret matrices in ABM.ik,
including {Rki,j}i∈[h],j∈[t], {RHi}i∈[h], RZ, are not needed. It is easy to see that this
change does not affect the (output distribution of) algorithm ABM.LTag. Moreover,
by Lemma 2.3.4, ABM.ek in Game 3 has a distribution that is statistically close to
the distribution of ABM.ek in Game 2. So for some negligibly small statistically
error negl1(λ), we have
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ negl1(λ)
In Game 4, we change the algorithm ABM.LTag. Specifically, in step 2 of
ABM.LTag, we compute ri(µ) with random functions ri : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} instead
of wPRF(ki, µ) for i ∈ [h]. (Note this does not affect ABM.Eval which still uses
CwPRF.) As µ is uniformly random, for a PPT adversary A2 against wPRF, a
straightforward hybrid argument across h instances of wPRF shows that
|Pr[S4]− Pr[S3]| ≤ h · AdvwPRFA2 (λ)
In Game 5, we randomly sample a matrix S
$←− Zn×2nq instead of computing
S =
∑h
i=1 ri(µ) · Hi mod q as in Game 4. By Corollary 2.2.1, the statistical
distance between the distribution of the variable
∑h
i=1 ri(µ) ·Hi mod q and the
uniform distribution over Zn×2nq is less than . So we have
|Pr[S4]− Pr[S5]| ≤ 
Per the security proof of indistinguishability, all tags generated in Game 5 are
random tags.
In Game 6, the trapdoor Td of the chameleon hash function is not available.
All tags are generated randomly, i.e, ((D, R), ta)
$←− (Z2n×2nq × RCH) × {0, 1}∗.
And we have that µ = CH.Eval(Hk, (D, ta);R) is uniformly random. So we simply
have that
Pr[S6] = Pr[S5]
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Moreover, for any fresh µ that was not derived from previous queries, S ∈ Zn×2nq
will be chosen randomly and independently. In other words, there does not exist
an adversary that outputs Type I tag with more than some negligible probability
negl2(λ). So we have
Pr[S6,I] ≤ negl2(λ)
Finally, any output tag with Type II breaches the collision-resistance of the
chameleon hash function, therefore
Pr[S6,II] ≤ AdvcollCH,A3(λ)
for some adversary A3. Since Pr[S6] ≤ Pr[S6,I] + Pr[S6,II], we obtain
Pr[S6] ≤ negl2(λ) + AdvcollCH,A3(λ)
Summing up, letting negl(λ) = negl1(λ) + negl2(λ) be some negligible term,
we have
AdvevaABM-LTF,A(λ) ≤ (n− n1) · AdvLWEn1,q,χNF,A1 (λ) + negl1(λ) + h · AdvwPRFA2 (λ) (5.5)
+ + negl2(λ) + Adv
coll
CH,A3(λ)
≤ (n− n1) · AdvLWEn1,q,χNF,A1 (λ) + h · AdvwPRFA2 (λ) + + negl(λ)
+ AdvcollCH,A3(λ)
This concludes the proof.
5.4 Tightly Secure IND-SO-CCA2 PKE Scheme
By using the ideas of previous constructions of selctive-opening secure PKE
scheme [Hof12,HLOV11] and the IND-CCA2 secure PKE construction by Zhang
[Zha07], we obtain the first IND-SO-CCA2 secure encryption scheme from the
LWE assumption by employing our ABM-LTF.
5.4.1 Definition of IND-SO-CCA2 Security
A public key encryption scheme Π consists of three PPT algorithms: KeyGen,
Encrypt and Decrypt. KeyGen(1λ) takes as input a security parameter λ, outputs
a public key pk and a private key sk. It also defines the message space Mλ,
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randomness space Rλ and the ciphertext space Cλ. Encrypt(pk,m; r) encrypts a
message m ∈ Mλ using pk and randomness r $←− Rλ, and outputs a ciphertext
ct. Decrypt(sk, ct) recovers the message m from ct using sk. The correctness of a
PKE scheme requires that for all m ∈Mλ, and (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ),
Pr [m = Decrypt (sk,Encrypt(pk,m; r))] ≥ 1− negl(λ)
over the choice of valid randomness r ∈ Rλ and random bits used by Decrypt (if
any), for some negligible function negl(λ).
Selective Opening Security. Assume that a vector of messages coming from
some joint distribution dist are encrypted as a vector of ciphertexts and sent out.
Selective opening attack allows an adversary to choose to open a subset of these
ciphertexts, obtaining the corresponding messages and the random coins used
during encryption. The opened messages, random coins and dist might help the
adversary to learn information about messages under the unopened ciphertexts.
To prevent this attack (thus to provide selective opening security), we need the
unopened ciphertexts remain secure. There are a few different ways of formalising
selective opening securityt. As defined by Hofheinz [Hof12], we are considering the
definition of indistinguishability-based security against chosen-ciphertext attacks
(refer to IND-SO-CCA2) with respect to joint message distributions that are
efficiently resamplable.
Definition 5.4.1 (Efficiently re-samplable). Let N = N(λ) > 0, Mλ be the
message space and let dist be a joint distribution over MNλ . We say that dist is
efficiently re-samplable if there is a PPT algorithm ReSamp such that for any
I ⊂ [N ] and any partial vector (m′(i))i∈I ∈ M|I|, ReSamp samples from the
distribution dist, conditioned on m(i) = m′(i) for all i ∈ I.
IND-SO-CCA2 security essentially requires that no efficient adversary can
distinguish the unopened messages from fresh messages from the same joint
distribution conditioned on opened messages.
Definition 5.4.2 (IND-SO-CCA2 Security). Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt)
be a PKE scheme. We say Π is IND-SO-CCA2 secure iff for every polynomial
N = N(λ), and every PPT adversary A, we have
Advind-so-ccaΠ,A (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expind-so-cca-bΠ,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
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is negligible and the experiment Expind-so-cca-bΠ,A (λ) is defined in 5.1.
Experiment Expind-so-cca-bΠ,A (λ)
1. b
$←− {0, 1}
2. (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
3. (dist,ReSamp)← ADecrypt(sk,·)(pk)
4. m0 = (m
(i))i∈[N ] ← dist
5. r = (r(i))i∈[N ] ← (Mλ)N
6. c =
(
ct(i)
)
i∈[N ] =
(
Encrypt(pk,m(i); r(i))
)
i∈[N ]
7. I ← ADecrypt(sk,·)(pk, c)
8. m1 = ReSamp(dist,mI)
9. b′ ← ADecrypt(sk,·) (mb, {m(i), r(i)}i∈I)
10. Return 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise
Figure 5.1: Security experiment of IND-SO-CCA2 security
The adversary A is required to provide the algorithm ReSamp as in figure 5.1,
and never submit a challenge ciphertext ct(i) to the decryption oracle Decrypt(sk, ·).
5.4.2 Construction
Let λ be the security parameter and κ = ω(log λ). Let ABM-LTF = (ABM.Gen,
ABM.Eval, ABM.Inv) be an l-lossy ABM-LTF with domain D = Im+n1β × In−n1γ as
constructed before. Assume X = In1β ×In−n1γ . Let LTF = (LTF.Gen, LTF.Eval, LTF.Inv)
be an l′-lossy LTF with domain D. Without loss of generality, we assume l ≥ l′.
Let UH be a family of universal hash functions from D × Imβ → {0, 1}τ with
τ ≤ (l + l′ − log |X| − 2λ) − 2 log(1/) for some negligible  = negl(λ) 6. Let
B = Θ(b · s1(R)) as in Lemma 5.2.1. The message space is {0, 1}τ . The PKE
scheme Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is as follows.
– KeyGen(1λ) The key generation algorithm does:
1. Run (ABM.ek,ABM.ik,ABM.tk)← ABM.Gen(1λ).
6We can satisfy this condition with large enough l, l′ from the LTF and our ABM-LTF
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2. Run (LTF.ek, LTF.ik)← LTF.Gen(1λ, inj).
3. Set the public key pk = (LTF.ek,ABM.ek) and private key sk =
(LTF.ik,ABM.ik).
– Encrypt(pk,m; r) To encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}τ , the encryption algorithm does:
1. Randomly select e1, e2
$←− Imβ , x $←− In1β × In−n1γ ; Set xt1 = [et1|xt],
xt2 = [e
t
2|xt] ∈ D.
2. Randomly select a universal hash function UH
$←− UH.
3. Compute y1 = LTF.Eval(LTF.ek,x1) and ρ = UH(x, e1, e2)⊕m.
4. Set tag = (tp, ta) for randomly sampled tp = (D, R) and ta =
(UH, ρ,x2), then compute µ = CH.Eval(Hk, (D, ta,y1);R).
5. Use µ as the input of the step 2 of the algorithm ABM.Eval, and
compute the output of ABM-LTF: y2 = ABM.Eval(ABM.ek, tag,x2).
6. Set the ciphertext ct = (y1,y2, tp,UH, ρ, µ).
Note the randomness of this encryption r = tag where all elements in tag is
public except x2.
– Decrypt(sk, ct) The decryption algorithm does:
1. Parse the ciphertext as ct = (y1,y2, tp,UH, ρ, µ).
2. Run LTF.Inv(LTF.ik,y1) to get x
t
1 = [e
t
1|xt]; Reject if ‖e1‖ > B.
3. Let F be the matrix derived at the step 2 of ABM.Inv. Compute
et2 = y
t
2 − xtF; Reject if ‖e2‖ > B; Otherwise, go to the next step.
4. Compute µ′ = CH.Eval(Hk, (D, ta,y1);R) where ta = (UH, ρ,x2); if
µ′ 6= µ, reject; Otherwise go to the next step.
5. Output the message m = ρ⊕ UH(x, e1, e2).
The correctness of decryption algorithm can be easily checked.
5.4.3 Security Proof
The next theorem shows the IND-SO-CCA2 security of the PKE scheme.
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Theorem 5.4.1. Suppose that the ABM-LTF specified above is secure. Then
the PKE scheme Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is IND-SO-CCA2 secure. In
particular, for every PPT adversary A against Π with advantage Advind-so-ccaΠ,A (λ),
there exist PPT adversaries B1, B2 and B3 such that Advind-so-ccaΠ,A (λ)
≤ AdvcollCH,B1(λ) + AdvindABM-LTF,B2(λ) + AdvevaABM-LTF,B3(λ) + AdvindLTF,B4(λ) + negl(λ)
for the same chameleon hash function CH used in the construction of ABM-LTF,
where AdvcollCH,B1(λ) is the advantage of B1 against CH that is used in ABM-LTF.
Proof. Recall that in the IND-SO-CCA2 security game (Figure 5.1), we have N
challenge ciphertexts. We denote the i-th challenge ciphertext by
ct(i) = (y
(i)
1 ,y
(i)
2 , t
(i)
p ,UH
(i), ρ(i), µ(i))
where t
(i)
p = (D(i), R(i)). Also recall ta = (UH, ρ,x2) for some x
t
2 = [e
t
2|xt]. And
x2 is applied to ABM.Eval with tag = (tp, ta, µ) to generate y2.
We prove the theorem through a game sequence. Let Si be the event that A
outputs 1 in Game i. The first game Game 1 is the same as the experiment
Expind-so-cca-bΠ,A (λ). By definition we have
|Pr[S1]− 1/2| = Advind-so-ccaΠ,A (λ).
In Game 2, we reject all the decryption queries in which the component µ
has already appeared in one of the challenge ciphertexts. If the adversary makes
a decryption query on ciphertext ct = (y1,y2, tp = (D, R),UH, ρ, µ
(i)) where
µ(i) is from some ct(i) = (y1
(i),y
(i)
2 , t
(i)
p ,UH
(i), ρ(i), µ(i)), we argue that such query
will be rejected unless the collision resistant property of the chameleon hash
function is broken. Notice that R is the randomness, y2 is the only ciphertext
component that is not a part of the message of the chameleon hash function. Let
ta = (UH, ρ,x2) and t
(i)
a = (UH
(i), ρ(i),x
(i)
2 ). There are three cases:
• If y2 = y(i)2 and(tp,UH, ρ) = (t(i)p ,UH(i), ρ(i)): In this case the query is
exactly the i-th challenge ciphertext which is invalid.
• If y2 = y(i)2 and (tp,UH, ρ) 6= (t(i)p ,UH(i), ρ(i)): The decryption algorithm
will output x2 in the step 3 (when the ciphertext passes through all test up
to step 3) and recompute µ′. We would have µ 6= µ, thus reject the query, un-
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less CH.Eval(Hk, (D, ta,y1);R) = CH.Eval(Hk, (D
(i), t
(i)
a ,y
(i)
1 );R
(i)), which
corresponds to a collision to the chameleon hash function.
• If y2 6= y(i)2 : Recall that µ = µ(i) is derived from an injective tag. If
the query makes decryption algorithm output x2 at step 3, we must have
x2 6= x(i)2 and, thus, ta 6= t(i)a . Then the query will be reject at step 4 unless
an explicit collision, ((D, ta,y1);R) and (D
(i), t
(i)
a ,y
(i)
1 );R
(i)), happens to
the chameleon hash function.
So Game 2 and Game 1 behave the same unless the collision resistancy of the
chameleon hashing is broken. Thus we have
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ AdvcollCH,B1(λ)
for some suitable adversary B1.
In Game 3, lossy tags are generated using ABM.LTag for all challenge cipher-
texts, i.e., ct(i) for i ∈ [N ]. By tag indistinguishability of the ABM-LTF,
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ AdvindABM-LTF,B2(λ)
for some suitable adversary B2.
Recall that in Game 3, we use LTF to invert y1 to get x
t
1 = [e
t
1|xt] and use y2
and x to recover e2 and, thus x2. In Game 4, we directly use ABM.ik to invert y2
and get x2. By our correctness of LTF and ABM-LTF, this gives the same result
unless µ in the decryption query is from one of the challenge ciphertexts, or the
queries are made with lossy or invalid tags. The first case is already excluded in
Game 3. The latter case would not happen under the evasiveness of ABM-LTF.
So we have
|Pr[S4]− Pr[S3]| ≤ AdvevaABM-LTF,B3(λ)
for some suitable adversary B3.
In Game 5, we generate a lossy evaluation key for LTF. We have
|Pr[S5]− Pr[S4]| ≤ AdvindLTF,B4(λ)
for some suitable adversary B4.
In Game 6, we produce the ρ component in each challenge ciphertext by
randomly sampling a string r
$←− {0, 1}τ and setting ρ = r⊕m. As in Game 5,
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the y2 components are computed from ABM-LTF with lossy tags on x2 ∈ D for
all challenge ciphertexts. Let |E2| and |X| be the number of possible values of
e2 and x respectively
7. Recall xt1 = [e
t
1|xt] and xt2 = [et2|xt]. By the parameter
selection and Lemma 2.2.1, we have
H˜∞(x1,x2|y1,y2, µ) = H˜∞(x, e1, e2|y1,y2, µ)
≥ H∞(x, e1, e2)− (log |D| − l)− (log |D| − l′)− 2λ
≥ log |D|+ log |E2| − (log |D| − l)− (log |X|+ log |E2| − l′)− 2λ
= l + l′ − log |X| − 2λ
Consequently, by the hypothesis that τ ≤ (l − 2λ)− 2 log(1/) and Lemma 2.2.2,
∆ ((y1,y2, µ,UH,UH(x)), (y1,y2, µ,UH,Uτ )) ≤  = negl(λ)
where Uτ stands for the uniform distribution over {0, 1}τ . So we get
|Pr[S6]− Pr[S5]| ≤ negl(λ)
In Game 6, as all challenge messages are masked by an one-time pad, A gets
no information about them. The original message vector m0 and the conditionally
resampled message vector m1 come from the same distribution, thus
Pr[S6] = 1/2
Summing up, we obtain that Advind-so-ccaΠ,A (λ)
≤ AdvcollCH,B1(λ) + AdvindABM-LTF,B2(λ) + AdvevaABM-LTF,B3(λ) + AdvindLTF,B4(λ) + negl(λ)
which completes the proof.
5.4.4 Tightly Secure IND-CCA2 PKE
One of the most standard security definitions for public-key encryption is cipher-
text indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2).
As IND-SO-CCA2 security is strictly stronger than IND-CCA2 security, the above
proposed public-key encryption scheme also has ND-CCA2 security. Traditional
7Recall that x, e1, e2 are chosen uniformly at random from certain intervals.
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IND-CCA2 security is defined in the single-challenge setting. In such security
model, the adversary, who has access to a decryption oracle, is given a single
challenge ciphertext which is the encryption of one of two messages chosen by
the adversary. The adversary needs to tell which message was encrypted without
sending the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle. Here, we consider a
stronger definition called IND-CCA2 in the multi-challenge setting in which the
adversary gets to attack multiple challenge ciphertexts at once. More specifically,
the definition of IND-CCA2 security in the multi-challenge setting is defined as
follows.
Definition 5.4.3 (Multi-challenge IND-CCA2 security). A PKE scheme Π =
(KeyGen,Encrypt, dec) is IND-CCA2 secure in the multi-ciphertext setting if for
every PPT adversary A, we have A’s advantage
Advind−cc2aΠ,A (λ) =
∣∣Pr [Expind-cca2Π,A (λ) = 1]− 1/2∣∣
is negligible in λ where the experiment Expind-cca2Π,A (λ) is defined in figure 5.2.
Experiment Expind-cca2Π,A (λ)
1. L ← ∅
2. (pk, sk)← KeyGen((1λ)
3. b
$←− {0, 1}
4. b′ ← AOenc(·,·),Odec(·)(pk)
5. return 1 if b′ = b, 0 other-
wise
Oenc(m0,m1)
1. If |m0| 6= |m1| return ⊥
2. r
$←− RΠ
3. ct← Encrypt(pk,mb; r)
4. L ← L ∪ ct
Odec(ct)
1. If ct ∈ L, return ⊥
2. return Decrypt(sk, ct)
Figure 5.2: Security experiment of IND-CCA2 security
It turns out that single-challenge IND-CCA2 security implies the multi-
challenge IND-CCA2 security. However, a generic proof needs to invoke a hybrid
argument across the number of challenge ciphertexts which incurs a security
degradation linear in the number of challenge ciphertexts (or number of encryp-
tion queries) the adversary requires (see, e.g., [BBM00]). One of the advantages of
our public-key encryption scheme is that it also has tight security reduction in the
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above model (That is the security loss of our public-key encryption scheme in the
reduction is independent of the number of decryption queries and the number of en-
cryption queries (the number of challenge ciphertexts). So far, only a few schemes
achieve tight security in the above model, e.g., [HJ12,LJYP14,AHY15,GHKW16]
and they are all based on quantumly broken assumptions.
Our scheme serves as the first public-key encryption scheme that has tight
security reduction in the multi-challenge IND-CCA2 security model and relies
on conjectured quantum-resistant assumptions. In fact, one can easy to modify
the security proofs of the IND-SO-CCA2 security to obtain a tight security proof
with respect to Definition 5.4.3. Particularly the reduction is able to answer
all the decryption queries, and construct all challenge ciphertext with lossy
tags simultaneously, making the challenge ciphertexts information-theoretically
unrecoverable.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we study the problem of building quantum-safe public-key encryp-
tion systems with strong security properties beyond traditional security notions.
Particularly, we design the first lattice-based public-key encryption that has cipher-
text indistinguishability (with respect to efficiently resampleable joint message
distributions) against selective-opening attacks and adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attacks. Such a scheme offers tight security deduction meaning that the security
reduction is independent of the number of decryption queries and the number
of challenge ciphertext. It also leads to an alternative solution to the problem,
firstly answered by Gay et al. [GHKW16] through decision linear (or DDH)
assumptions, of constructing tightly secure IND-CCA2 public-key encryption in
the multi-challenge setting without pairings with standard assumptions.
The core of our construction is an all-but-many lossy trapdoor function
(ABM-LTF) which does not rely on any quantum-unsafe assumptions. It is also
the first lattice-based all-but-many trapdoor function which enables trapdoors
to be punctured by unbounded many points (tags). This result solves two
open questions. The first one is how to build an ABM-LTFs under reasonable
assumptions, posed by Hofheinz [Hof12]. Previous constructions were either
based either on decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption plus some
non-standard technical assumptions, or on the subgroup decisional assumption
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over composite order bilinear groups. Our construction is based on the widely
accepted LWE assumption. The second open question proposed by Alperin-Sheriff
and Peikert [ASP12] is how to construct a lattice-based all-but-many trapdoor
function.
One future work is to address the issue of constructing post-quantum public-
key encryption schemes that achieve simulation-based security against selective
opening attacks thus removing the restriction on message distributions. Another
direction is to apply the lattice-based ABM-LTF in other settings, e.g., key-
message dependent security and key-leakage resilience.
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We now summarize the thesis and discuss some future research directions.
6.1 Summary
In this research, we mainly focussed on building public-key encryption systems
from computational assumptions on lattices including Learning-With-Errors
(LWE) and Short-Integer-Solution (SIS), which are widely accepted as two of
the most promising computational assumptions for the future of post-quantum
cryptography. We sought to strengthen three different aspects of post-quantum
public-key encryption. The first one is to increase the expressivity of public-key
encryption and offering accelerated decryption. The second one is to provide
tight security reduction for identity-based public-key encryption, a special ex-
pressive public-key encryption, from the LWE assumption. The third one is
to design a public-key encryption system that enjoys security against a strong
and realistic attack called selective opening attack. It needs to mention that
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all our presented constructions are provably secure in the standard model of
cryptographic computation. We summarize our research results as follows.
6.1.1 Expressive Public-Key Encryption
In Chapter 3, we presented an expressive attribute-based public-key encryption
scheme and proved its security in the well-studied selective security model under
the LWE assumption. In such scheme, each private key can be expressed as a
deterministic multi-stack push-down automaton, hence a deterministic Turing
machine, which has a priori bounded runtime and input length. A message is
encrypted with an input string for automata. Decryption succeeds if the string is
accepted by the automaton.
Ours scheme is the first expressive public-key encryption scheme that supports
computational machines with additional memory spaces. Besides this, our scheme
has a nice property which we call input-specific decryption complexity which
means the decryption runtime varies for different input strings in ciphertexts.
More specifically, once an automaton reaches an accepting state, decryption may
proceed regardless of the unread substring. This is in contrast with most existing
expressive public-key encryption systems in which the decryption procedures have
to check the whole input strings that describe the ciphertexts, and, thus, the
decryption runtime always reaches its worst case.
6.1.2 Tightly Secure IBE and Signature
In Chapter 4, we showed how to obtain tight security reductions for identity-based
encryption (IBE), a special expressive public-key encryption, from lattices in
the full security model. The unique feature of our scheme is that it is the first
lattice-based IBE scheme with tight security reduction in the sense that the
security loss of reductions is independent of adversaries’ queries. All known
lattice-based IBE schemes suffer from loose security reductions.
Our main contribution is a novel combination of techniques that independently
appeared in different contexts. They include Katz and Wang’s proof technique
for obtaining tightly secure full-domain hash signature schemes in the random
oracle model [KW03], Agrawal et al.’s efficient selectively secure lattice IBE
scheme [ABB10], Boyen’s fully secure lattice signatures [Boy10], and Boneh et
al.’s fully key homomorphic encryption on lattices [BGG+14].
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Our IBE scheme also extends to provide the first fully secure lattice-based
signature scheme that enjoys short signatures and a tight security reduction
simultaneously. It answers the open question proposed by Blazy et al. [BKKP15]
regarding building tight and short signature schemes from lattice assumptions.
6.1.3 Selective Opening Secure Public-Key Encryption
In Chapter 5, we proposed the first lattice-based public-key encryption scheme
that has ciphertext indistinguishablility against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks
and selective opening attacks with respect to joint message distributions that are
conditionally resampleable (IND-SO-CCA2). Our scheme has a tight security
reduction which is idependent of the number of decryption queries and the
number of challenge ciphertexts. Our scheme also results in the first tightly
secure IND-CCA2 lattice-based public-key encryption scheme whose security
loss is independent of the number of decryption queries and the number of
challenge ciphertexts. Such a public-key encryption scheme therefore provides
another solution to the problem of building tightly secure pairing-free public-key
encryption schemes with tight reduction in the multi-challenge setting. Previously,
the problem was solved by Gay et al. [GHKW16] based on the DDH assumption
which is quantumly broken.
The selective-opening secure public-key encryption scheme is built on top of a
newly designed lattice-based all-but-many lossy trapdoor function (ABM-LTF).
Our ABM-LTF can be solely based on the standard LWE problem. This is the
first ABM-LTF based on a standard assumptionn providing a solution for the open
problem proposed by Hofheinz [Hof12] which asks for constructions of ABM-LTFs
under reasonable and standard assumptions. Regardless of the lossiness property,
our ABM-LTF also solves the open problem proposed by Alperin-Sheriff and
Peikert [ASP12] which asks for finding a construction of lattice-based all-but-many
trapdoor functions.
6.2 Future Directions
Our research suggests a number of interesting questions for future study.
1. From Chapter 3, two challenging problems arise. The first one is to devise a
technique whereby the benefits of input-specific complexity can be achieved
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for different classes of ABE, such as ABE for circuits. Another even more
challenging problem is to design ABE schemes to handle a-priori unbounded
automata or machines. Achieving the second goal would allow us to obtain
the highest theoretical expressivity for expressive public-key encryption.
2. In Chapter 4, three important directions remain open. The first one is to
leverage the tight security reduction of our identity-based encryption (IBE)
scheme to the multi-instance and multi-challenge setting. Such a result
would further strengthen the appeal of our current techniques. The second
direction is to improve the efficiency of our IBE scheme. In particular,
shortening the size of public parameters would be really valuable. The last
one is to improve the reductions for other lattice-based expressive public-key
encryption schemes in terms of tightness in the full security model.
3. For Chapter 5, the main question is to find a way to build lattice-based
public-key encryption systems which satisfy simulation-based security for
selective opening attacks. While various lossy trapdoor functions are often
helpful for achieving indistinguishability-based security, it seems that new
ideas are needed. Another direction would be to apply our ABM-LTF to
other settings for building more useful and powerful lattice-based crypto-
graphic primitives. Since the non-lattice-based ABM-LTFs have already
been applied to key-dependent message security and leakage resilience secu-
rity, we are optimistic to see further applications of our ABM-LTF in the
post-quantum setting.
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